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Abstract 
China’s economic development has performed spectacularly during the period of China’s 
economic transition as a result of radical economic reform in the all markets. The country 
has also gone through extensive fiscal reforms in the last three decades. However, a number 
of problems have been associated with such rapid economic growth. One of these has been 
raising inequality. In both Keynesian and neoclassical endogenous growth theories, public 
spending can play an important role for economic growth and inequality. The majority of 
previous studies have focused on the relationship between public spending and economic 
growth, or between public spending and inequality separately. There is no doubt that public 
spending has an effect on both economic growth and equity simultaneously. In this respect, 
this thesis attempts to address the problems that have emerged during the period of China’s 
fiscal reforms, and seeks to examine the effects of public spending on economic growth and 
equality in the same model. 
 
This thesis investigates the dynamic relationships among these three variables in China. For 
aggregate national data, vector error correction model (VECM) has been used. Analysis at 
the provincial level is based on the panel vector auto-regression (PVAR) model. These 
methods help to solve the endogeneity in estimations. The national level analysis indicates 
that total public spending shows a long term Granger causality with GDP per capita, which 
supports the positive growth effect of public spending in the Keynesian and endogenous 
growth model. Social public spending has a negative effect on real output per capita in both 
the short term and long term, but it also has a negative impact on income inequality. 
Moreover, we find that a higher level of real GDP per capita will increase the level of 
inequality, but a higher level of inequality has a negative effect on real GDP per capita in the 
long term. Furthermore, total provincial public spending and provincial social spending have 
either a non-significant effect on economic growth. On the other hand, the SOEs’ investment 
has a significant, positive growth effect at both the national and provincial level. As for the 
redistributive role of the public spending, the provincial total public spending and social 
spending have played an important role on income distribution. Furthermore, the Gini 
coefficient has a positive effect on the per capita growth rate at the provincial level, but the 
economic growth has no significant impact on the Gini coefficient.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation will explore the effects of different types of public spending on 
economic growth and inequality. Firstly, I will provide a brief introduction to the Chinese 
fiscal system and Chinese social-economic development since the economic transition of 
1978. Following this, the aims and objectives of this thesis will be explained, and the four 
researchable hypotheses will be introduced. Finally, the structure of the thesis will be 
outlined. 
 
Since late 1978, China has been conducting market-oriented economic reforms. Public 
spending has played a vital role in China’s reforms. A cornerstone of the transition from a 
centrally-planned to a market economy is the establishment of a well-defined system of 
property rights (Brandt et al., 2004). Although Chinese economic development has 
resulted in significant achievements, rising inequality has led to considerable criticism. In 
recent years, the slowdown of global economic growth and the uncertainty of the 
international economic environment have both challenged China’s economic growth. 
Simultaneously, income inequality has reached a historically high level, and public 
spending on social welfare has been regarded as largely insufficient. 
 
The worldwide attention paid to the economic activities of China’s government has led to 
a significant refinement of Chinese macroeconomic policy. Public expenditure, as one of 
the instruments implemented by the government, affects resource allocation, income 
distribution and economic stability. Therefore, there is little doubt that public spending 
has an effect on both economic growth and equality simultaneously. Much of the current 
global debate about the approach to spur growth and reduce inequality in developing 
countries has centred on the need to promote a large increase in public investment (United 
Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2005). There have also been 
numerous empirical studies into the impact of public expenditure on economic growth. 
However, the distributional role of public spending has not been sufficiently explored; 
this is despite the fact that inequality is a major concern within economic development. In 
this respect, the first contribution of this thesis is to explore the role of public spending as 
regards economic growth and income inequality in China.  
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As there are conflicting views on the role of public spending in the process of 
development, this dissertation is designed to explore the perspectives of different 
economic schools. The Keynesian view assumes that there is unemployment in the 
economy, and that the correlation between interest rates and investment is low. Hence, an 
increase in public spending has little effect on interest rates, but it will raise income and 
output in the short run. In addition, government spending may stimulate further private 
spending due to its positive expectations, which therefore crowds in rather than crowds-
out private consumption and investment (Aschauer, 1989; Kusteoeli, 2005). New 
Keynesian models adopt the rational expectation assumption for individuals and some 
form of price rigidity, such as staggered prices or wages. Both new and traditional 
Keynesian models assert that public spending has a positive effect on output and 
employment, and that the only difference is how generous the multipliers are. In general, 
the multipliers are smaller in the newer Keynesian models compared with more 
traditional models.  
 
In the earlier neoclassical model, public spending was considered to be exogenous in 
Solow (1956) and Swan’s (1956) growth model. Hence, fiscal policy had little effect on 
the rate of capital accumulation or growth rate in the long run. Arrow and Kurz (1970) 
firstly considered public capital as another input apart from labour and private capital in 
the function of aggregate production. They also suggested that the determination of the 
optimal input allocation between public and private capital was key to keeping the whole 
economy on an optimal growth path. With the emergence and popularity of neoclassical 
growth theories, the endogenous growth model provided a foundation for the role of 
productive government spending in fostering long term economic growth. Government 
provision of public capital to the production process contributes to growth directly by 
adding to the existing capital stock, as well as indirectly by raising the marginal 
productivity of privately supplied factors of production (Barro, 1990).  
 
Public capital was integrated into neoclassical growth theory in the 1970s. The most 
influential contribution was made by Aschauer in 1989, who estimated the elasticity of 
output with respect to public spending in the function of aggregate production. Aschauer 
(1989) found that the elasticity of output to public spending is 0.39 in the United States, 
which indicates that increasing public spending by 1 dollar will increase output by 0.39 
dollars. He suggested that public spending was highly productive, and argued that the 
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decline in government productive spending in the US had largely contributed to the 
observed decline in productivity in the 1970s and 1980s. His paper suggested that the 
share of public investment within total public spending should be raised to improve the 
output potential of an economy. Empirically, there seems to be a consensus that public 
investment in basic physical infrastructure such as roads, transportation and 
communication is growth-enhancing. Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) claim that 
spending in these areas has shown a positive impact on aggregate production because of a 
strong growth-promoting effect through their impact on the productivity of private inputs 
as well as the rate of return on capital, particularly when stocks of infrastructure assets are 
relatively low. More recently, a broader concept of human capital indicates that public 
spending on education also has significant growth effects in the long run. 
 
The empirical results of the effects of public spending are quite diverse, and are often 
contested in different studies. Hemming et al., (2002) undertook an extensive survey of 
the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the impact of public spending on 
promoting economic output. They conclude that, in general, public spending has 
Keynesian effects on economic activity, but that the multiplying effect is small. 
Furthermore, they acknowledge the possibility of non-Keynesian effects. There have been 
ongoing concerns that substantial and growing public spending has negative effects on 
economic growth. The usual policy prescription calls for a scaling back of government 
activity and budgets, constraining public spending from growing faster than output. In 
countries facing fiscal imbalances and high debt burdens, this has prompted wide-ranging 
fiscal consolidation programmes to reduce government spending (Christie, 2011). The 
continued growth of public spending has become a heavy burden on some countries, and 
has precipitated fears that progressively larger governments may well compromise 
economic growth. Following the global economic crisis in 2008, some heavily-indebted 
governments have sought to reduce the size of the public sector, and attempted to become 
engaged in activities that can be carried out more efficiently by the private sector. In order 
to escape from a variety of economic problems, such as ineffective governance and 
inadequate economic growth, increasing numbers of countries have adopted strategies to 
cut public spending. Simultaneously, these reductions in public spending may well 
significantly affect the welfare of these countries’ citizens.  
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The redistributive effects of public spending have not received as much attention in the 
theories of economic development. Since the governments of developed economies have 
increased the role of public spending through a host of programmes, such as public 
education, health care and pensions. The perception of market failure provides a rationale 
for government intervention, not only to correct purported resource misallocations by the 
market, but also to promote macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Lipford and 
Slice, 2007).  
 
Sylwester (2000) examined whether higher public spending can reduce income inequality 
or promote economic growth simultaneously. He found that countries with a higher 
proportion of public spending on education relative to their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) have relatively higher levels of income inequality. Thus, public spending on 
education has a positive relationship with inequality. Conversely, public spending on 
education helps the development of human capital, which in turn should promote 
economic growth according to endogenous growth theory. Therefore, Sylwester (2000) 
states that an increase in public spending has a short term cost of rising inequality and a 
long term beneficial effect on economic growth.  
 
Public expenditure policy plays an irreplaceable role in boosting national and regional 
coordinative economic growth, eliminating regional differences and achieving common 
prosperity. Theoretically, there exists an optimal level of government spending in each 
economy. Typically, a less developed country resides within its production possibility 
frontiers, so growth spurts are possible if the government can mobilize additional 
resources which the private sector has failed to provide. When the economy is on the 
production possibility frontier curve, allocative efficiency becomes important, and 
resources transferred from the private sector to the government may have a positive 
crowding-in effect or a negative crowding-out effect (Jamhour, 2012). In this respect, 
public spending has different effects according to the level of economic development. It 
can have a greater effect on output in developing countries, because their economies are 
usually in a sub-optimal position.  
 
Moreover, there is a huge difference in the effects of public spending between countries 
according to their initial conditions of economic development and the size and 
composition of their public spending impulse (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996). Due to 
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differences in the levels of economic development, the size and structure of public 
expenditure varies across countries, yet every country nevertheless desires more 
efficiency in their use of public resources. It is not clear how government expenditure 
affects longer term economic growth and inequality. Most previous studies have focused 
on the relationship between public spending and economic growth, or between public 
spending and inequality separately. In response to this major deficiency in the current 
literature on the empirical analysis of public spending, the second contribution of this 
thesis is to adopt both a national and provincial level analysis through Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) at the national level, and using the Panel Vector Auto-
Regression (PVAR) estimation at provincial level data. The newly developed Vector 
Auto-Regression (VAR) and PVAR methods can examine the dynamic relationships 
between public spending, growth and inequality in the endogenous growth model without 
causing an endogeneity bias. Moreover, the provincial PVAR estimation can examine the 
relationship between public spending, economic growth and inequality at the provincial 
level to address a more comprehensive study of China’s public spending.  
1.1 Why studying China? 
China1 has witnessed a rapid growth rate since the late 1970s, when the period of reforms 
and opening-up first began. The period between 1978 and 2008 witnessed an annual 
growth rate of 9.1 per cent in China’s real GDP, with per capita real GDP rising 8.3 per 
cent annually (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). Such accomplishments have 
failed to help to improve public equality and welfare, while this fast economic growth has 
brought about numerous problems. The huge gaps in income levels and living standard 
between rural and urban areas, coastal and inland regions, may affect further economic 
growth and social stability. Johansson and Zhang (2014) state that China is now facing 
new challenges such as high income inequality and limitations in the growth model that 
has been so successful since the beginning of the economic reforms. A continued reliance 
on the ‘growth-first strategy’ led to income distribution biased toward capita and against 
                                                 
1
 China has four types of formal provincial administration under the central government, which is made up 
of 33 provincial level governments. These include 22 provinces (excluding Taiwan); 5 geographic entities 
that China calls ‘autonomous regions’, which have large ethnic minority populations (Guangxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang); 4 municipalities that report directly to the central government (Beijing, 
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin); and 2 special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
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labour, economic structure biased toward investment and against consumption, and 
government spending biased toward infrastructure and against social welfare (Du et al., 
2014). This may result in an increase in social instability, and an inability to maintain 
growth due to an overreliance on investment and high inequality. This, in a worst-case 
scenario, could lead to a ‘middle-income trap’ in China. Hence, there is a fierce debate as 
to whether the Chinese government requires profound reforms to its fiscal system, 
especially in terms of increasing public spending on its public welfare system, in order to 
move the Chinese economy toward greater efficiency and equality. 
  
In the context of China’s fiscal decentralization and economic reforms, the problem of 
rising inequality has also been observed and studied by an increasing number of scholars. 
During the process of fiscal decentralization, local governments became financially self-
reliant, while simultaneously they were allocated greater expenditure duties, especially on 
social welfare. The disparity of fiscal capacity across local governments grew 
considerably during the reform period. Moreover, provincial governments have focused 
more on capital-intensive industries and on real estate development strategies in order to 
push for economic growth and fiscal revenue growth. It is argued that the problem of 
unmet fiscal needs at the local level is attributable to low fiscal capacity (Tsui and Wang, 
2004; Du et al., 2014); however, the unmet needs in social services such as education, 
health and social security are also attributable to a perverse governmental incentive 
structure. Provincial governments have over-emphasised short term GDP growth, rather 
than their people’s welfare. Meanwhile, the gap between the rich and the poor, as 
measured by the Gini-coefficient, has been widening rapidly, jumping from 0.30 in 1982 
to 0.48 in 2010, with the richest 10 per cent of families consuming 5.66 times as much as 
the poorest 10 per cent of families in 2010. With a Gini-coefficient approaching 0.5, 
China’s income inequality is in the same ballpark as that of relatively high-inequality 
Latin American countries, such as Mexico (0.51), Nicaragua (0.52) and Peru (0.48), 
although it is still lower than that of Brazil and Honduras (0.56-0.57) (World Bank, 2010). 
Hence, balancing the distribution of public spending is urgently required in further 
economic development in order to reduce income inequality.  
 
A high level of income and wealth inequality increases the demand for redistributive 
public spending (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). Thus, it is vital to gain a better 
understanding of the processes of rising inequality in China’s economic growth. An 
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important issue is whether governmental policies that target the specific spatial allocation 
of public investment have succeeded in reducing regional inequalities. It has been a 
common trend in China over the last few years that government spending has grown 
faster than GDP. However, a large proportion of public spending has gone on public 
investment in social infrastructure programmes and public administration. This has 
inevitably led to a relatively low proportion of public spending on essential social sectors 
such as the social security system, health, education and other basic public goods and 
services. 
 
The role of good government as a key determinant of the productivity of public 
investment affects the relationship between public spending and output, particularly in 
developing countries. The problem of unmet public needs at the local level may also be 
the outcome of poor local governance. Keefer and Knack (2007) argue that public 
investment is much higher in those countries with bad institutions, which is a reflection of 
the ‘rent-seeking’ incentives in areas where property rights are less secured. In China, the 
state dominates the economy and, thereby, the misuse and misallocation of public 
investment is common. This may imply a very low return on public investment, and 
perhaps a negative impact on economic growth. Lastly, even though there has been a 
growth in the non-state sector since the 1980s, most financial resources, land, other 
factors of production and economic policies are still controlled and allocated by 
provincial governments. Therefore, political institutions prevailing incentive mechanisms 
can have significant impact on the local economic performance (Zhang, 2002). 
 
There now appears to be a major focus by the Chinese government on greater income 
equality, less corruption and greater reform to enable the economy to get on a stable 
footing. In response to the global economic slowdown, China needs to focus on income 
disparity, not only on its economic growth rate. More importantly, this view was 
reinforced by the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao, 
who pursued a ‘harmonious society’ policy agenda that emphasized equitable growth. 
This thesis focuses on the sub-national level to examine the effects of public spending on 
growth and inequality since China’s second major fiscal reform in 1994. 
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1.2 Aims of research  
The existing research on public spending issues conducted over the last two decades has 
largely been based on the work of Barro (1990), who developed a theoretical model for 
public spending and economic output. Various authors address public spending and 
inequality via different economic theories. However, there is comparatively less literature 
on the dynamic relationship between public spending, economic growth and inequality. 
When research has touched upon this dynamic relationship, it has yielded several new, 
surprising findings. Hence, the investigation into the dynamic relationship between public 
spending, growth and inequality in the context of China can help improve our 
understanding of the performance of public spending during China’s periods of economic 
transition.  
 
Different theories indicate that public spending can either increase output by the 
multipliers effect in the short run, or enhance economic growth as an endogenous input in 
the long run. In the economics of the public sector, the positive role of public spending is 
based on the foundation of eliminating market failures and optimizing resource allocation. 
In the twentieth century, government expenditure has accounted for a rising proportion of 
national income worldwide. Numerous studies have compared the level of government 
spending across countries and attempted to explain its effects on economic development 
(Lindauer and Velenchik, 1992). Despite the fact that considerable institutional and 
geographic differences that exist among countries, it is nevertheless remarkable that the 
increase of public spending has been a general phenomenon (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 
2000). 
 
A number of recent studies have used various empirical estimations to investigate the 
complex links between public spending and economic growth. Moreover, economic 
development is not only about output growth, but also about income redistribution. If 
economic growth increases income inequality, economic development involves a trade-off 
between economic growth and equality, as demonstrated by Barro (2000), Forbes (2000), 
and Lundberg and Squire (2003). Hence, it is crucial to examine public spending, regional 
economic growth and inequality together to ascertain whether public spending can 
circumvent the trade-off between growth and equality. From the perspective of regional 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
9 
 
public spending, this thesis explores the spatial impact of public spending on regional 
output and income disparity. Therefore, the three core research questions are as follows: 
 
I. Does public spending have a positive growth effect in China?  
 
Since late 1978, China has been carrying out market-oriented economic reforms. Fiscal 
decentralization has been adopted in order to improve production efficiency through 
economic liberalization and the provision of local public goods and services (Tsui and 
Wang, 2004). Since the tax reforms of 2004, China’s public spending has increased from 
12 per cent of GDP to 23 per cent from 1995 to 2010, which constitutes an annual growth 
rate of around 20 per cent. Private investment also increased from nearly zero in 1979 to 
more than two thirds of total investment in 2012. According to the empirical literature, 
public spending has different effects on economic growth across countries, while it can 
promote economic growth through improving infrastructure and the crowding-in effect on 
private investment in China. Hence, this dissertation distinguishes different types of 
public spending and examines the growth effect of total public spending and social public 
spending at both the national and provincial levels.  
 
II. Does public spending have a negative effect on income inequality in China? 
 
The traditional view of public spending in economic development rests on both economic 
growth and income redistribution. Hence, if China adopts an optimal social spending2 
level in order to achieve an egalitarian income distribution, then this spending should 
have a negative effect on inequality. This research question is designed to test whether 
public spending has a positive redistribution effect on income inequality in China.  
 
III. Does economic growth have a negative effect on income inequality in China? 
 
Since the economic opening up, China’s government has placed economic growth at the 
forefront of economic development. China’s government believes that if the annual 
                                                 
2
 Social spending is named public spending on people’s well-being in Chinese government publications. It 
is the sum of public spending on education, health and social welfare, which has the most direct relationship 
with public welfare.  
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economic growth rate is greater than 8 per cent 3 ; the consequent social economic 
problems during economic liberalization will be limited. However, overall inequality has 
risen significantly over the last two decades. Hence, the third hypothesis investigates 
whether economic growth has a positive effect on income inequality.  
 
The objectives of this research are to analyze the growth and income redistribution effects 
of public spending in China. In response to the major deficiency in the current literature 
on the analysis of Chinese public spending, this dissertation is designed to apply the VAR 
model at the national level, and the newly-developed PAVR method to examine the effects 
of public spending on growth and equality at the provincial level. The national time series 
data is from 1979 to 2012, and the provincial panel dataset covers 24 Chinese regions for 
16 years from 1995-2010. 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
This research will focus on both national and provincial level data to examine the 
relationships between public spending, economic growth and inequality. The thesis 
consists of seven chapters. This chapter has provided an introduction to the research and 
its aims and objectives, outlining the gaps in the existing literature, and introducing the 
research questions.  
 
Overall, the literature review chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) include both the theoretical and 
empirical effects of public spending on growth and inequality. Chapter 2 reviews the 
effects of public spending on economic growth. It briefly discusses the role of the 
government in economic development, beginning with the views of Adam Smith, to those 
of Adolph Wager and subsequently John Maynard Keynes. This is where the importance 
of public finance in macroeconomics will be addressed. Then, Chapter 2 introduces the 
effects of public spending in Keynesian and neoclassical models, focusing on the debate 
regarding crowd-in or crowd-out effects, exogenous growth or endogenous growth 
models and its empirical effects on growth. Finally, it reviews the Chinese literature on 
public spending and economic growth.  
                                                 
3
 For example, the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) adopted by the Chinese government targeted an 
economic growth rate of 7.5 per cent.  
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Chapter 3 investigates the redistributive role of public spending and its effects on 
inequality. Fast economic growth accompanied by a dramatic increase in income 
inequality has been the key phenomenon in China’s path of economic development. 
According to Kuznets’s inverted U curve hypothesis, economic growth will increase the 
level of inequality when initial income levels are low, but when income achieves a certain 
level, the additional increase of income will reduce inequality. Hence, this chapter also 
investigates the relationship between economic growth and inequality in order to provide 
a better understanding of the role of public spending for economic growth. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the historical and contemporary contexts of China’s public spending 
system and economic development, and provides a brief overview of the relationship 
between public spending, economic growth and inequality. Firstly, this thesis focuses on 
the policy changes of the past three decades, and outlines the current challenges in the 
Chinese fiscal system. China has undertaken two significant fiscal reforms during the 
period of its economic opening up. These reforms have shifted China’s public finance 
from a centrally-planned system to that of a market economy. The transformation of 
Chinese public spending can be discussed through the lens of economic theory. However, 
in the past, China’s public spending strongly focused on infrastructure investment rather 
than people’s welfare programmes, such as education, health and social security. This 
chapter will focus on social welfare spending in China to investigate the importance of 
the redistributional role of public spending. Then, I will focus on the changes in income 
equality in China at both inter-regional and intra-regional levels during the period of the 
economic opening up. 
 
Chapter 5 features a presentation of the applied empirical econometric methods adopted 
in this thesis. It will use both econometric techniques of VECM and PVAR 4  in the 
empirical section. The majority of previous studies have focused on the relationship 
between public spending and economic growth or between public spending and inequality 
separately. In response to this major deficiency in the current literature on the empirical 
analysis of public spending, this dissertation applies VAR method to examine the effects 
of public spending on growth and inequality in China. The VECM and PVAR models are 
able to examine the relationship between public spending, GDP per capita and the Gini 
                                                 
4
 The VEC models test the national level data. PVAR models examine the provincial level data. 
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coefficient in the endogenous growth model without assuming exogeneity in the 
regression. Then, this chapter briefly introduces the data in regression analysis, such as 
Chinese public spending, GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient at both the national and 
provincial levels.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the relationships between public spending, economic growth and 
inequality at both the national and provincial levels. The findings demonstrate that 
national public spending has a negative effect on economic growth in the long run, but 
has a positive effect in the short run. Provincial public spending and its social spending 
have a negative effect on economic growth in the short run, yet a positive accumulative 
effect on economic growth in the long run. Total national spending has a negative 
relationship with inequality in both the short run and long run; provincial level public 
spending has a negative relationship with inequality in the short run, yet a positive 
relationship in the long run. Social spending at both national and provincial levels has a 
significant positive effect on inequality in the short run. 
 
The final chapter provides a conclusion and the limitations of this research. One possible 
suggestion for future research is to investigate public spending via different econometric 
methods, because different econometric methods are likely to have different results. The 
most obvious solution to this problem is to apply other instrumental variables with a 
different econometric method to re-examine the results. However, there are significant 
data constraints in terms of the provincial Chinese data; consequently, we do not have 
sufficient instrumental variables in the econometric model. Moreover, Chinese economic 
policies include numerous adjustments and changes which are difficult to incorporate into 
the econometric model and over a long period of time. Hence, future research may adopt 
a case study approach towards a single province or city to demonstrate the effects of 
public policy shifts and economic development.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review I: Effects of Government 
Spending on Economic Growth 
2.1 Introduction  
The role of government expenditure and its effects on economic growth has been widely 
debated by economists for decades. Over a century ago the German economist Wagner 
proposed that economic development had increased public or state activities worldwide. 
This is known as Wagner’s Law, which establishes economic growth as the fundamental 
determinant of public sector growth (Wagner and Weber, 1977). Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory suggests that government spending can accelerate economic 
growth or avoid recession by stimulating aggregate demand. For example, if the economy 
initially has less than full employment, increasing public expenditure shifts the economy 
towards a higher level of output and interest rate. The effects on aggregate demand and 
output are dependent on the interest-elasticity
5
 of public expenditure (Snowdon and Vane, 
2005). However, the general trend of growth in the average size of governments over time 
has precipitated fears that such progressively larger governments will compromise 
economic growth. This has prompted calls to scale back government activities and to cut 
budgets. Various strands of literature provide theoretical and empirical analyses of the 
crowding-out or crowding-in effect of public spending, which are based on conflicting 
views on the government’s role in the process of economic development. 
 
The recent emergence of endogenous growth theory provides a foundation for the role of 
productive government spending in fostering long term economic growth. Government 
provision of public capital to the production process contributes directly to growth by 
adding to the existing capital stock, as well as indirectly by raising the marginal 
productivity of privately supplied factors of production (Barro, 1990). While it is a matter 
                                                 
5
 The interest-elasticity implies the slope of IS and LM curve, which results in the size of the crowding-out 
effect. The extreme Keynesian case is a vertical IS curve in which investment is perfectly interest-inelastic. 
On the other hand, a vertical LM curve refers to the zero effect (or 100 per cent crowding-out effect) of 
public expenditure, in which a rise in interest rates will reduce private investment by the same amount as 
the increase in government spending.  
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of debate as to what exactly constitutes productive government spending in practice, there 
nevertheless seems to be a consensus that public investment in basic physical 
infrastructure such as roads, transportation and communication, is indeed growth-
enhancing.  
 
Spending on these areas has been shown empirically to have a positive impact on 
aggregated production, because this spending may have a strong growth-promoting effect 
through its impact on the productivity of private inputs and the rate of return on capital-
particularly when, to begin with, stocks of infrastructure assets are relatively low (Agénor 
and Moreno-Dodson, 2006). Endogenous growth models are characterized by allowing 
continued growth without the assumption of decreasing returns to capital. This is 
achieved by having technology evolve as a result of learning-by-doing, for example R&D 
or human capital accumulation (Romer, 1990; Kuhn, 2010). Hence, public spending may 
also increase the stock and quality of human capital through public investment in 
education and healthcare, which then results in increased output in the long run.  
 
Moreover, an optimal level of public spending exists in the endogenous growth model. 
Before achieving the economic efficiency, it is possible for the government to mobilize 
additional resources to promote economic growth, which the private sector has failed to 
do. Once the economy reaches this production possibility frontier, increasing public 
spending may have a crowding-out effect on private investment. Barro (1990) specifies 
that the growth rate depends on the share of public spending in output, and he also derives 
a growth-maximizing spending share. The relationship between public spending and 
growth depends on the current spending level, which is positive if public spending is 
below the growth-maximizing share; however, if public spending goes beyond the 
optimal point, higher public spending will reduce economic growth. If the nonlinear 
hypothesis is valid, and the effect of government spending on long run economic growth 
varies with its size, this would not only help to explain the ambiguous findings in the 
empirical growth literature, but also offer a guideline as to the appropriate level of public 
spending for a country.  
 
Nevertheless, macroeconomists remain uncertain about the effects of public spending. 
This uncertainty arises from the differing views as to the correct theoretical framework 
and econometric methodology. This chapter provides an overview of the recent literature 
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in this area, starting with the introduction of the role of government, and then presenting 
the various views on government spending. This is followed by an analysis of the 
empirical evidence regarding public spending on economic growth. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the debates among Chinese economists. 
2.2 Role and objective of government  
Different views have emerged about the role of government for economic development 
over the past two centuries. In his book ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Adam Smith (1776) 
advocated a limited role for government. He attempted to show how competition and the 
profit motive would lead individuals to pursue their own private interests to serve the 
public interest. The profit motive would lead individuals to supply the goods that other 
individuals wanted. He argued that the economy is led, as if by an invisible hand, to 
produce what was desired in the best possible way, which implies that the government 
should not regulate or control the private sector. Adam Smith’s views had a powerful 
influence on industrializing countries, in which the government expenditure formed only 
a small part of GDP, and government regulations were limited in the 19th century. 
 
Conversely, Adolph Wagner was the first to recognize a positive correlation between 
government expenditure and economic growth, a notion referred to in the literature as 
Wagner’s Law (1883). This is accounted for by the increasing demands for regulatory and 
protective functions during economic development, such as the demand for education, 
healthcare and social services. In addition, during economic development, more 
government intervention is needed to manage and finance natural monopolies and to 
maintain well-functioning market forces (Bird, 1971). Several studies such as those by 
Gandhi (1971), Gupta (1967) and Dritsakis and Adamopoulos (2004) support this theory.  
 
In the sphere of public economics, the first fundamental theorem suggests that a perfectly 
competitive market economy necessarily achieves a ‘Pareto optimal’ 6  allocation of 
resources. In the Pareto optimal level, it is not possible to make one person better off 
without making one person worse off. The second fundamental theorem suggests that ‘the 
                                                 
6
 Consequently, for each commodity, the marginal rate of substitution in consumption equals to the 
marginal rate of transformation in production (MRS = MRT). 
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only thing the government needs to do is redistribute wealth, because every Pareto-
efficient resource allocation can be obtained through a competitive market process with 
an initial redistribution of wealth’ (Stiglitz, 2000, p.60). However, economies fail to 
achieve Pareto efficiency in most circumstances, mainly because of market failures. In the 
period between the Great Depression (1930s) and the early 1960s, economists became 
aware of a large number of market failures in the free market economy. In the 1930s in 
the U.S.A, the unemployment rate reached 25 per cent and national output fell by about 
30 per cent from its peak in 1929. Even if the economy is efficient, there is no 
consideration of distribution among individuals. Hence, one of the objectives of 
government activities can be to alter the distribution between individuals, although such 
programmes may also have shortcomings. For example, critics of government 
intervention in the economy believe that government activities can be constrained by the 
government’s failure (Stiglitz, 2000). 
 
Since the Great Depression, the perception of market failure has provided a rationale for 
increasing government spending, not only to correct the purported resource misallocations 
by the market, but also to provide macroeconomic stability and economic growth. 
Musgrave (1959) stated that the three main objectives of public finance are: economic 
efficiency, the redistribution of public resources and macroeconomic stability. These three 
objectives are the traditional roles of fiscal policy in the western countries. The increasing 
emphasis on such government activity brought about a variety of reforms in public 
economics. In the developed economies, the economic activities of governments have 
increased significantly since World War Two. Although governments argue in favour of 
increasing their budgets to allow for the provision of productive public goods that will 
foster economic growth and increase public welfare, there has been an ongoing concern 
that such growth of governments may have deleterious effects on the long term growth of 
their economies. These opposing policies are based on conflicting views of the role of 
government in the process of economic development. For example, when the 2008 
financial crisis hit the world economy, some high government debt countries carried out 
wide-ranging fiscal consolidation plans to reduce government spending in order to reduce 
the government’s debt. However, most categories of public spending cuts are widely 
associated with welfare expenditure, such as education, healthcare and pension provision. 
Conversely, some governments have increased public investment in infrastructure to 
stimulate the economy in the short run and pay back borrowing or debt in the long run. 
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2.3 Keynesian views of public spending and its critiques   
Keynesian economic theory has greatly affected public spending since the Great 
Recession. The aim of Keynesian economic policy is to avoid recession and to stimulate 
economic activity by using fiscal policy when a recession occurs. Traditional Keynesian 
theory suggests that governments should increase public spending and cut taxes in order 
to boost aggregate demand during a recession. Thus, the increase of aggregate demand 
stimulates firms to increase production, hire workers and this in turn also increases 
household income. Through these effects on aggregate demand, the fiscal policies of the 
government may, in turn, influence aggregate employment, output and price levels 
(Snowdon and Vane, 2005). Theoretically, the well-known hypothesis of the Keynesian 
approach suggests that positive government spending should induce economic stimulation 
by means of an income multiplier effect. Public spending can affect the economy by 
boosting aggregate demand and employment. Positive changes in capital stock may lead 
to increasing profit rates, which, in turn, leads to higher investment in the short run. 
  
Private investment is a vital channel for economic growth. The effect of public spending 
on private investment is crucial due to its relevance to real economic growth. Crowding-
out generally refers to the economic effects of an increase in government demand, 
financed by either taxes or borrowing; when this fails to stimulate total economic activity, 
private sector investment is considered to be crowded-out by the government’s spending. 
The crowding-out effect is one of the issues, which helps to distinguish between 
Keynesians and Monetarists. Keynes contended that monetary policy was powerless to 
boost the economy out of a depression, because it depended on the interest rate. When an 
economy is in a depression, the interest rate is already close to zero. Conversely, 
increasing government spending would not only boost aggregate demand directly, but 
also set off a chain reaction of increased demand from workers and suppliers whose 
incomes had been increased by the government's expenditure. Similarly, a tax cut would 
put more disposable income into the wallets of consumers, which would also boost 
demand (Nelson, 2006). 
 
Moreover, Keynesians believe that increasing government spending will also boost 
private investment in certain areas. For example, Aschauer (1987) suggests that an 
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increase of public investment spending should have a larger multiplier impact on private 
output than a similarly-sized increase in public consumption expenditure. Specifically, 
public investment induces an increase in the rate of return on private capital, and thereby 
stimulates private investment. 
 
However, compared to the impact of the rational expectation theory postulated by Lucas 
(1972), traditional Keynesian theory fails to account for the economic development of the 
1970s, when both high inflation and unemployment co-occurred. The new Keynesian 
models adopt the rational expectation assumption in terms of firms and individuals, 
various forms of price rigidity, usually staggered prices or wages, as well as market 
imperfections to provide a microeconomic foundation for government spending. 
Notwithstanding this incorporation of rational expectation into new Keynesian models, 
the role of public spending has not changed in improving macroeconomic stability and 
economic welfare (Krugman, 1998). The following section addresses effects of public 
spending on aggregate demand and output in Keynesian economic frameworks.  
2.3.1 The AS-AD analysis 
The Keynesian revolution resided in the fundamental way of analysing the effects of 
government spending on output. In his ‘General Theory’, Keynes (1936) indicated that 
national income is determined by the level of employment. In order to develop this 
theory, he emphasized the demand side of the economy. He argued that national income 
will increase к times7 of the increase in investment (or public spending). The traditional 
Keynesian view assumes that the level of output is determined entirely by aggregate 
demand, where the market features less than full employment and the correlation between 
interest rates and investment is low. Hence, an increase in public spending will increase 
income and output with little effect on interest rates. In addition, consumption should rise 
in response to increased government spending. Moreover, government spending may 
boost private spending if it leads to positive expectations, hence, it may crowd-in rather 
than crowd-out private consumption and investment (Aschauer, 1989; Kusteoeli, 2005). 
 
                                                 
7
 К is the multiplier of investment, where △Y=△I*К (Keynes, 1936, p.115).  
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At the aggregate level, the aggregate supply (AS) curve indicates the total supply by 
producers at each price level. According to the Keynesian view, wages are sticky, so the 
economy cannot continuously have full employment. Phillips (1958) found a negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and inflation in the United Kingdom. Hence, 
policy makers suffer the ‘trade off’ between the unemployment rate and inflation, which 
cannot be established at a very low level. 
 
In general, the AS curve is shown as follows:  
Equation 2.1 
𝑃𝑡+1 =  𝑃𝑡[1 + ƛ(𝑌 − 𝑌
∗)]                                                               (2.1) 
Equation 2.2 
ƛ = 𝜀 𝑌∗⁄ .                                                                                                     (2.2) 
 
Y* is the potential output level, and ε measures the response level between wages and 
unemployment. When ε=0, the price level 𝑃𝑡=1 = 𝑃 , which is the extreme Keynesian 
horizontal AS curve. When ε→∞, the output level is equal to the potential output level 
Y*, which is the ‘classical’ vertical AS curve. Thus, the impact of a change in aggregate 
demand on output and inflation depends on the aggregate supply curve. If it is vertical, 
only inflation increases. If it is horizontal, only output increases. Furthermore, if there is a 
positive relationship between output and inflation (upward-sloping), both output and 
inflation will increase (Romer, 2006). 
 
The aggregate supply curve shows the relationship between price levels and the real 
domestic output that firms in the economy produce. This relationship varies depending on 
the time horizon and how quickly output prices and input prices can change. Figure 2.1 
features the three possible AS curves, which are the immediate short run AS curve, the 
short run AS curve and the long run AS curve. In the immediate short run aggregate 
supply curve (curve A), both input price and output price are fixed, which is the (extreme) 
Keynesian view. When the economy achieves far from its potential income, an increase in 
aggregate demand will not cause inflationary pressure. The immediate AS curve is 
horizontal, with strong assumptions about price rigidity (Romer, 2006). Hence, an 
increase in aggregate demand will cause firms to increase employment and output at the 
fixed price level in the immediate short run.  
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Figure 2.1: Three types of aggregate supply curve 
 
Source: McConnell et al., 2011, Figure 10.3-10.5 
 
The short run Keynesian aggregate supply curve (curve B in Figure 2.1) begins after the 
immediate short run ends i.e., period of time with sticky price or wage, or imperfect 
market. In all of these models, this state of imperfection causes the output of the economy 
to deviate from the classical assumption. As a result, the short run aggregate supply curve 
is upward-sloping, rather than vertical (Mankiw, 2011). Therefore, an increase in 
aggregate demand causes the level of output to deviate temporarily from its natural rate. 
 
The long run aggregate curve (curve C in Figure 2.1) is vertical at the economy’s full-
employment output, irrespective of the level of prices. The ‘natural rate hypothesis’ of 
Friedman (1968) indicates that nominal variables, such as the money supply and inflation, 
could not have an impact on real output or unemployment in the long run. Therefore, 
prices and wages are flexible in the long run, and changes in aggregate demand do not 
affect real output or unemployment. In the new Keynesian model, monetary shocks are 
clearly non-neutral in the short run, but money remains neutral in the long run as the 
vertical long run aggregate supply curve. While new Keynesian economists have adopted 
the new classical micro foundations, they aim to construct a coherent theory of aggregate 
supply where wages and price stickiness can be rationalized (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). 
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To sum up, the immediate short run aggregate supply curve, the short run aggregate 
supply curve and the long run aggregate supply curve are all important, as each curve is 
appropriate to situations that match its respective assumptions about the flexibility of 
wages and prices. The Keynesian version of immediate short run aggregate supply curve 
implies that increasing the government spending has a real effect on real output and 
employment, because price levels are assumed to be fixed. By contrast, according to the 
new classical version of the aggregate supply curve, the economy’s real full employment 
output is not affected by government spending shocks in the long run. 
2.3.2 The multiplier effect of public spending in the IS-LM framework 
In Keynesian theory, increasing government spending will increase aggregate demand; it 
will cause an increase in output and subsequently an increase in income; simultaneously, 
an initial increase in output leads to an increased demand for money, which then pushes 
up the real interest rate. The rise in interest rates may reduce private investment, the 
extent of which depends on the interest elasticity of investment. Hence, the effects of 
government spending on output and employment depends on the slopes of the IS and LM 
curves
8
. This section analyzes the effect of public spending on the IS-LM model, where 
the IS curve represents equilibrium in the goods market, the LM curve represents 
equilibrium in the market for real money balances, and the IS and LM curves together 
determine the interest rate and national income in the short run when the price level is 
fixed (Mankiw, 2011). 
Assuming that consumption function is: 
         Equation 2.3 
𝐶 = 𝐶̅ + 𝑐(𝑌 + 𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑡𝑌) c>0                                                                   (2.3) 
 
Where 𝐶̅ is autonomous consumption, and c is the marginal propensity to consume. Y is 
the total income, 𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  is government transfer payment, and t is the tax rate. c>0 indicates 
the positive relationship between consumption and disposable income.  
 
                                                 
8
 The flatter LM curve and steeper IS curve represent less interest-elasticity of investment (crowding-out 
effect), in turn; that is, the greater effect of public spending on output.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review I: Effects of Government Spending on Economic Growth 
22 
 
Assuming the investment function is: 
Equation 2.4 
𝐼 = 𝐼 ̅ − 𝑏𝑖            𝑏 > 0                                                                              (2.4) 
  
Where i is the interest rate, b measures the interest elasticity of investment, and 𝐼 ̅ is 
autonomous investment, which is not dependent on interest rate and income. 
Hence, the aggregate demand can be written as: 
Equation 2.5 
𝐴𝐷 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋 = [𝐶̅ + 𝑐𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑐(1 − 𝑡)𝑌] + (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑏𝑖) + ?̅? + 𝑁𝑋 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
= ?̅? + 𝑐(1 − 𝑡)𝑌 − 𝑏𝑖                                                                                      (2.5) 
 
Here ?̅? = 𝐶̅ + 𝑐𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝐼 ̅ + ?̅? + 𝑁𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ , which is the autonomous spending level. According to 
the requirement of goods market clearing, we can get:  
Equation 2.6 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐷 = ?̅? + 𝑐(1 − 𝑡)𝑌 − 𝑏𝑖                                                                       (2.6) 
 
Hence, we can get the IS curve:  
Equation 2.7 
𝑖 =
?̅?
𝑏
−
[1−𝑐(1−𝑡)]𝑌
𝑏
=
?̅?
𝑏
−
𝑌
𝑎𝐺𝑏
                                                                            (2.7) 
 
In (2.7), 
1
𝑎𝐺𝑏
 is the slope of the IS curve and 𝑎𝐺 =
1
1−𝑐(1−𝑡)
 is the multiplier of government 
spending. Where 𝑎𝐺 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 are greater than zero, the slope of the IS curve is negative. The 
slope of the IS curve is determined by the multiplier of government spending 𝑎𝑔 and the 
interest elasticity of investment 𝑏. If 𝑎𝑔 and b are smaller, the slope of the IS curve is 
steeper. In other words, the IS curve will be steeper when the value of the multiplier9 is 
smaller, and less effect of investment on interest rate. In the extreme Keynesian case, 
where investment is perfectly interest-inelastic, the IS curve will be vertical. 
 
The LM curve describes the equilibrium of the capital market, and provides a 
combination of interest and output level when money demand is equal to the money 
                                                 
9
 The smaller the value of the multiplier, the less income will increase by a given increase in investment; 
hence, the IS curve will be steeper. 
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supply. Money supply is assumed to be exogenous by a central bank (Mankiw, 2011). 
 
Real stock of money (or demand for money) is:   
Equation 2.8 
𝐿 = 𝑘𝑌 − ℎ𝑖,       𝑘, ℎ > 0                                                                                   (2.8) 
 
We can see that the real stock of money is determined by the real income level (Y), 
interest rates (i), the income sensitivity of demand for money (k), and the interest rate 
sensitivity of the demand for money (h). In the equation (2.8), (k) and (i) are greater than 
zero, which means that the quantity of real money demand is positively related to income, 
and negatively related to the rate of interest. For example, an increase in national income 
will raise the demand for money, which depends on the increase in income, as well as the 
income and interest rate sensitivity of the demand for money.  
 
The nominal money supply ?̅? is determined by the central bank, and we know the price 
level is ?̅?. The real money supply is ?̅? ?̅?⁄ . According to the money market clear, the 
demand for money, or what Keynes called the liquidity preference (L), equals the supply 
of money ?̅? ?̅?⁄ . 
 
The LM curve can be written as:         
Equation 2.9 
𝑖 =
1
ℎ
⌈𝑘𝑌 −
?̅?
𝑃
⌉                                                                                                    (2.9) 
 
The goods market and capital market short run equilibrium requires (2.7) to be equal to 
(2.9), which is the intersection of the IS-LM curves. 
10 
?̅?
𝑏
−
𝑌
𝑎𝐺𝑏
=
1
ℎ
[𝑘𝑌 −
?̅?
𝑃
]                                                                                           (2.10) 
 
Rewriting Y on the left side: 
       Equation 2.11 
𝑌 = 𝑎𝐺 ⌈?̅? −
𝑏
ℎ
[𝑘𝑌 −
?̅?
𝑃
]⌉                                                                                      (2.11) 
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To simplify the equation (2.11) gives: 
Equation 2.12 
𝑌 = 𝛾?̅? + 𝛾
𝑏
ℎ
?̅?
𝑝
                                                                                                      (2.12) 
 
Where 𝛾 =
𝑎𝐺
1+𝑘𝑎𝐺
𝑏
ℎ
 and ?̅? = 𝐶̅ + 𝑐𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝐼 ̅ + ?̅? + 𝑁𝑋̅̅ ̅̅   
From 2.12, we can get =
∆𝑌
∆𝐺
 . Hence, 𝛾 =
𝑎𝐺
1+𝑘𝑎𝐺
𝑏
ℎ
 is the equilibrium multiplier of fiscal 
policy, which indicates the change in national income for a given change in government 
spending, if the money supply remains constant. 
 
The fiscal policy multiplier is given by the coefficient on autonomous spending ?̅? in the 
equation (2.12). It is different from the government expenditure multiplier 𝑎𝐺 because it 
takes into account the impacts on interest rates caused by rising government spending in 
the money market10. The simple expenditure multiplier is only derived from the goods 
market, and on the assumption that interest rates do not change when national income 
rises. Hence, the fiscal policy multiplier is smaller than the initial multiplier of 
government spending because of 𝑎𝐺 =
1
1−𝑐(1−𝑡)
> 0 and 
1
1+𝑘𝑎𝐺
𝑏
ℎ
< 1 . 
 
Assuming the interest rate does not change, increasing government spending drives the 
aggregate demand and the output level. However, interest rate will rise because of the 
increase in income and money supply. A higher interest rate reduces the supply of firms 
and aggregate demand. Conversely, private consumption and investment are crowded-out 
by the rise of interest rates after increasing government spending, so the equilibrium 
output demanded in the goods market is less than the initial increase in government 
spending (Romer, 2006). 
 
Thus, in the new equilibrium, the increase in output is: 
Equation 2.13 
∆𝑌 = 𝑌0
′ − 𝑌0 = 𝛾. ∆𝐺 =
𝑎𝐺
1+𝑘𝑎
𝐺
𝑏
ℎ
. ∆𝐺                                                                   (2.13) 
 
                                                 
10
 This indicates the government spending has a crowding-out effect on private investment in the money 
market. 
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And the crowding-out effect is:      
Equation 2.14 
𝑌0
" − 𝑌0
′ = (𝑎𝐺 − 𝛾). ∆𝐺 = ⌈𝑎𝐺 −
𝑎𝐺
1+𝑘𝑎
𝐺
𝑏
ℎ
⌉ . ∆𝐺 > 0                                            (2.14) 
 
Where the crowding-out effect depends on the 𝑎𝐺, k, b, h. Recall, the k and h indicate the 
sensitivity of real money demand on income levels and interest rates respectively, and b 
represents the interest elasticity of investment. If the k, h and b are larger, the crowding-
out effect is greater.  
 
Figure 2.2: The expansionary public spending in LS-LM framework 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the effect of expansionary public spending on output in the equation 
(2.13) and (2.14). The economy is initially in equilibrium at point E (the intersection of IS 
and LM). In the Keynesian framework, the economy has less than full employment. An 
increase in government spending shifts the IS curve towards the right, from IS to IS’. The 
equilibrium moves from E to E', which results in an increase in both the level of income 
(∆𝑌 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2.13) and interest rates. Compared with point E", the new equilibrium 
E' has less output, because the rise in interest rates in turn leads to a reduction in private 
investment (the degree of the crowding effect is shown in equation 2.14 by 𝑌0
" − 𝑌0
′). 
𝑌0 𝑌0
′ 𝑌0
" 
LM 
𝐼𝑆′ 
IS 
𝐸′ 
E 𝐸" 
Y 
i 
i 
𝑖′ 
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Hence, an increase in public spending will increase real output and interest rates in the 
short run, although the rise in interest rates has a crowding-out effect on private 
investment.  
2.3.3 The post-Keynesian growth theory 
In neoclassical economics full employment is ensured by market clearing condition for 
economic activity. In Keynesian economics employment depends on economic activity 
which in turn is determined by effective demand. Common denominators in post-
Keynesian analyses are their emphasis on realism, uncertainty and social and institutional 
factors. Rational expectations hypothesis is rejected because the nature of human 
decision.  
 
Human decisions affecting the future, whether the personal or political or 
economic, cannot depend on the strict mathematical expectation, since the 
basis for making such calculations does not exist (Keynesian, 1936, 
pp162). 
 
Overall, economic output depends on aggregate private consumption demand, aggregate 
investment, government expenditures and net exports (Stockhammer et al., 2009). In the 
post-Keynesian economics, there is an investment function distinct from the savings 
function. Income is determined by effective demand and investment as a variable 
independent of consumption and saving (Pasinetti, 1962). The theory of income 
distribution in Post-Keynesian analysis plays an important role on economic growth. For 
example, rising wage shares can have a positive effect on economic growth through an 
increase in capacity utilization, which in turn leads to a strong accelerator effect resulting 
in higher investment, and higher profit rate. Thus, a rising inequality can cause an 
economic instability from a post-Keynesian perspective (Stockhammer and Onaran, 
2012). 
 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) analyse the changes in functional income distribution on 
aggregate demand. They demonstrated that economic development can be both wage-led 
and profit-led. It depends on the relative response of saving and investment to changes in 
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the profit share. If the effects of changes in the profit share on investment are dominated 
by the effects on saving, growth is wage-led. If the effects in the profit share on 
investment dominate the effects on saving, growth is profit-led. However, wages are the 
most important element of production costs and they are the main source of income of the 
biggest part of the population and, hence, have a prominent influence on aggregate 
demand.   
 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) approach has increasingly inspired empirical work. 
Stockhammer et al., (2009) find the decline of wage share since 1981 has together with a 
reduction on growth rate and employment rate in Euro area. This indicates that the wage 
share has a positive effect on the output growth in Euro area (wage-led growth), although 
it has contradictory effects on the aggregate demand11. Hein and Vogel (2008) examine 
the functional income distribution and economic growth in six countries. They suggest 
that wage-led growth becomes less feasible when the effects of distribution on foreign 
trade are taken into account, which is consistent with the conclusion of Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990). 
 
Bhaduri (2006) presents a demand side endogenous growth 12  model where labour 
productivity is driven by inter-class conflict over income distribution between workers 
and capitalists and it is adjusted through the gap between the growth rates of real wage 
and labour productivity. Bhaduri’s endogenous model helps to overcome the error of 
‘omission’ on the effective demand and the error of ‘commission’ on the supply side to 
the faulty assumption on the capital and labour substitution.  
 
In order to introduce the effective demand, it requires the disequilibrium between 
investment and saving in a growing economy. In a start of equilibrium growth from a 
market clearing condition, where investment equals to saving (I*/S*=1). A higher ratio of 
investment (I/I*>1) will adjust the economy by: 
Equation 2.15 
(𝑔𝑦 − 𝑔𝑦
∗ ) = F[(𝐼∗ 𝑆∗⁄ ) + (𝐼 𝐼∗⁄ − 𝑆 𝑆∗)⁄ ]                                                   (2.15) 
 
                                                 
11
 Theoretically, an increase in the wage share has positive effect on the private consumption, but a negative 
effect on investment and export. Therefore, the total effect of changing wage share on aggregate demand 
depends on the sum of these effects.  
12
 The demand side growth model means that the economic growth depends on the effective demand. 
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Where (𝐼 𝐼∗⁄ − 𝑆 𝑆∗)⁄ = [(1 + 𝑔𝐼) − (1 + 𝑔𝑆)] = 𝑔𝐼 − 𝑔𝑆 
 
Hence, the first order term is  
Equation 2.16 
𝑑𝑔𝑦 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑎(𝑔𝐼 − 𝑔𝑆), 𝑎 > 0                                                                       (2.16) 
 
The Investment function: I = f(Y, X), on simple manipulation reduces to  
Equation 2.17 
𝑔𝐼 = 𝜂𝑦𝑔𝑦 + 𝜂𝑥𝑔𝑥                                                                                           (2.17) 
 
Where Y is the output level, X is the labour productivity level, and 𝜂𝑦 and 𝜂𝑥 are positive 
partial elasticities of investment with respect to output and investment, respectively. 
Saving is treated as an increasing function of income:  
Equation 2.18 
𝑔𝑠 = 𝜀𝑦𝑔𝑦                                                                                                        (2.18) 
 
Where 𝜀𝑦  is the positive partial elasticity of saving with respect to income. Inserting 
(2.17) and (2.18) to (2.16), we have 
Equation 2.19 
𝑑𝑔𝑦 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑎[(𝜂𝑦 − 𝜀𝑦)𝑔𝑦 + 𝜂𝑥𝑔𝑥]; 𝜂𝑥, 𝜂𝑦, 𝜀𝑦 > 0                                        (2.19) 
 
If the employment grew at the same rate as labour supply, we have: 𝑔𝐿 = 𝑛. And we 
assume  
Equation 2.20 
𝑔𝑦 = 𝑔𝑥 + 𝑔𝐿                                                                                                   (2.20) 
 
The labour productivity is driven by inter-class conflict in the labour market: 
Equation 2.21 
𝑑𝑔𝑥 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑏(𝑔𝐿 − 𝑛) = 𝑏(𝑔𝑦 − 𝑔𝑥 − 𝑛), 𝑏 > 0                                            (2.21) 
 
Note: 𝑑𝑔𝑦 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 0 implies 𝑔𝑦 = 𝑧𝑔𝑥, where z = [𝜂𝑥 (⁄ 𝜀𝑦 − 𝜂𝑦)], z > 1. And 𝑑𝑔𝑥 𝑑𝑡⁄ =
0 implies 𝑔𝑦 = 𝑛 + 𝑔𝑥 , 𝑛 > 0 
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Thus, the steady growth is  
Equation 2.22 
𝑔𝑦
∗ = 𝑛𝑧 𝑧 − 1⁄  , 𝑔𝑥
∗ = 𝑧 𝑧 − 1⁄ , and 𝑔𝐿
∗ = 𝑛                                                   (2.22) 
 
In the Bhaduri (2006) growth model, the long run steady-state growth rate is determined 
by the growth of labour, investment and saving decisions. This result shows that the 
endogenous growth of labour productivity provides long run output growth on the supply 
side. The growth in both the real wage rate and labour productivity is driven 
simultaneously by the forces of class conflict, and the wage rate remains constant over the 
long run. This ensures that the technical progress remains ‘neutral’ in the long run and the 
growth of aggregate demand and output absorb the growth in the labour productivity.   
2.3.4 The shift and critics of Keynesian theory 
Since the late 1970s, the neoclassical economists argue that the aggregate demand-driven 
models have failed to capture the significant aspects of fiscal policy in advanced 
economies. Lucas and Sargent (1978) pointed out that the Keynesian model failed to 
explain the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s, which is based on a trade-off between the rate of 
unemployment and inflation. Friedman (1977) argued that, under normal circumstances, 
monetary policy is a more useful tool for economic stabilization than fiscal policy in the 
long run. He argued that the government should consider a macroeconomic policy within 
a rule-based framework. Lucas (1972) also supported Friedman’s ‘rule-based’ framework 
for macroeconomic policy, emphasizing the rational expectations. In contrast to both the 
Keynesian and monetarist models, Lucas (1976) proposed that a policy’s stabilizing 
effects can be retarded by the expectations and actions of rational agents who observe the 
government’s policy process. For example, investment might actually drop more during a 
recession in anticipation of a countercyclical investment incentive to be enacted in the 
near future; furthermore, consumption might not respond much to a countercyclical 
reduction in income taxes, as the wealth effects of such tax reductions are small when the 
reductions are regarded as temporary. 
 
Following the ‘fiscal profligacy’ of the 1970s and 1980s, several advanced economies 
stabilized and reduced their debt to GDP ratios, which is called large fiscal adjustments. 
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In contrast to the prediction of standard Keynesian models driven by aggregate demand, 
the fiscal contractions in many advanced economies have been associated with higher 
growth, even in the very short term. Meanwhile, economic activity slowed during several 
episodes of rapid fiscal expansion. These empirical observations led to a significant 
interest in the so-called ‘non-Keynesian’ effects of fiscal policy, and, in particular, in the 
response of private consumption to major fiscal changes (Alesina et al., 2002). 
 
For a number of decades after the emergence of Keynes’s general theory, discretionary 
adjustment of fiscal policy to maintain balance between the supply capacity of the 
economy and demand replaced the classical economic theory. Keynes’s theory has now 
been replaced by a variation of the classical theme (Garnaut, 2005). Since the 1980s, a 
large body of literature has explored the effects of government spending in the dynamic 
general equilibrium model, which is mainly based on the neoclassical growth model with 
constant returns to scale. In these studies, the effects of government spending have 
negative effects on real wages and private consumption.  
 
The argument against government fiscal policy interventions would be the lags in the 
formulation of economic policy and further lags in the implementation and effects after 
the policy is enacted, a delay which makes it difficult for policymakers to time fiscal 
policy actions to stabilize the economy (Auerbach et al., 2010). Indeed, the neoclassical 
view assumes full employment and advocates competitive markets against government 
intervention. In the case of an increase in government spending, the interest rate has to 
increase to bring about capital market equilibrium, reducing private investment 
(Kusteoeli, 2005). The Real Business Cycle (RBC) model predicts a decline in private 
consumption in response to a rise in government spending: with infinitely-lived Ricardian 
households, an increase in government spending lowers the present value of after-tax 
income, and thus generates a negative wealth effect on consumption (Furceri and Sousa, 
2011). 
 
Hence, the new Keynesian models adopt the rational expectation assumption regarding 
firms and individuals and some form of price rigidity, usually staggered prices or wages. 
The central arguments of the new Keynesian models are: the importance of the imperfect 
and incomplete market (Stiglitz, 2000), wage and price stickiness based on maximizing 
behaviour and rational expectations (Gordon, 1990). In both the traditional and new 
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Keynesian models, there is an absence of market clearing condition, so the demand or 
supply shocks will have substantial, real effects on output and employment, because the 
process of prices and wages adjustment is slow (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). 
 
In the aftermath of studies by Aschauer (1989) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), there has 
been a substantial debate on the effects of public spending. However, the empirical results 
are mixed, and the debate has not yet been resolved. Aschauer (1989), using the United 
State time series data, found that an increase in public investment crowds-out private 
investment, but simultaneously raises the marginal productivity of private capital, which 
may crowd-in private capital.  
 
In contrast, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) show that public spending has non-Keynesian 
effects. Specifically, they claim that, under special circumstances, a fiscal contraction 
policy may have expansionary effects on consumption, investment and output. They 
examine two European countries, Denmark from 1983-1986 and Ireland from 1987-89. 
During these periods, the government deficit dropped by 9.5 per cent and 7.2 per cent of 
GDP respectively, and private consumption increased by 17.7 per cent and 14.5 per cent 
cumulatively. Moreover, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) largely sought to answer whether 
public spending has Keynesian or non-Keynesian effects on economic activity. According 
to their research, the impact of fiscal policy depends on: (i) the type of the impulse 
(budget cut or expansion); (ii) its size and duration; (iii) the initial conditions (previous 
level or rate of growth of public debt, preceding exchange rate and money supply 
movements); and (iv) the composition of the impulse (changes in taxes and transfers 
relative to changes in government consumption, changes in public investment or in social 
security entitlements). 
 
Hemming et al., (2002) conducted an extensive survey of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of public spending in stimulating economic activity. They 
concluded that public spending does have Keynesian effects on economic activity, but the 
multiplier effect is small. Furthermore, they also acknowledged the possibility of non-
Keynesian effects. Ramey (2011) reviewed the government spending multiplier on 
aggregated U.S. data and cross-country analysis. She indicated that the multiplier for a 
temporary, deficit-financed increase in government spending is probably between 0.8 and 
1.5. This suggests that public spending has a Keynesian effect on the economy.  
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Moreover, there is a growing interest in including the experience of developing countries 
in this debate. Schclarek (2003) investigated the effects of fiscal policy on private 
consumption in both industrial and developing countries and indicated that fiscal policy 
can have Keynesian or non-Keynesian effects on private consumption, which is affected 
by the initial conditions of the economy. The impact of public spending on output is based 
on the market value of wealth and expectations about future taxes (Giavazzi et al., 2000). 
A fiscal contraction often reduces interest rates, raising the market value of stocks, bonds 
and real estate, thus stimulating aggregate demand. It is also suggested that public 
spending more often has non-Keynesian effects in developing countries, as opposed to 
Keynesian effects (Giavazzi et al., 2000).  
 
To sum up, the government spending multiplier has been estimated in both traditional 
Keynesian and new Keynesian models, showing that the multipliers are smaller in the 
new Keynesian models as compared with traditional Keynesian models. Nevertheless, 
both the new Keynesian and traditional Keynesian models suggest that public spending 
has a positive effect on output and employment, the only difference between them being 
the size of the multipliers. Despite this, macroeconomists remain rather uncertain as to the 
quantitative effects of public spending. This uncertainty stems not only from the usual 
errors in empirical estimation, but also from different perspectives regarding the 
theoretical framework and econometric method. 
2.4 Government spending in neoclassical growth models  
The development of the neoclassical growth model provided a theoretical construct to 
explain the growth effects of government spending. The exogenous neoclassical growth 
model was developed by Solow (1956), and it proposes that, if there was no technological 
progress, then the effects of diminishing returns would eventually cause economic growth 
to cease. Hence, long–term economic growth is entirely dependent on technological 
progress. In the Solow neoclassical growth model, steady state growth is driven by 
exogenous factors, such as population growth and technological progress. Government 
spending has only temporary effects on growth during the transition to the steady state, 
which implies that fiscal policy cannot have an important impact on economic growth in 
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the long run (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). According to the exogenous neoclassical 
growth model, the share of government in output, or the composition of expenditure and 
revenue, does not affect the long term growth of per capita income (Kneller et al., 1999). 
In these models, tax and expenditure measures that influence the saving rate or 
investment incentives ultimately affect the equilibrium factor ratios, rather than the steady 
state growth rate. 
 
Arrow and Kurz (1970) developed a model wherein consumers derive utility from private 
consumption as well as from the public capital stock. In addition, private production 
benefits from the services of public capital stock. Arrow and Kurz (1970) assumed that all 
government investment was productive. Furthermore, their model was in the neoclassical 
tradition in which public spending only affected the economy's transitional growth rate; 
the steady-state growth rate remained unchangeable.  
 
However, in the 1980s, the development of the endogenous growth model assigned the 
potential to fiscal policy (also other endogenous economic variables) to be a determinant 
of long term economic growth. In the endogenous growth model, public spending has a 
permanent effect on growth, and it can determine both the level of output and the steady 
state growth rate. Thus, public spending has an important impact on economic growth in 
the endogenous growth models. Any change in public spending can affect the growth rate 
for sustained periods of time, so that these accumulated effects during the transition to a 
new equilibrium may translate into potentially significant effects on the steady state level 
(Turnovsky, 2004).  
 
There is a considerable body of literature which highlights the role of human capital and 
R&D in endogenous growth models. Lucas (1988) argued that public investment in 
education increases the level of human capital, which is a main source of long term 
economic growth. Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) claimed that investment in 
human capital has robust effects on the steady state growth rate, and consequently there is 
more scope for government fiscal policy to play a role in any economic growth. For 
example, Barro (1990) and Kneller et al., (1999) argued that recent endogenous models of 
economic growth can generate long term growth without relying on exogenous changes in 
technology or population. A general feature of these models is the presence of constant or 
increasing returns in the factors that can be accumulated. Because of externalities 
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associated with public expenditures and taxes, the privately determined values of saving 
and economic growth may be suboptimal. 
 
The endogenous models suggest that an increase in the level of government spending 
results in an endogenous increase in total factor productivity. This implies that an increase 
in government spending may result in simultaneous increases in output, employment 
wages and consumption. This notion, therefore, rejects the invariant relationship between 
government spending and the Solow residual in the exogenous growth model. Aschauer 
(1989) adopted an endogenous assumption regarding the constant return of capital. He 
found that government spending in core infrastructures, such as roads, airports, highways, 
sewers and water systems have a significantly positive impact on the growth of 
productivity and, in turn, increasing the economic growth. One strand of these models 
features positive externalities to human capital or ideas, leading to too little growth in the 
absence of government intervention. Such externalities call for governmental actions, 
such as taxation, maintenance of law and order, provision of infrastructure services, 
protection of intellectual property rights and the regulation of international trade, financial 
markets and other aspects of the economy. The government, therefore, has great potential 
for good or ill through its influence on the long term rate of growth (Temple, 1999).  
 
In the standard neoclassical growth model with constant returns to scale, real wages and 
private consumption are invariant to changes in the share of government spending in 
output. However, in the endogenous growth model with increasing returns, steady state 
real wages and private consumption are positively related to the share of government 
spending in output if the labour supply is sufficiently elastic. Hence, government 
spending will not crowd-out long term private consumption (Devarajan et al., 1996). 
Typically, long term growth models with productive government spending lump several 
goods and services, such as roads and highways, law and order, sewer systems, harbours 
and public sector R&D together into one category called ‘public capital’. While 
increasing the stock of transportation may enhance the productivity of private factors, 
increasing police protection seems to operate in a fundamentally different manner. 
Without police protection, a high level of crime may prevail, such as stealing. Although 
stealing is purely redistributive in the given period, expectations of future stealing lowers 
rates of returns to investment (Glomm and Ravikuman, 1997).  
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2.4.1 Effect of public spending in the endogenous growth model  
The Solow neoclassical model sought to study how the three exogenous factors affect or 
determine the long term growth of per capita output. Based on a series of assumptions 
concerning production and exogenous variables, the Solow model predicts that economic 
growth will enter into a steady state. During the period of the steady state, per capita 
output cannot be affected by any change in the level of endogenous and exogenous 
variables, except the technological growth rate. 
  
Although the traditional Solow growth model has been extended to make the saving rate 
endogenous within the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model and the Diamond overlapping-
generation model extended (Cass, 1965; Diamond, 1965; Koopmans, 1965), none of these 
models separately consider the economic effects of public capital (Song, 2011).  
 
Arrow and Kurz (1970) included public capital as input in the production function, which 
is specified as follows: 
 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝐾𝑝(𝑡), 𝐾𝑔(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)) 
 
The simplest form of production is: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾 
 
Where A represents the level of technology in the economy and K is the economy’s stock 
of capital. The standard Solow neoclassical growth model, featuring diminishing returns 
of capital, was unable to account for the determinant of long term economic growth, since 
the economy converges to a steady state with a zero growth rate of per capita output at a 
certain technological level. The main reason for the failure of the Solow neoclassical 
growth model to account for the zero long term growth rates at the steady state without 
technological change is the assumption of the diminishing returns of capital. Therefore, in 
the AK model, the diminishing returns of capital are absent. Moreover, the AK model 
allows the endogenous parameters to determine the long term growth rate without 
technological changes.  
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The role of government spending in economic growth remains an unresolved issue 
theoretically, as well as empirically. The theoretical positions on the effect of government 
spending are quite diverse since Barro’s (1990) model of government spending emerged 
as a single model of endogenous growth. Barro (1990) suggested a possible relationship 
between the share of government spending in GDP and the real GDP per capita growth 
rate. Hence, if changes in the share of government spending can affect real output growth 
rate, the size of government spending can potentially be a critical factor in accounting for 
the disparity in long term economic growth in different nations. 
 
Barro (1990) devised a simple model of government spending and economic growth, one 
which assumes constant returns13 to both private and public capital. The representative 
household in a closed economy seeks to maximize overall utility, as given by:.2 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑢(𝑐)𝑒−𝑝𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
                                                                                        (2.23) 
 
Where c is consumption per person, and ρ>0 is the constant rate of time preference. The 
utility function is: 
Equation 2.24 
𝑢(𝑐) =
𝑐1−𝜎−1
1−𝜎
                                                                                                  (2.24)  
 
Where σ>0, thus the marginal utility can have a constant elasticity of –σ. 
 
Combining the equations (2.23) and (2.24), we can get  
Equation 2.25 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒−𝑝𝑡(
∞
0
𝑐1−𝜎 − 1)/( 1 − 𝜎)𝑑𝑡                                                               (2.25) 
 
Where we assume constant returns to scale, the intensive production function can be 
written as  
Equation 2.26 
𝑦 =  𝛷(𝑘, 𝑔) = 𝑘﹒∅(
𝑔
𝑘
)                                                                                  (2.26) 
 
Where 𝛷 is positive and satisfies the diminishing marginal products, so that ø′ > 0 
                                                 
13
 The constant return to capital implies that doubling all inputs causes output to double. 
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and ø" < 0. The variable g is per capita government spending, and k is the quantity of 
capital per worker. Subject to a government budget constraint, we get: 
Equation 2.27 
𝑔 = 𝑇 = 𝜏𝑦                                                                                                    (2.27) 
 
Where we assume that government spending is financed by a flat-rate income tax, 
therefore we can get  
𝑔 = 𝜏﹒𝑘﹒∅(
𝑔
𝑘
)                                                                                             (2.28) 
 
Where y is per capita output, τ is the average tax rate. The model allows government 
activities to enter as a separate input to private production. From the production function 
in equation (2.26) we can drive the marginal product of capital as: E 
Equation 2.29 
𝜗𝑦
𝜗𝑘
= (1 − 𝛽)∅
𝑔
𝑘
                                                                                              (2.29) 
 
Where 𝛽 is the elasticity of government spending, (g) on the output (y), so that 0<𝛽<1. 
Following the model above, the steady-state growth rate can be written as 
Equation 2.30 
𝛾 =
𝑐̇
𝑐
= [(1 −
𝑔
𝑦
) (1 − 𝛽)∅
𝑔
𝑘
− 𝜌) /𝜎                                                             (2.30) 
 
Therefore, an increase in the share of public spending to output (g/y) affects 𝛾 in two 
counteracting ways. Firstly, it crowds out private investment, and therefore lowers the 
growth rate. Secondly, a higher g/y makes private capital more productive, raises 𝜗𝑦/𝜗𝑘 
and hence leads to a higher 𝛾.  
 
The net effect of government spending on  per capita output (y) can be illustrated as: 
Equation 2.31 
𝜗𝑦
𝜗(
𝑔
𝑦
)
=  ∅(
𝑔
𝑘
)(∅′ − 1)/𝜎                                           (2.31) 
Furthermore, the effect depends on the size of government. An expansion of government 
spending will reduce output when the government is too large, such as ∅′<1. Conversely, 
if the government is small enough, such as ∅′>1, so 
𝜗𝑦
𝜗(
𝑔
𝑦
)
 > 0, an increase in government 
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spending will result in a rise in the real output. With the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the size of government maximizes the growth rate to achieve production 
efficiency. The optimal size of government requires ∅′=1, then 
𝜗𝑦
𝜗(
𝑔
𝑦
)
 = 0. At the optimum, 
any further marginal change of government spending will not affect the real output.        
2.4.2 Optimal government spending in the endogenous growth model  
Barro (1990) specifies that the share of public spending14 in output affects the growth 
rate, and he derives a growth-maximizing spending share for an optimizing government. 
The relationship between public spending and growth depends on the current spending 
level; it is positive (negative) if public spending is below (above) the growth-maximizing 
share15. Therefore, only when public investment is below its growth-maximizing share 
will additional public investment increase growth. 
 
Let us assume that the government will purchase some private output, and that the 
government provides free public services. We can derive the Cobb-Donglas production by 
the number of i firms: 
Equation 2.32 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴𝐿𝑖
1−𝛼. 𝐾𝑖
𝛼 . 𝐺1−𝛼                                                                                            (2.32) 
 
In the equation (2.32), we assume 0< 𝛼 <1 and a constant return to scale. Government 
spending G is financed on the tax rate 𝜏 on the total output, which is: 
Equation 2.33 
𝐺 = 𝜏 . 𝑌                                                                                                                 (2.33) 
 
We assume tax rate 𝜏 does not change over time, and that public spending as the share of 
total output is constant. The after-tax profits of firms is: 
Equation 2.34 
𝐿[(1 − 𝜏) . 𝐴 . 𝑘𝑎 . 𝐺1−𝛼 − 𝑤 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑖]                                                             (2.34) 
                                                 
14
 The model for optimal public spending is based on a paper by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003. 
15
 In this framework, (Barro, 1990, p. 123) concluded that the economy's growth rate and saving rate 
initially rise with the ratio of productive government expenditure to GNP, g/y, but each rate eventually 
reaches a peak and subsequently declines.  
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Where 𝑘𝑖 =
𝐾𝑖
𝐿𝑖
⁄ , w is wage ratio and 𝑟 + 𝛿 is rent ratio. The rent ratio depends on the 
interest rate r. Profit maximization requires that the wage ratio is equal to the marginal 
cost of labour, and that the rent ratio is equal to the marginal cost of capital. If we make 𝑘𝑖 
constant, the rent ratio equals:  
Equation 2.35 
𝑟 + 𝛿 = (1 − 𝜏). (
𝜕𝑌𝐼
𝜕𝐾𝑖
) = (1 − 𝜏) . 𝛼𝐴 . 𝑘−(1−𝛼). 𝐺1−𝛼                                          (2.35) 
 
From equations (2.24) and (2.25), we can rewrite government spending G: 
Equation 2.36 
𝐺 = (𝜏𝐴𝐿
1
𝑎) . 𝑘                                                                                                        (2.36) 
 
Putting equation (2.36) into equation (2.35), we have:   
Equation 2.37 
𝑟 + 𝛿 = (1 − 𝜏). (
𝜕𝑌𝐼
𝜕𝐾𝑖
) = (1 − 𝜏) . 𝛼𝐴 . 𝑘−(1−𝛼). ⌈(𝜏𝐴𝐿)
1
𝛼
 .. 𝑘⌉
1−𝛼
                               (2.37) 
 
According to the AK model, a balanced equilibrium requires the growth rates of per 
capita consumption, capital and output to be the same. The familiar condition for the 
consumption optimization growth rate is given by: 
 
𝛾𝑐 =
?̇?
𝑐⁄ = (
1
𝜃⁄ ) ∙ (𝑟 − 𝜌)                                                                                   (2.38) 
 
Putting equation (2.37) into equation (2.38), we get a steady-state growth rate: 
Equation 2.39 
𝛾 = (1 𝜃⁄ ). ⌈𝛼𝐴
1 𝛼⁄  . (𝜏𝐿)(1−𝛼) 𝛼⁄  . (1 − 𝜏) − 𝛿 − 𝜌⌉                                             (2.39) 
 
From (2.39) we can see that the effect of government spending on economic growth 
depends on the tax ratio 𝜏 (see equation 2.33). The first difference in the tax ratio 𝜏 in 
(2.39): 
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Equation 2.40 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜏
=
1
𝜃
 . 𝛼 . 𝐴1−𝛼 . 𝐿
1−𝛼
𝛼  . 𝜏
1−𝛼
𝛼
 ⌈1 − 𝛼 − 𝜏⌉                                                             (2.40) 
 
According to (2.32), when the share of government spending as total output (𝜏 < 1 − 𝑎) 
is small, increasing government spending can raise economic growth. However, when 
government spending exceeds a certain level (𝜏 > 1 − 𝑎), an increase in government 
spending will have a negative effect on economic growth. Assuming
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜏⁄ = 0, we can 
get the optimal share of government spending to total output:  
 
𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼.                                                                                                            (2.41) 
 
In order to interpret such a result, we need to calculate the marginal product of 
government expenditure given in equation (2.32) as follows: 
 
)/τ(1)(Y/G)(1GΥ/                                                                            (2.42) 
 
When 𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼, we can get ∂Y/∂G=1. This result corresponds to the natural efficiency 
condition for the size of the government, in which the marginal cost is equal to the 
marginal benefit (the equilibrium point E* in Figure 2.3). Therefore, a benevolent 
government would seek to maximize the utility attained by the representative household 
in a first-best environment. However, although the condition ∂Y/∂G=1 would be part of 
this utility maximization problem, such a condition might not necessarily hold in a 
second-best scenario in which taxes were of a distorting nature (Stournaras, 2013).  
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Figure 2.3: Government spending and economic growth (the Armey curve) 
 
Source: Armey (1995) 
 
Armey (1995) developed the Armey Curve (Figure 2.3) to address the optimal size of 
government spending. He argued that the non-existence of government causes a state of 
anarchy and low levels of output per capita because there is no rule of law, and no 
protection of property rights. If the economy increases the government’s spending on the 
allocation of resources, output should rise. Accordingly, the output-enhancing features of 
the government should dominate when the government is very small, and any expansion 
in governmental size should be associated with an increase in output. When public 
spending rises, additional projects financed by the government become increasingly less 
productive, and taxes and borrowing add to the government’s burdens. Additionally, the 
Armey Curve indicates an optimal size of government, E*. At some point E*, the 
marginal benefits from increased government spending become zero. If public spending, 
as a share of GDP, is above the optimal point E*, the marginal effect of extra public 
spending becomes negative, which would then reduce real economic growth.  
2.5 Empirical evidence of government spending on economic 
growth  
The importance of public spending on economic growth has been extensively studied in 
the literature. The traditional approach in endogenous growth models to analyze the 
Real 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
r* 
Size of government (as share of GDP) g* 
E* 
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composition of government spending has been divided into two broad categories: 
productive and unproductive. Aschauer (1989) adopted a Cobb-Douglas production-
function approach, which incorporates public and private capital as well as labour into a 
neoclassical production function of the private sector. Within an endogenous growth 
framework, Barro (1990) introduced public spending into the production function. 
Several empirical studies have followed this idea to investigate the possible link between 
government spending and growth, using different econometric techniques, empirical 
settings and samples from different countries. Even though public spending can be a 
significant determinant of growth for countries that are capable of using expenditure for 
productive purposes, the results are nevertheless mixed. 
 
Different kinds of government expenditures have heterogeneous effects on economic 
growth. Some macroeconomists believe that the stock of public capital is an important 
factor in the production of total output. For example, public infrastructures, research and 
development and public education are often considered to be public goods, which have a 
positive effect on economic growth (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997). At the other extreme, 
various authors believe that this correlation is completely spurious, reflecting a 
misspecification of trend. Thus, the provision of public sector capital has little effect on 
private productivity (Fernald, 1999). There have also been observations that growth in 
government spending, mainly based on non-productive spending, is accompanied by a 
reduction in economic growth. Thus, it is criticized that the greater the size of government 
intervention, the greater the negative impact on economic growth (Pieroni, 2009).  
 
Table 2.1: The most-cited empirical literature on the relationship between public spending 
and economic growth 
Author(s) Data and Methods Results 
Grier and Tullock 
(1989) 
Panel data on 115 
countries, 1960-1981 
Negative relationship between growth rate of real 
GDP and government consumption's share of GDP 
Aschauer (1989) 
Time series, 1954-1982, 
US data 
Positive effect on output productivity  
Barro (1990) Panel data, 98 countries 
Positive long term relationship between public 
spending and growth if (1) below optimal level of 
public spending, (2) productive public spending. 
Munnell (1990b) 
Panel data of 48 states in 
the U.S. from 1970 to 
1986 
Public capital has a positive effect on output 
growth 
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Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) 
Panel data, across 
countries, between 1970-
1988 
Public investment has both positive and negative 
effects on output growth 
Devarajan et al., 
(1996) 
Panel data, 69 developing 
countries, 1970-90 
Different compositions of public spending have 
different effects on economic growth 
Kneller et al., 
(1999) 
Panel data, 22 OECD16 
countries over the period 
1970-1995  
Positive relation between public spending and 
growth, but depends on how taxation is financed 
Fernald (1999) 
Time series, 1953-1989, 
U.S. data 
Public investment on roads had a positive 
relationship with economic growth before 1973 
Alesina et al., 
(2002) 
18 OECD countries, 
1960-1996 
Public spending has a large, negative impact on 
private investment 
Afonso and 
Furceri (2010) 
15 EU members and rest 
14 OECD countries, from 
1970 -2005 
Public consumption spending has a negative 
impact on economic growth, and investment 
spending has no impact on economic growth 
 
 
Although several theories suggest that government expenditure has a key role in securing 
a higher steady-state growth rate of the economy, the empirical findings are not always in 
line with these theoretical suggestions. In the endogenous growth model with increasing 
returns to scale, steady-state real wages and private consumption are positively related to 
the share of government spending in output, if the labour supply is sufficiently elastic. 
Hence, government spending will not crowd-out long term private consumption 
(Devereux et al., 1996). In Table 2.1, we can find that some forms of public spending 
have a negative effect on economic growth in some empirical studies. For example, Grier 
and Tullock (1989) use pooled cross-section/time-series data of 115 countries, including 
both developed and developing countries, in the post-World War Two period. They find a 
significantly negative relationship between the growth rate of real GDP and the 
government’s share of GDP. Only government investment expenditure, such as the 
provision of infrastructure services, may have a positive impact on economic growth. 
Alesina et al., (2002) suggest that increases in public spending raise labour costs and 
reduce profits, and that private investment declines as well. These empirical observations 
have been called the ‘non-Keynesian’ effects of fiscal policy, in particular the crowding-
out effect of public spending.  
 
                                                 
16
 OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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The effects of public spending on output are diverse across different types of public 
spending, selected countries and time. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) state that fiscal policy 
is an important growth determinant in accounting for growth performance over the past 
three decades, but it varies according to the type of government consumption. Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993) used data from various countries to ascertain the effects of public 
investment on growth between 1970 and 1988. They included the key fiscal variables in 
the regressions, such as taxes, government expenditure and investment and transfer 
payments. Although they believed that public investment and other aspects of fiscal 
policy can contribute to economic growth, they found that total public investment, as well 
as public enterprise investment, has a negative effect on private investment. However, 
they found that transport and communication investment are robustly correlated with 
growth, and that the correlation between education, housing investment and growth is not 
significant. 
 
It has been asserted that definitions of public infrastructure capital make the most sense 
from an economics standpoint, including large capital-intensive monopolies such as 
highways, other transportation facilities, water and sewer lines, as well as 
communications systems (Gramlich, 1994). The economics approach to infrastructure 
investment involves computing all the benefits and costs of projects and their rate of 
return. If the effective real rate of return exceeds the going real interest rate, then the 
investment is worthwhile. Fernald (1999) examined road investment’s impact on 
productivity growth by using the U. S. data for the years 1953-89. He found that the road 
building contributed to the pre-1973 productivity growth, but did not offer the same 
benefits at later times. This indicates that public infrastructure spending in U.S. was 
higher than the optimal level after 1973. Moreover, this point differs from country to 
country, and may depend on economic factors such as the openness of the economy as 
well as social factors such as family size. For example, U.S. productivity growth slowed 
dramatically around 1973, and macroeconomists should have known that the slowdown in 
public investment after the early 1970s accounted for a substantial portion of the 
productivity slowdown, which occurred at around the same time in the United States and 
other Western countries.  
 
Kneller et al., (1999) tested the impact of public spending on economic growth for 22 
OECD countries over the period 1970-1995. They assumed that fiscal revenue was 
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collected from distortionary or non-distortionary taxation, and that public spending had 
productive and non-productive expenditures. They found that when the government 
budget was mainly financed by the non-distortionary taxation, an increase in productive 
expenditures significantly enhanced economic growth, and an increase in distortionary 
taxation significantly reduced economic growth rate.  
 
Miller and Russek (1997) also examined the effects of national fiscal structures on 
national economic growth, using a cross-country sample of both developed and 
developing countries. Firstly, they found that the method of financing government 
expenditure played an important role in determining the effects of public expenditures on 
economic growth in both developing and developed countries. For example, in 
developing countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure reduced 
economic growth, and tax-financed public expenditure promoted a higher growth. 
Contrastingly, for developed countries, debt-financed increases in government 
expenditure did not affect economic growth, and tax-financed increases led to lower 
growth. Secondly, they found that different expenditure categories affected growth 
differently. For example, increasing education expenditure by debt financing would have 
a positive effect on economic growth, rather than the predicted negative effects.  
 
More recently, Schaltegger and Torgler (2006) have suggested that large public 
expenditure reduces growth in high income countries. Agell, Ohlsson, and Thoursie 
(2006) indicated that there is no robust relationship between growth and the share of 
government expenditure. Afonso and Furceri (2010) focused on the components of total 
spending (transfers, subsidies, government consumption and government investment) 
across OECD and EU countries. They found that subsidies and government consumption 
had a significant, negative impact on economic growth in both sets of countries, and that 
government investment did not have a significant effect on growth. Only the transfers had 
a significant effect on growth in the EU countries.  
 
The composition of public spending is also a relevant issue. If the aim is to promote 
economic growth, the government should pay more attention to the more productive items 
of the budget. Based on the ‘AK’ model, Devarajan et al., (1996) asserted a positive effect 
of total government expenditure on economic growth; however, a negative effect of 
physical capital components of government expenditure on economic growth. They found 
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that a change in the mix of public spending could lead to a higher steady-state growth rate 
for the economy. The conditions depended not only on the physical productivity of the 
different components of public spending, but also on the share of government expenditure 
allocated to them. They also suggested that expenditure, which is normally considered as 
productive, could become unproductive if it reaches an excessive level. 
 
Various studies exist that have examined the effects of the composition of public spending 
on the social sector. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) examined the growth effect of shifting 
public spending from social security to education. They found that such a shift would 
lower economic growth. Zhang and Zhang (1998) found that social security programmes 
may actually accelerate economic growth when there are interaction effects with fertility 
and investment in human capital. 
 
Both the size of the government and the initial condition of the economy has a significant 
effect on the outcome of public spending. Perotti (1999) highlighted the importance of the 
initial condition of the economy, based on an analysis of both the positive and negative 
effects of fiscal policy on the economy. He argued that government expenditure shocks 
have a positive correlation with private consumption in normal times, and a negative 
correlation in bad times. The overall effect of fiscal policy may be determined by the 
initial condition of the economy, such as the initial level of debt. In general, Perotti argued 
that government expenditure shocks have positive effects at low levels of debt or deficit, 
yet negative effects in the opposite circumstances. Although public spending can 
harmonize conflicts between private and social interests, as well as provide a socially-
optimal direction for growth and development, a large volume of public spending is likely 
to be detrimental to both efficiency and economic growth. For example, (i) government 
operations are often conducted inefficiently, (ii) the regulatory process imposes excessive 
burdens and costs on the economic system, and (iii) many of the government's fiscal and 
monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lessen the productivity of the 
system (Ram, 1986). 
 
Even if we accept that the public spending has growth effects, it is not possible to address 
whether there is a causal relationship between public spending and economic growth. 
Firstly, we need to be cautious when drawing conclusions based on theories (both 
Keynesian and neoclassical growth theories) between a government’s size and economic 
Chapter 2: Literature Review I: Effects of Government Spending on Economic Growth 
47 
 
growth. The theories cannot encompass every element that could potentially increase 
economic growth, such as human capital, technological progress, international trade and 
political reform, economic freedom and the fluctuations of inputs and exchange rate in the 
same model.  
 
Furthermore, the theories are rather generalized, as they may postulate the same model for 
every country, and thereby exclude country-specific characteristics. Moreover, a larger 
public sector size does not necessarily imply a better satisfaction of public needs. The 
empirical studies have different results in terms of different countries, periods and the 
measurements of government spending. Agell et al., (1997) claimed that the statistical 
data and methodological problems have resulted in difficulties in creating comparable 
cross-country analysis. Traditional regression analysis assumes that explanatory variables 
do not depend on the rate of growth; an assumption of certainty is debatable when it 
comes to government expenditure. In most empirical studies, the problem is reduced to 
finding a simple linear relationship between growth and public spending by Wagner’s 
Law. However, reality is more complicated than that, which is why the assumption of 
linearity is difficult to explain. 
2.6. Empirical literature review of Chinese research 
In recent years, the relationship between public expenditure and economic growth has 
drawn the attention of many scholars. After the advent of China’s ‘tax sharing’17 reform 
in 1994, the division of fiscal power was based on the economic decentralization to 
establish balanced relationships between central and local governments, as well as 
between governments and SOEs (Jia and Liu, 2015). Generally, current research can be 
classified as investigations into the relationship between the scale of public spending, as 
well as its compositions and economic growth, and the optimum compensation of fiscal 
expenditure at national or provincial level data. This section attempts to generalize current 
findings based on these two criteria. 
                                                 
17
 The ‘tax sharing’ reform marked a milestone in the fiscal structural framework. It divided fiscal power 
and public spending between central and provincial governments, and defined the scope of their revenue 
according to the types of taxes.  
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2.6.1 Effects of public expenditure on economic growth at the national 
level 
The literature on the effects of public expenditure on economic growth mainly 
concentrated on its share of GDP. Compared with the mixed empirical results regarding 
public spending in the previous chapter, most Chinese studies have suggested that public 
spending has a positive effect on economic growth in the period of economic reforms. In 
other words, increasing government expenditure promoted faster economic growth in 
China during the economic reform period. For example, OuYang (2004) examined the 
effect of public spending on economic growth, and established a positive relationship 
between public spending and economic growth in the 1990s. He suggested that public 
spending also has a strong Keynesian effect on economic growth. Chen and Dai (2008) 
examined the multiplier effect of government expenditure on economic growth with time 
serial data from 1985 to 2006. They calculated that the multiplier of fiscal spending 
towards economic growth was 4.26, indicating that an increase in government spending 
boosted GDP more than four-fold during the period of 1985 to 2006. Moreover, they 
found an inverted ‘U’ shape relationship18 between the size of government spending and 
economic growth. This suggests that, with an increase in public spending, the marginal 
effect of extra public spending will fall to zero at the optimal level. Under the framework 
of fiscal decentralization, Jia, Guo and Liu (2006) explored the optimal level of public 
spending on economic growth. Theoretically, they insisted that the relationship between 
public spending and economic growth has an inverted U shape. Based on the empirical 
tests, they claimed that public spending is lower than the optimal level, and suggested that 
increasing the ratio of public investment would accelerate economic growth.   
 
We have discussed how different types of expenditure affect economic growth in 
different ways. There are different opinions regarding the growth effect of different types 
of public spending in China. According to Keynesian theory, investment is more 
important for economic growth, while new classical theory suggests human capital is 
crucial for long–term economic growth. Because the ratio of human resource investment 
to total capital investment is low in China, the marginal return to human capital 
                                                 
18
 The inverted ‘U’ shape relationship is consistent with the Armey curve in Section 2.4.2. 
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investment is higher than that of capital investment. Therefore, public spending on 
education and social welfare should have a greater growth effect than capital spending. 
Song et al., (2008) found that public spending on human capital, the labour force, social 
welfare and education are positively related with economic growth, while economic 
construction
19
 and administrative spending have a negative relation. Zhu and Zhu (2008) 
found a similar relationship between categories of public expenditure and GNP per capita 
in China from 1978 to 2005. The results suggest that economic construction expenditure, 
social welfare, culture and educational expenditure and national defence expenditure have 
a positive effect on GNP per capita. In addition, social, cultural and educational 
expenditure have a greater impact on economic growth than economic construction 
expenditure.  
 
In contrast, administration expenditure has very little impact on GNP per capita. Zhang 
(2010) also found that economic construction spending, social protection and educational 
expenditure can promote economic growth, but administrative and national defence 
expenditure will hinder economic growth. However, Sun (2004) and Wang (2009) 
postulate a negative relationship between public investment and economic growth, 
because infrastructure investment has surpassed the optimal value. They found that only 
education expenditure is positively associated with economic growth. In contrast, other 
types of spending, such as health expenditure, scientific research expenditure, economic 
construction expenditure, national defence spending and administration expenditure have 
a negative relationship with economic growth. 
 
In recent years, a growing number of empirical studies have examined the causality
20
 
between public spending and economic growth. Dong and Teng (2007) and Zhou (2010) 
found a positive, long term dynamic relationship between fiscal expenditure and 
economic growth on the basis of the Granger causality analysis. By implementing a VAR 
(vector autoregression) model, Guo and Jia (2006) applied the endogenous growth model 
                                                 
19
 This is the largest category according to the Chinese classification by categories before 2006. It includes 
all Capital Expenditure (Capital Construction, Innovation Funds and Science and Technology Promotion 
Funds) and from Current Expenditure: Economic Services (Geological Protecting, Agriculture, Operating 
Expenses of Industry, Commerce, and Transport, and Working Capital for State enterprises), Urban 
Maintenance and Construction Support for Developing Areas and Policy Subsidies. For full categories of 
spending, please see Appendix A. Source: Ministry of Finance (2004), OECD (2006). 
20
 Causality here means that a correlation between two variables does not necessarily imply that one causes 
the other. This is usually the case in the Granger causality test and VAR models.  
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by dividing government investment into capital investment and human capital investment 
in order to examine the long term impacts of public investment from 1978 to 2004. They 
suggested that both capital and human investment have a positive relationship with long 
term economic growth. Moreover, the positive effect of capital investment on the 
economy is greater than that of human investment, and the bidirectional Granger 
Causality relationship between them had been established. The effect of human resource 
investment on long term economic growth is weakly positive, and may become negative 
in the short term. Li and Wu (2009) applied a vector error correction model (VECM) to 
analyze the impact of the scale and structure of public spending on economic growth from 
1978 to 2006. The empirical results suggest that the total scale of public spending is a 
crucial factor in economic growth in the long term. In terms of the composition model, 
although educational, cultural and social welfare investment will increase the rate of 
economic growth in the long term, economic construction and administrative expenditure 
are not beneficial to economic growth.  
 
 
To sum up, most Chinese scholars have found a positive relationship between public 
spending and economic growth in China over different time periods. However, the 
differing composition of public spending may result in different effects on economic 
growth. Although there are different views regarding the growth effect of public capital 
investment, spending on human resources has exhibited a greater growth effect than 
capital investment. Guo et al., (2003) indicated a different relationship with economic 
growth between productive and non-productive expenditure. Productive public 
expenditure, such as public investment, is positively associated with economic growth, 
while non-productive public spending, such as transfer payments and administrative 
expenditure, will restrain the growth of economy.  
 
Meanwhile, the excessive growth of government consumption occupies a large proportion 
of productive expenditure, which constrains the growth effect of productive expenditure, 
and thus triggers a negative relationship between government spending and economic 
growth. Xia (2009) conducted a study of the impact of public expenditure on economic 
growth. There were various findings: excessive public capital spending on economic 
construction will depress the development of economy; there is a serious shortage in 
social welfare expenditure and educational spending although, because of its low 
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efficiency, the effect on economic growth is negative; to enhance income distribution as 
well as the economic growth rate, capital investment should be suppressed and human 
resources investment and social welfare spending should be encouraged.  
2.6.2 Effects of public spending on economic growth at the provincial 
level 
China began its fiscal decentralization reform when it began to open up. The evolution of 
China's fiscal system has passed from the centralized fiscal regime through to each 
administrative level having its own source of revenue and expenditure in the framework 
of a market economy. Fiscal decentralization is, in essence, the granting to local 
governments of a certain scope of taxation rights and expenditure responsibilities, and 
permitting them to decide upon their own budgets independently. Thus, local 
governments, at the grassroots level, have the right to design the scale and structure of 
their budgetary expenditures, select the policy model of their own free choice and actively 
take part in social management. The most significant change in provincial government 
spending is that the ratio of provincial spending has comprised approximately 80 per cent 
of total fiscal expenditure in recent years. Hence, a growing number of studies have 
focused on public spending at the provincial level.  
 
Apart from fiscal decentralization, the impact of China’s geography on economic 
development is also significant. Thus, there is a genuine need to include study at the 
provincial level to account for regional disparities. Whilst some studies focus on a single 
province or district, others target several provinces. As is the case with studies into the 
composition of national fiscal expenditure, studies of regional fiscal expenditure 
unanimously agree that regional public spending subcategories have different impacts on 
economic growth. Meanwhile, due to the differences in the choice of data and methods, 
the results on output growth vary. 
 
I. Single province studies 
 
Meng and Cui (2009) selected Liaoning province as an example to investigate the 
relationship between public expenditure and economic growth. With the Granger 
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causality relation test, they found a long–term relationship between total public 
expenditure and the level of GDP. In addition, culture and education expenditure and 
economic construction expenditure have a positive growth effect in the long term, while 
social expenditure and maintenance expenditure have a negative effect. Furthermore, 
according to the results of the Granger test, cultural and education expenditure will also 
promote GDP. On the other hand, GDP growth promotes greater social welfare 
expenditure. Zhang (2009) explored the relationships between different types of public 
expenditure and economic growth in Hunan province. He found a positive relationship 
between economic growth and several types of expenditure, including public 
infrastructure expenditure, cultural and educational expenditure. Public infrastructure 
expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth, although the coefficient is low. 
Cultural and educational expenditure is positively associated with economic growth, with 
more elasticity in growth than infrastructure expenditure. Other forms of public 
expenditure, such as national defence expenditure, agriculture expenditure, administration 
expenditure and city maintenance fees all have a negative effect on economic growth.  
 
Based on the annual public expenditure data of Yunnan province from 1978 to 2006, Guo 
(2009) adopted the VAR model and found that the impact on GDP varies across the 
different types of expenditure. Although science and education expenditure have the most 
positive growth effect, the effects are relatively insignificant. In contrast, the volume of 
infrastructural and administrative spending is quite large, yet its coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Chen (2009) used the data of Fujian province in the VAR method 
to draw a similar conclusion; that is, that public spending on science and entrepreneurial 
innovation has a significant, positive relationship with economic growth. 
 
Liang, Chang and Xu (2008) used the VAR technique to analyze the impact of fiscal 
expenditure based on data from 1978 to 2006 in Shaanxi province. The results suggest 
that the effect of total provincial public expenditure on economic growth is not 
statistically significant. Additionally, the various subcategories of expenditure have 
different effects on economic growth: public investment expenditure is ranked as having 
the greatest growth effect, followed by public consumption expenditure and 
administrative expenditure. Li and Yu (2010) also adopted the VAR technique on data 
from Gansu province. The results demonstrate that there is a negative relationship 
between infrastructure and administrative spending and economic growth, yet a positive 
Chapter 2: Literature Review I: Effects of Government Spending on Economic Growth 
53 
 
relationship with economic reconstruction
21
 spending, innovation of enterprise 
expenditure, agricultural expenditure, social welfare, cultural expenditure and education.  
 
Wu and Jiang (2010) focused on Hainan province from 1987 to 2006. Empirical analysis 
showed that science, cultural and education expenditures are significantly positively 
related to economic growth, but that administrative spending is negative. Liang et al. 
(2008) takes Shanxi province as an example to explore the same issue. Through the VAR 
model and impulse response function analysis, many findings emerged: economic 
construction expenditure has a positive relationship with the GDP growth rate, and the 
coefficient is strong; scientific, technological and cultural spending also has a significant 
growth effect, but makes a smaller contribution than capital spending; conversely, 
administrative expenditure and social welfare spending have a negative effect on 
economic growth and the coefficient of social welfare expenditure is higher than that for 
administrative spending. 
 
Hence, the effects of public spending on economic growth in a single province are highly 
consistent. We can see that the public spending on science, economic reconstruction 
(public investment) and education have a significant effect on economic growth. 
Contrastingly, expenditure on social welfare and administration has a negative effect on 
economic growth.  
 
II. Cross-provincial studies 
 
Using provincial panel data, Wang and Zhou (2009) followed the econometric method of 
Aschauer (1989), including government investment within the production function with 
panel data from 1994 to 2006. They found provincial public investment to be quite low 
and lacking in efficiency. This result suggests that the direct impact of government 
investment is not strong, but that public investment will promote private production, 
which boosts the economy indirectly. Thus, an increase in government investment will 
crowd-in private investment, in turn, to promote faster economic growth.  
 
Kou and Zhou (2007) followed the econometric model of Ghosh and Roy (2004), using 
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 Economic reconstruction is public investment in China, according to the definition from the Statistical 
Yearbook of China.  
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panel data from 1993 to 2005, to analyze the effects of government expenditure in 30 
provinces. From the perspective of capital spending and services spending, public 
spending on infrastructure, innovation of enterprises expenditure, agricultural spending, 
industry and transportation, education and cultural expenditure have significantly boosted 
economic growth. In contrast, scientific and technological expenditures, administration 
spending of fiscal departments and expenditure by public security organizations, 
procuratorial and people's courts have a negative impact on economic growth.  
 
Yang (2009) studied the effects of public investment on economic growth by using panel 
data from 1994 to 2005, that is, data since the tax sharing reforms of 1994. He found that 
an increase in public spending on culture and education, infrastructure expenditure, 
agricultural expenditure and city maintenance fees will boost economic growth, whereas 
social welfare expenditure has a significantly negative relation with economic growth. 
However, scrutinizing the same time period from 1995 to 2005, Yu (2008) analyzed the 
relation between provincial government spending and economic growth in 31 provinces, 
districts and cities. He suggested that productive expenditure, such as economic 
reconstruction and the innovation of enterprises expenditure and regional agriculture 
expenditure, all have a significantly negative effect on economic growth, while the other 
types fail to show any impact on economic growth. 
 
Yan and Gong (2009) investigated the impact of fiscal policy using an endogenous 
growth model. They indicated that the structure of public expenditure will affect 
economic growth through the choice of the ratio of productive public expenditure to total 
production. They sought to determine the optimal level of spending as a share of GDP. 
Specifically, this paper used data from 31 provinces, setting up the panel data model and 
exploring the impact of productive public expenditure on economic growth. The results 
showed that productive public production in China does not always boost the economy, 
and it exhibits strong geographical variations. They suggested that possible explanations 
for this are that the scale of productive public expenditure exceeds the acceptable level in 
some regions, or that the efficiency of this expenditure may be low. 
 
Because geographical differences play a significant role in the impact of regional fiscal 
expenditure on regional economic growth, some scholars choose to divide the Chinese 
provinces by their geographical area, such as eastern, central and western regions, or 
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coastal and inland regions. Liu and Guo (2009) focused on the growth effect of public 
spending in the western, middle and eastern regions of China. In general, the ratio of 
infrastructure expenditure was shown to benefit the economy, but administrative 
expenditure had a negative effect on economic growth. The impact of educational 
expenditure, however, varies significantly across these three regions. With the panel data 
of the western part of China from 1996 to 2007, Wang et al., (2010) investigated the 
relationship between public expenditure and economic growth. They found a positive 
relation between government expenditure and economic growth. 
 
However, an increase in public spending crowded-out private consumption in the western 
regions during this period. Li and Wang (2010) suggested that all the western, middle and 
eastern regions had a positive relationship between public spending and economic growth, 
but there were significant geographical differences. Public spending in the eastern 
provinces had the most significant effect on economic growth, while provinces in the 
central part of China had the least. Moreover, fiscal expenditure in the eastern and central 
parts of China crowded-in private consumption, while crowding-out private consumption 
in the western regions. The long term Granger causality relation existed among 
government expenditure, private consumption and economic growth in the eastern and 
central parts of China, but not in the western part. Simultaneously, the short term two-way 
Granger causality relation between public spending and economic growth emerged in the 
eastern part, whereas the single-way Granger causality relation existed in the central part.  
 
To summarize, as regards the impact of total public expenditure scale on economic 
growth, there is an agreement among Chinese scholars on the positive effect of total 
expenditure on economic growth at both the national level and the provincial level. 
Compared with the empirical results of public spending (section 2.5) in other countries, 
China’s public spending shows a strong Keynesian effect, one in which an increase of 
public spending (investment) will increase economic output. Moreover, some Chinese 
scholars have focused on the long term relationship between public spending and 
economic growth in the new classical endogenous growth model. These scholars
22
 
suggest that public spending is an endogenous variable in promoting economic growth in 
the long term. There exist different views on the effect of public spending on private 
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 See for example Guo and Jia (2006), Dong and Teng (2007), Li and Wu (2009) and Zhou (2010). 
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investment. For example, Li and Wang (2010) and Wang et al., (2010) find that public 
investment has a crowding-in effect on private investment in central and eastern parts of 
China, yet a crowding-out effect in the western parts of China. This result reveals the 
strong geographical variations as regards effects on economic development. The western 
parts
23
 of China are the less developed areas of the country, including eleven provinces 
and one municipality - Chongqing. When the ‘western development plan’ began in 2000, 
a huge amount of public investment was launched in these provinces, an action which 
may have caused the reduction in the share of private investment in total investment. 
Hence, the ‘western development plan’ may have caused the crowding-out effect in 
western China temporarily.  
 
As regards the impact of the fiscal expenditure structure on economic growth, scholars 
have demonstrated the varied impacts of different compositions of public spending on 
economic growth via diverse samples of data and econometric methods. However, most 
scholars find that public expenditure on science, economic reconstruction (public 
investment) and education have a significant growth effect on economic growth, while 
social welfare and administration expenditure have a negative effect on economic growth. 
However, there are different views
24
 in terms of capital public spending (public 
investment). Some scholars emphasize that excessive infrastructure investment has 
surpassed the optimal value, or that it is relatively inefficient. They suggest that public 
spending on social sectors, such as education and social welfare, is more important for 
economic growth. They argue that a high level of public investment and administration 
spending will reduce economic efficiency and equality; in turn, a low share of social 
sector spending will reduce domestic consumption. From this review of current Chinese 
literature, we can find that public spending has a significant growth effect in China, and 
its structures need to adjust for balanced economic growth. This requires reducing the 
proportion of administrative public spending, and increasing the share of social sector 
spending and the efficiency of public spending, especially in the less developed western 
parts of China
25
.  
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 Western China comprises 70 per cent of China's land, but only 30 per cent of its population, and 20 per 
cent of its total economic output at the end of 2010. 
24
 See for example Sun (2004), Yu (2008), Wang (2009) and Xia (2009). 
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 This point of view was also embraced by the Chinese State Council on June 6
th
 2016. The state council 
ordered all levels of Chinese Government to implement policy measures that would include ‘steady growth, 
adjusting structure, promoting reforms and benefit livelihood’.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a debate on the role of government; the main objectives of public 
fiscal policy are economic efficiency, the redistribution of public resources and 
macroeconomic stability. It has reviewed the Keynesian and neoclassical views of 
macroeconomics, public spending and output growth. Both Keynesian theory and 
endogenous growth theory have posited the positive effect of government spending on 
economic growth. However, while the theory identifies productive government 
expenditure as having a key role in obtaining a higher steady-state growth rate of the 
economy, the empirical findings are not consistent with the theoretical suggestions. The 
empirical review has focused on the impact of government spending, and it has 
demonstrated that the relationship with economic growth is different across different 
compositions and taxation methods. 
 
The debate among economists shows that public spending has the potential to drive either 
positive or negative effects on real output or economic growth. The effect of public 
investment is considered to be positive if this investment is likely to enhance the 
productivity of the private sector. Conversely, if capital expenditure has been excessive in 
some circumstances, public spending can become unproductive at the margin. Hence, in 
order to achieve a positive outcome of public spending, governments need to pay 
attention to the scale and composition of public spending, and the ways of financing 
public expenditure at different time periods. In the empirical review of Chinese literature, 
we find a strong positive relationship between total public spending and economic growth 
at both the national level and the provincial level. In other words, the fast economic 
growth of China has depended heavily on public investment since its economic 
liberalization (Chen, 2012). Although there are regional economic differences between 
Chinas various provinces, education spending and public investment have a positive 
effect on GDP growth. In addition, social welfare spending constitutes only a small share 
of total public spending, and has a negative relationship with GDP growth in China. 
Contrastingly, public administrative spending accounts for a large share of total public 
spending, but has a negative effect on GDP growth. In order to maintain balanced 
economic growth, there is a need to adjust the structure of Chinese public spending 
towards greater efficiency and equality.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review II: Government Spending and 
Inequality 
3.1 Introduction 
Although much of the attention in public policy is focused on the impact of public 
spending on economic output, economic growth in itself does not constitute an 
improvement in economic welfare for a sizable proportion of the population. In the field 
of public sector economics, the government is assumed to be a social welfare maximizer, 
providing public goods and services which the private sector regards as inefficient or 
unprofitable. Social welfare and equality are the key indicators to measure the 
redistributive role of government. There is a substantial body of literature on government 
spending and inequality which seeks to explore the question of whether public spending 
can reduce inequality in an era of global economic integration. Rudra (2004) compared 
the redistributional effects of social spending between the developing and the developed 
countries. He found that all of the categories of social spending help to improve income 
distribution in rich countries, yet the effects of social spending are much less favourable 
in Less Developing Countries (LDCs).  
 
In China, previous economic and fiscal reforms played a crucial role in accounting for 
rapid economic development. Conversely, reforms may arguably have had negative 
effects on income equality over the past two decades. The overall gap between different 
geographic regions has become increasingly prominent at the regional level of economic 
growth and equality. The failure of balanced regional economic development threatens 
Chinese social stability, and it further increases the risk of political and social 
fragmentation, as well as massive interregional migration. This may have been caused by 
an inadequacy in public spending and unmet social needs in terms of public welfare. 
These points suggest that it is important to study public spending as a tool to making 
economic development more evenly distributed, as well as achieving growth. Because 
government budgets are limited, policymakers need to be able to evaluate the 
distributional effects of public spending components. To date, the relationship between 
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public spending and income inequality remains under-examined in the existing studies.  
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between 
public spending, inequality and growth. Section 3.2 introduces the rise of global 
inequality and the redistributional role of government spending. Section 3.3 reviews the 
theoretical models based on public spending and inequality. Section 3.4 concludes the 
empirical literature on public spending and inequality. Section 3.5 illustrates China’s 
public spending on social welfare to reduce inequality. The final section provides the 
conclusion and limitations of this chapter. 
3.2 Role of redistributional government spending  
Public Economics, which can be defined as the study of government intervention in the 
market place, is intimately concerned with the welfare implications of governmental 
intervention in the marketplace. Traditionally, the subject has been split up into an 
analysis of the ‘positive’ question of efficiency, and the ‘normative’ question of choosing 
the right distribution of welfare among individuals (Jha, 1998). There exists a general 
agreement that resources should be used as effectively as possible to maximise the 
welfare of society, which is the objective of economic efficiency, or what is called ‘Pareto 
optimality’. However, this approach does not address concerns about equality, even if an 
economy is indeed Pareto-efficient. One of the most important objectives of the 
government is to redistribute income by taking money away from some individuals and 
distributing the money to others. There are two major categories of explicit redistributive 
programmes, i.e., public assistance and social insurance (Stiglitz, 1988). Thus, public 
spending has been regarded as the main vehicle to achieving the goals of equality in an 
economy.  
 
In Chapter 2, numerous studies indicated that the growth in public spending is not a 
handicap to economic growth, but that it seems to be an essential aspect of economic 
growth and development in most countries. This is not only because public spending has a 
crucial role in investment in infrastructure, but also because public spending is a more 
efficient way of producing numerous services, such as education, health and social 
protection. Unlike pure public goods, public goods or services can create either 
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externalities or problems of moral hazard (Musgrave, 1959; Inman, 1987). This can lead 
to an outcome of inefficiency under such market failures. However, compared to the 
private provision of public goods or services, government provision involves the concept 
of equality and income distribution. Therefore, the government’s provision of public 
goods and services is introduced partly as the response to a market failure and income 
distribution.  
 
In the western economies, there are two major types of social models, which are the 
liberal model in U.S.A. and the social democratic model in the Europe. In the 1980s, the 
social democratic model was under severe attack with the seeming exception of the 
Nordic countries. As unemployment rose substantially in the European welfare states and 
the crowning achievement of social democracy suffered cuts (Huber and Stephens, 1998). 
The spread of U.S. liberal model was facilitated through the deregulation of labor and 
financial markets and reduction in public expenditures. Navarro and Schmitt (2005) 
challenge the widely held view in neoliberal discourse that there is a necessary trade-off 
between higher efficiency and lower reduction of inequalities. They found that the liberal 
model has been less efficient economically (for example, slower economic growth, higher 
unemployment) than the social model in existence in the European Union.  
 
On the other hand, developing and transition economies have different types of social 
model than western economies. It has been difficult to replicate either U.S. liberal model 
or European social democratic model in these economies. In the developing world, East 
Asian and Chinese models have been quite successful. In the 1980s and 1990s, many 
developing countries adopted western models but failed to achieve socioeconomic 
development and a stable democracy. Therefore, the China model can offer an alternative 
point of reference for developing economies. 
 
Another major issue is whether the governmental policies that target the specific spatial 
allocation of public investment have in fact succeeded in reducing regional inequalities. 
These public policies are commonly grounded in the ‘hypothesis of regional 
redistribution’. This hypothesis states that regional inequalities may decline as a result of 
a specific distribution of public investment, which is designed to encourage regional 
economic convergence (Costa-i-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005). Among developed 
countries, public welfare spending has a relatively positive effect on income distribution. 
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Garrett (1988) states that a higher level of public spending on welfare programmes can be 
reconciled when this spending is indeed redistributive. Capital flow is not necessarily 
disrupted when a government devotes more resources to redistribution, because welfare 
states can bring about lower social strife and encourage social (labour market) 
cooperation. However, social spending in many LDCs is not redistributive, which 
suggests that the western models of social spending must be reassessed in LDCs. In 
developing countries, particularly in postcolonial societies, state apparatuses are 
sometimes overdeveloped when compared to the private sector, monopolizing and 
controlling the resources in the national economy. State-oriented policies encourage the 
uneven allocation of resources as well as income differentials between employees in the 
public and private sector, and governments prefer to invest in state-sponsored industries. 
 
Moreover, government spending has been characterised largely by infrastructural 
investment in most developing countries. These policies have been justified by a number 
of authors in terms of the positive impact of public investment on economic growth 
(Aschauer 1989; Munnell 1990; Gramlich 1994; Fernald 1999). Public spending is 
increasingly playing a redistributive role, since a positive relationship between growth 
and inequality has been established, e.g. Barro (2000), which implies that the inequality 
will not reduce by itself after a certain level of economic growth, as it was suggested by 
Kuznets (1955). From this point of view, policymakers have to confront the issue that 
growth-enhancing policies may have a negative effect on the distribution of income, as 
they increase the return of capital, and when the capital is not equally distributed, a higher 
return to capital generates greater income inequality.  
 
Hence, policymakers need to evaluate the distributional impacts of public spending 
components. The optimal level of public sector spending is determined by balancing the 
potential social gains against the loss in efficiency that is created by tax wedges, which 
are necessary to finance the public sector (Agell et al., 1997). Walle (1996) suggests that 
benefit incidence studies assume that the value of public services can be identified by the 
cost of providing them. Then, governments assign benefits to the users of the services 
ranked by various agreed measures of current welfare. These examine the distributional 
effects of the specific category of public spending on the chosen welfare indicator. This 
provides a way to determine whether the public spending component actually reduces or 
increases inequality.  
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3.3 Public spending and income inequality 
This section explores the effect of government spending on distributive outcomes by 
either changing individuals’ incomes, or by changing public infrastructure and services. In 
the literature on public choice, elected politicians should pursue policies aimed at 
maximizing net social benefit. For example, even though public education and health 
services do not change individuals’ incomes, they expand opportunities to include those 
who could not afford these services in a completely private system. Governmental 
expenditure can also affect the distribution of income among generations. In many 
developed countries, governments transfer resources from the young to the old in the 
form of social security systems (Glomm and Kaganovich, 2003). Moreover, using 
different governmental fiscal policies can have different effects on income distribution. If 
public expenditure on infrastructure such as roads and railways are financed by taxes, 
rather than by borrowing, the current generation will subsidize future generations. In 
contrast, when workers are taxed to finance the social security payments to the retired 
generation, there is an income transfer from the younger to the older generation (Pogue 
and Sgontz, 1978).  
 
The Keynesian view evolved out of the Great Depression, and it suggested that market 
economies are inherently unstable. Such instability generates welfare-reducing 
fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. The Keynesian view assumes that 
governments actually desire stability as a platonic guardian of social welfare. In the 
Keynesian framework, it is assumed that politicians will automatically take the necessary 
actions to maximize social welfare by following the impartial and well-informed advice 
provided by other economic advisers. However, in the new political economic 
perspective, policy makers will be strongly influenced by interest groups, political parties 
and a balance of conflict in voters. Therefore, the politico-economic approach to 
macroeconomic policy highlights the incentives, which confront politicians and influence 
their policy choices (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). 
 
The political economy approach indicates that a higher level of inequality will lead the 
government to increase redistributional public spending via the pressure of voters. Mello 
and Tiongson (2006) suggest that the relationship between public spending and income 
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inequality is based on the median voter hypothesis, a notion proposed by Meltzer and 
Richard (1981). Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that the rule of majority determines the 
size of a government. According to the majority rule, a balanced tax policy will follow the 
voters’ choice. Under the model adopted by Meltzer and Richard (1981), there is a larger 
income gap between mean voters26 and median voters in a more unequal country than that 
in a more equal country, which will have greater pressure for redistributional public 
spending. The median voters tend to pressurise the government to alter its policy of 
income redistribution, because the benefits that the median voters obtain from a new 
policy exceed those costs generated by taxation for redistribution. Until they achieve an 
equal society, people feel the same about redistribution, and no one wants higher taxation 
for redistributive policies. 
 
Benabou (2000) attempts to address the question of standard political economy theory27, 
in which more unequal countries tend to redistribute less than industrialised countries. He 
developed a stochastic model to examine the relationship between public spending and 
income inequality under the assumption of imperfect capital markets. Capital market 
imperfections enable individuals with high initial wealth to become richer, and thereby 
make society more unequal. He identified a negative relationship between income 
inequality and public spending in the long run. Redistributive public spending can 
improve welfare, which implies that their political supporters tend to reduce inequality. In 
the short term, he shows that the relationship between inequality and redistribution is 
nonlinear (U-shaped), and that there is potential for multiple steady states. In other words, 
when income inequality is low, government policies are likely to support large income 
transfers. Under the circumstances that there exists a high level of income inequality in a 
society, the government tends to use less public spending on income redistribution 
because the consensus for ex ante efficient redistribution policy breaks down, and beyond 
this point the standard effect eventually dominates. Intuitively, efficient redistributions 
meet with wide consequences in a relatively equal society, but opposition in an unequal 
one.  
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 Median voters’ income is the median of all voters’ income. The mean income is equal to the sum of all 
voters’ income divided by the number of voters. 
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 The standard Political Economics theory means that policy makers have incentives to increase 
redistributive public spending when inequality is large.  
Chapter 3: Literature Review II: Government Spending and Inequality 
64 
 
Public spending as an effective tool to eliminate income inequality has been announced 
by the United Nations Millennium Reports over various years. It seems that those 
countries with higher inequality should spend more proportion of their public spending on 
income redistribution. Melllo and Tiongson (2006) investigate whether more unequal 
societies are likely to spend more on income redistribution than other societies that are 
more equal. Melllo and Tiongson (2006) apply the median voter hypothesis to investigate 
public spending based on the level of income equality among different countries. Their 
models allow for a nonlinear relationship between public spending and income 
inequality28. Whilst Political Economics literature supports the notion that more unequal 
societies should have higher redistributive income spending, it also finds that unequal 
societies may actually spend less on income redistribution at the cross-country level, due 
to the imperfections of the capital market. For example, the incomplete market view 
suggests that income inequality is consistent, especially when poor people do not use 
capital markets to hedge economic shocks or economic crises to obtain profit from 
investment.  
 
Moreover, due to different levels of political influence and rent seeking, a negative 
relationship between redistributional public spending and income inequality may also 
transpire. In Rodriguez’s (2004) non-median voter model, the negative relationship 
between inequality and redistributional public spending can be accounted for, as more 
economic resources will be transferred from the poor to the rich with an increase in 
inequality; those with more economic resources have more political power, or are closer 
to the policymakers. Therefore, this context provides easier access for the rich to the 
policy makers, allowing them to bargain for their benefit maximization. Consequently, 
any increase in inequality will generate a lower level of equilibrium of redistributional 
public spending.  
 
In addition, Moene and Wallerstein (2003) study the impact of income inequality on 
social welfare public spending in different categories on the basis of the median voter 
hypothesis. They find that public spending in most welfare spending categories is 
                                                 
28
The model is: 
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐼1 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑖
2 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 . Where 𝑇 stands for redistributive public spending, 𝑌 
denotes GDP, 𝐼 is the Gini coefficient that is used to measure income inequality, 𝐶 indicates a vector of 
control variables, 𝑢 is the error term and 𝑖 identifies different countries in the sample 
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uncorrelated with income inequality. Corcoran and Evans (2010) employ the median 
voter model to investigate the relationship between public spending on education and 
income inequality. They conclude that income inequality is negatively related with public 
spending on education. Gradstein (2003) reviews the literature and identifies a bias that, 
under political pressure, public policies always err in favour of the rich. He argues that 
this bias, with its origins in extreme income inequality, is likely to induce an incidence 
bias called ‘social exclusion’. In this argument, inequality in public spending on education 
leads to an increase in income inequality. 
 
Contrastingly, there have been a number of empirical studies on the impact of public 
spending on inequality. Calderon and Chong (2004) show the relationship between public 
spending on infrastructure and income inequality in a cross-countries analysis during the 
period from 1960 to 1997. They use the measurements of railways, energy, roads and 
telecommunications, and they apply panel regressions for individual measurements and 
composite indices. Calderon and Chong (2004) find a negative link between the quantity 
and quality of public infrastructure and income inequality, in which the public 
infrastructure spending can help to reduce income inequality. Rudra (2004) tests the link 
between government public spending, including welfare, education, social security and 
health, openness and income inequality. The panel data set includes 35 LDCs and 11 
industrial countries for the period 1972 to 1996. He finds that public spending in all 
categories can help reduce income inequality in developed countries, but similar effects 
cannot be found in LDCs, with the exception of the effect of education spending. Holzner 
(2011) focuses on the relationship between income inequality and public spending in 
Central, East and South East Europe from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. In general, 
government public spending negatively impacts on income inequality. Specifically, 
government public expenditure on health, social protection, housing and education will 
reduce income inequality. However, Adelantado and Cuevas (2006) examine the 
relationship between social protection spending, income inequality and the risk of poverty 
by focusing on the European Union. They find that the countries that spend more on 
social protection will increase income inequality and the risk of poverty. Conversely, the 
countries with less spending on social protection may reduce income inequality and the 
risk of poverty.  
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Social welfare spending provides income redistribution from rich to poor people or offers 
public insurance, but its effect on income inequality is related to the design of the 
government’s policies. Moene and Wallerstein (2003) examined the impact of income 
inequality on public welfare spending in different categories among developed countries 
from 1980 to 1995. They found that welfare spending on health care, poverty alleviation, 
family benefits, housing subsidies and pensions are unrelated to income inequality. 
Nevertheless, welfare spending on income replacement programmes such as sickness pay, 
disability, unemployment insurance and occupational illness has a negative relationship 
with inequality. Finally, they indicated that public insurance on social welfare is 
appropriate. Costa-I-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2005) investigate whether public 
investment can reduce regional income inequalities in Mexico. In their work, regions are 
classified into different groups according to their regional income. They found a 
significant negative relationship between public spending and regional inequality in the 
regions with the highest income. The findings suggest that public investment can reduce 
income inequality only in regions with a certain level of income.  
 
Apart from social protection spending, education and health spending are also 
components of social spending. Corcoran and Evans (2010) studied the relationship 
between public spending on education and income inequality by using the panel data of 
U.S. school districts from 1970 to 2000. They used a median voter model and found that 
income inequality that decreases the tax share of median voters leads to a higher level of 
public spending on education. Furthermore, according to their estimates, 12 to 22 per cent 
of the increase in public education spending is attributable to the rise of income 
inequality. Conversely, Afonso et al., (2010) used a sample of OECD countries to 
investigate the impact of public spending of education on income inequality. They found 
that higher public spending on education induces more equal income distribution among 
OECD countries. Ghobarah et al., (2004) state that the resources used for public health 
care account for nearly 10 per cent of total worldwide economic resources. In order to 
investigate the variation at the level of public spending on health and the achievement of 
health, they use data from the World Health Organization (WHO) and develop an 
analytical framework. They find that severe income inequality reduces the amount of 
resources devoted to health care. Bidani and Ravallion (1997) and Gupta et al., (2003) 
examine whether public spending on health has a greater effect on the poor. They find that 
the poor countries are more likely to be in poor health, and that public spending on health 
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has a greater impact in poor countries. However, Selden and Sing (2008) investigate the 
incidence of public spending on health care in the United States. They find that public 
spending on health care provides more benefits to middle and upper income families than 
to lower income families.  
 
To sum up, the standard Political Economics theory suggests a higher level of inequality 
will generate more public spending on redistribution, based on the median voter theorem. 
However, the opposite is the case: unequal countries have a relatively lower level of 
redistributive public spending at the cross-country level. In addition, redistributive public 
spending will only reduce inequality by achieving a certain level of income. Moreover, 
the design and efficiency of redistributive spending plays an important role in the 
reduction of inequality. As regards education spending, this will increase income 
inequality in the U.S., yet reduce inequality in the OECD countries. As with healthcare 
spending, there is also a huge difference in its effects in a single country or cross-country 
analysis, which should have a greater effect on poor populations in poor countries.  
3.4 Economic growth and income inequality 
Numerous theories have been constructed to assess the relationship between inequality 
and economic growth, ever since the advent of the inverted ‘U’ hypothesis by Kuznets 
(1955) in his paper “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”. Following the 
publication of this influential paper, many economists focused on the way in which a 
country can attain faster economic growth while simultaneously maintaining control over 
income inequality. In the Kuznets model, the agricultural and rural sector initially 
constitutes the economy with a low per capita income and inequality. Economic 
development involves a shift of people and resources from agriculture to industry. When 
the industrial and urban sectors start to grow, both income and inequality will increase at 
the early stages of development. Barro (2000) states that, in Kuznets’ theory, some people 
experience a rise in per capita income while others do not, and this possibly raises the 
overall level of inequality in the economy. According to other approaches, the poor sector 
may be the users of old technology, whereas the rich sector is that which employs more 
advanced technology. By contrast, Kuzents’ inverted ‘U’ hypothesis also suggests that 
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inequality has a positive effect on economic growth in low income countries, yet a 
negative effect in high income countries.  
 
At the empirical level, most studies focus on the impact of inequality on economic 
growth. The results do not show a consistent sign for the effect of inequality on economic 
growth. In general, there are two main positions regarding the relationship between 
inequality and economic growth: a negative relationship (Perotti, 1993, Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Osberg, 1997; Deininger and 
Squire, 1998; Tanninenm, 1999; Panizza, 2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; De la Croix 
and Doepke, 2003), and a positive one (Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Garcia-Penalosa 
and Turnovsky, 2006; Frank, 2008). 
 
As can be seen, there are more studies that support the negative relationship between 
inequality and economic growth. Perotti (1993) introduced a model to test the impact of 
income inequality on economic growth in imperfect financial markets. In this model, 
education and training are considered as sources of economic growth. Perotti indicated 
that lower income individuals (in a high-inequality society) will reduce human capital 
investment, which will reduce economic growth. De la Croix and Doepke (2003) 
constructed a model which links the long term effects of income inequality with fertility 
differentials. Poorer families tend to have more children and spend less on education, 
which leads to a higher level of income inequality. This reduces the average education 
investment, which has a negative effect on economic growth. Therefore, the decline of 
fertility reduces the level of income inequality. Consequently, the improvement of human 
capital helps the growth of economy. 
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develop a Political Economics approach to address the 
negative relationship between inequality and growth. In a high-inequality society, voters 
will pressure public policymakers to adopt higher taxation on redistribution (from the rich 
to the poor). The redistributive transfer by a higher tax on income will generate a cost on 
total output, and reduce economic growth. Some scholars take into account other factors 
to investigate the relationship between income inequality and growth rates. To address the 
negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth, they construct a 
model which links the long term effects of income inequality with fertility differentials 
for different income brackets. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also adopt a Political 
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Economics-based theory to explain the negative relationship between inequality and 
economic growth. They emphasize the inefficiency of the redistributive process of using 
tax reductions.  
  
Clarke (1995) conducted a cross-countries analysis to investigate whether income 
inequality is harmful to economic growth, and finds three main results. Firstly, he finds 
that the level of income inequality is negatively correlated with economic growth, which 
is robust to different specifications of economic growth regression and to different 
measures of income inequality. Secondly, although the negative relationship is statistically 
significant, the size of the impact of income inequality on economic growth is small. 
Finally, the negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth is 
found both in democratic and non-democratic countries. To improve the quality of the 
dataset and to examine issues in new ways, Deininger and Squire (1998) examine the 
effect of income inequality on economic growth in a group of countries. Their data 
regarding income inequality had to be based on surveys from households, cover all 
sources of income and spending, and represent the results at national level. Deininger and 
Squire (1998) find significant negative relationships between income inequality and long 
term economic growth. However, the negative effect is only applicable to the poor, not to 
the rich. 
  
A section of the literature focuses on data samples at a single country level to examine the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth in long term series data. 
Osberg (1997) focuses on Canada to investigate the links between income inequality and 
growth rates with and between the peaks of birth rates in 1975, 1981, 1984, 1989 and 
1994 respectively. The findings show that income inequality negatively impacted on the 
growth of income in the 1990s. Panizza (2002) uses a cross-state panel for the United 
States to study the link between income inequality and economic growth rates. Applying 
both the fixed effects and GMM29 estimations, he finds a negative relationship between 
income inequality and national growth. However, the negative relationship is not robust to 
different measures of income inequality, which can significantly change the estimated link 
between income inequality and economic growth. Azzoni (2001) tested the correlation 
between regional income inequality and regional economic growth in Brazil from 1939 to 
                                                 
29
 GMM (generalized method of moments) is a method for estimating parameters in econometric analysis.  
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1995. To calculate the speed of convergence, he used the coefficient of variation, which 
can test the link between the fluctuations in income inequality and national economic 
growth rates. The results show that a convergence of regional income will reduce 
inequality between regions, which indicates a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth.  
 
In contrast, Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) challenge the notion of the negative 
impact of income inequality on economic growth. Li and Zou (1998) set up a theoretical 
model for the relationship between inequality and economic growth. They indicate that 
income inequality may have a positive effect on economic growth if public consumption 
enters the utility function. Empirically, they find that a high level of income inequality 
can induce high economic growth. Forbes (2000) also shows a robust, positive 
relationship between the level of income inequality and economic growth. Garcia-
Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) develop an endogenous growth model to take into 
account an elastic labour supply. In their framework, the level of income inequality and 
economic growth are jointly determined. They find that a faster economic growth rate is 
always associated with a higher level of income inequality. Frank (2009) examines the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth at the U.S. level from 1945 
to 2004. He shows that the level of income inequality experienced a long stable period 
after World War II, and subsequently a substantial increase during the 1980s and 1990s, 
and that it positively affects economic growth. 
 
Barro (2000) found a non-linear relationship, but the results are inconsistent with the 
Kuzents inverted ‘U’ hypothesis. He states that, if considering poor countries and rich 
countries separately, the level of income inequality negatively affects economic growth in 
poor countries, and that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth rates in rich countries. García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006) suggest 
that the relationship between growth and income inequality could be either positive or 
negative. They indicate that the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth is negative in the long term and positive in the short term. This suggests that a 
country with a higher income equality will experience rapid growth for the present, but 
will end up with a lower growth rate in the long term. Charles-Coll (2013) states that 
there are remarkable disparities in the relationship between inequality and growth, which 
can be divided into three proposed relationships (negative, positive and non-linear). In 
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both the theoretical and empirical literature, there is no general agreement as to how 
income inequality results in a lower or higher GDP growth after a period of time, but 
distributional policies can impact on growth rates in the long run30.  
3.5 Effects of Chinese public spending on economic growth and 
inequality  
Since the economic reforms of 1978, China’s economy has grown at a rate of about 10 per 
cent annually. Simultaneously, the Chinese public spending system has undergone various 
important changes1. Many economists have evaluated the effect of fiscal decentralization 
on economic growth in China. Lin and Liu (2000) investigated the effect of public 
spending decentralization, initiated in the mid-1980s in China, on the growth rate of per 
capita GDP. They found that fiscal decentralization has made a significant contribution to 
economic growth, which is consistent with the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization can 
increase economic efficiency. In addition, other market-oriented reforms, such as the 
household responsibility system in the rural sector, the privatization of the industrial 
sector, and non-state sector development, have also contributed to Chinese economic 
growth. 
 
The wisdom behind China’s economic reform was to improve production efficiency 
through economic liberalization and decentralization. Fiscal decentralization has been a 
central component of China’s economic policy, and is expected to improve the provision 
of local public goods and services (Tsui and Wang, 2004). Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization in transition economies is the natural result of the transformation from an 
over-centralized socialist system to a market economy (Bird et al., 1995). Given the 
widespread implementation of fiscal decentralization in developing and transition 
countries, a growing number of scholars and policy-makers have started to scrutinize not 
only the potential benefits, but also the challenges, of this policy experiment. At the very 
least, local governments, being closer to local residents, may have more knowledge with 
regard to the preferences of local residents than does the central government. 
 
                                                 
30
 This point of view suggests that government spending has a more important role in economic growth. 
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During the economic liberalization and fiscal decentralization of the past three decades, 
the efficiency of Chinese public spending and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has 
improved. According to endogenous growth theory, institutional arrangements (such as 
fiscal decentralization) can increase long term economic growth (King and Rebelo, 1990). 
Conversely, fiscal decentralization has also generated a number of negative trends. 
Although economic efficiency is the central argument of welfare economics, the potential 
negative impacts of fiscal decentralization on the distribution of resources across sub-
national jurisdictions and macroeconomic stability are the key arguments against fiscal 
decentralization. This is because the objectives of income redistribution and 
macroeconomic stability may be better pursued by central or federal governments 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Moreover, the SOEs play an important role in 
China’s social welfare system in urban areas. During the 1990s, the SOEs transferred their 
welfare support for their employees to local governments in order to improve their 
profitability and efficiency. Simultaneously, the local governments’ progress was slow in 
terms of the establishing of a welfare system in both urban and rural areas. Wang (2007) 
indicates that 61 per cent of urban recipients were entitled to the minimum living 
assistance, yet failed to receive it, in 2004.  
 
In the early 1990s, Oi (1992) argued that the role of local government had increased 
dramatically after the economic reforms. However, local governments always intervene in 
the markets to achieve their short term economic boom by using subsidies to SOEs. In 
turn, this reduces long term economic growth, and harms the economy in the rural areas. 
Park et al., (1996) argue that public spending decentralization can also undermine the 
government's ability to redistribute public financial resources between rich and poor 
regions. Forcing poor localities to be more fiscally self-reliant may have adverse 
consequences for their ability to provide basic services and to pursue coherent investment 
strategies to further their economic development. Increased pressure on local 
governments in less developed regions led to over-investment in revenue-generating 
industrial enterprises; it encouraged bureaucratic predation of enterprise resources and 
regional protectionism, and diverted attention away from long term economic 
development and environmental concerns. Moreover, Zhang and Zou (1998) examined 
the impacts of fiscal decentralization on economic growth based on 28 provinces’ annual 
data in China from 1986 to 1992. They found that a higher degree of fiscal 
decentralization is associated with lower regional economic growth in China. Their results 
Chapter 3: Literature Review II: Government Spending and Inequality 
73 
 
suggested that increasing the share of local government expenditure to the level of central 
government expenditure causes a decline of income growth. The reason for this surprising 
finding may be that the central government only had only limited resources for public 
investment on infrastructure projects, which may have had a more significant impact on 
economic growth during that period.  
 
Fan et al., (2000) developed a simultaneous model to estimate the effects of different 
types of government spending on growth, regional inequality and poverty. They found 
that educational spending has the greatest effect on economic growth, as well as reducing 
inequality and poverty. They also indicated that public spending in the western part of 
China had the greatest impact on reducing inequality and poverty, because this region is 
where most of China’s poor are concentrated. Zheng and Kuroda (2013) also adopted a 
simultaneous model to explore the effects of public infrastructure spending on China’s 
regional inequality and growth. In general, they found that improving infrastructure can 
enhance economic growth and reduce regional inequality. They also suggested that labour 
mobility is an important aspect of public spending, where higher labour mobility tends to 
have a greater effect on public infrastructure spending on stimulating growth and 
reducing inequality. Moreover, He (2005) and Tian (2012) examined the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth in China from 1992 to 2003 and 1985 to 2007, 
respectively. Both results show that income inequality has a negative impact on the 
economic growth rate. In addition, an increase in income inequality will reduce the saving 
rate and GDP growth rate in Tian’s (2012) model.  
 
However, the share of Chinese public spending on social welfare has been very low over 
the last three decades. Inadequate social welfare protection and the increasingly high cost 
of private expenditure on health and education have caused a lower level of private 
consumption in China. During the past thirty years of economic reforms, the ratio of 
private consumption to GDP dropped from 50 per cent to 37 per cent, and the saving rate 
increased from 11 per cent to 25 per cent (Baldacci et al., 2010). This low private 
consumption and high saving rate has been the key element in China’s economic 
development. Xue and Xu (2012) examined the relationship between government 
spending and private consumption. They found that government spending has a positive 
relationship with urban households’ consumption, but a negative relationship with rural 
households’ consumption. Hence, they suggest government spending should focus on 
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rural areas in order to stimulate rural households’ demand and reduce the income 
disparity between rural and urban areas.  
 
In addition, public spending has been unequally distributed among regions and citizens, a 
factor which caused not only low private consumption, but also unsatisfied public 
resource needs in poorer areas. Zhang and Fan (2000) estimated the decomposing 
consequence of various types of public spending on regional inequality by using a 
provincial level data set for the period 1978 to 1995. They indicated that Chinese 
provincial public spending has a positive relationship with economic growth, but has 
increased overall inequality. In general, the government has pursued a coast-biased 
investment strategy, and this has contributed to the rapid rise in regional inequality. They 
suggest that, if the government continues to favour coastal regions in its public spending, 
then regional inequality will widen even further.  
 
From the above analysis, we can see that the reforms in public spending in China have 
played an important role in the economic transition period. However, the decentralization 
of public spending has failed to promote balanced regional development, which has 
undermined Chinese socio-economic stability and caused massive interregional 
migration1. These perceived dangers have led China’s central government to give priority 
to public spending on low income households. In recent years, the Chinese government 
has placed increasing emphasis on stemming the growth in inequality. National strategies 
such as the ‘western development plan’, ‘providing a social safety net’ and ‘building a 
harmonious society’ have aimed to reduce the income disparity between urban and rural, 
and the east and western regions (Zhu and Wan, 2012).  
 
However, a large proportion of public spending went on public infrastructure programmes 
and public administration, which inevitably caused a relatively low proportion of public 
spending on essential social sectors, such as the social security system, health, education 
and other basic public goods and services. Moreover, social welfare in terms of pensions, 
education, health and unemployment subsidies are more advanced in the urban areas and 
wealthier provinces. Therefore, further public spending reforms should focus on people’s 
welfare rather than capital spending on public projects which directly push GDP in the 
short term.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has focused on the redistributive role of public spending to address the 
effects of public spending on income inequality. As is the case with the effects of public 
spending on economic growth, there is no unified empirical result regarding income 
distribution. Nevertheless, the objective of public spending is clear; it needs to promote 
the economy towards great efficiency and equality. This chapter has also reviewed the 
relationship between inequality and growth, which can indicate whether there is a positive 
relationship between economic growth and the rise of inequality. There exists a standard 
view of economic growth and inequality, which is the ‘inverted U’ curve. It suggests that 
inequality will rise inevitably as per capita income increases, which is frequently 
encountered in a country’s early stage of economic development. However, the results 
have not yet come to converge into one generalized position regarding the nature of the 
relationship. Conversely, numerous economists, such as Perotti (1993), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) and Clarke (1995), have posited a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth, in which countries with a higher level of inequality will experience reduced 
economic growth. In this perspective, inequality harms economic growth. In China, He 
(2005) and Tian (2012) have suggested that income inequality has a negative impact on 
the economic growth rate. Hence, as regards China’s widening regional disparity and its 
impact on further economic growth, debate continues regarding China’s public spending 
system, in terms of whether it has helped to stem the growth in overall inequality.  
 
The review of the literature suggests that the effects of government spending on 
inequality as well as the relationship between inequality and growth are mixed. Various 
types of government spending have different impacts on economic growth and inequality, 
implying the existence of a greater potential to improve efficiency by reallocating among 
sectors. In many developing countries, capital spending accounts for a large proportion of 
total expenditure, reflecting the role of the government in providing infrastructure, such 
as transportation, communication and energy. Middle and low income countries are at the 
initial stages of economic development, so public spending projects play a vital role in 
increasing demand and supply. However, some public investment is commercial in nature, 
which may compete with or crowd-out private sector investment and activity.  
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Finally, the introduction of social welfare programmes in China is a difficult task, 
especially given China’s huge population. Justino (2003) stated that, in developing 
countries, capital and insurance markets are under-developed, budget restrictions are high 
and tax revenues and income are low. These problems have led researchers and policy-
makers to argue that the eradication of poverty and the provision of social security in 
developing counties would be better achieved through economic growth, which would 
raise the standard of living of the whole population. Over the past twenty years, Chinese 
governments have always set an economic growth target of 8 per cent in order to achieve 
fast economic growth and sound macroeconomic stability. However, although economic 
growth is an important factor in improving living standards and reducing poverty, it is 
unclear whether economic growth can promote social development and equality across 
the whole population. Growth-oriented policies have meant that disadvantaged groups 
slip further back down the distributional scale due to their inability to respond to 
economic shocks. 
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Chapter 4: Background to the Analysis of China’s Fiscal 
Reforms, Economic Growth and Income Inequality  
4.1 Introduction 
From late 1978 onwards, China began to implement its market-oriented economic 
reforms. After 30 years of rapid economic growth, China became the world’s second 
largest economy in 2010. China’s socio-economic reforms aimed to improve production 
efficiency through economic liberalization and decentralization. Fiscal decentralization 
has been a central component of China’s economic policy, and is expected to improve the 
provision of local public goods and services (Tsui and Wang, 2004). However, such rapid 
economic growth also brings numerous problems. The huge gaps in income levels and 
living standards between rural and urban, coastal and inland regions are expected to affect 
economic growth and social stability. Hence, there is a fierce debate as to whether the 
Chinese government needs to profoundly reform its fiscal system, especially increasing 
public spending on its public welfare system, in order to promote the Chinese economy 
toward greater effectiveness and equality.  
 
The decentralization of control by the central government devolved greater responsibility 
to the provinces and governments at a lower level (Brun et al., 2002). During the fiscal 
reforms, the fiscal relationships between the centre and the provinces changed drastically, 
giving more power to provincial level governments. It was a common trend that the 
growth rate of government revenue was greater than the growth rate of GDP. However, 
China’s public spending has mainly been channeled towards large, capital-intensive 
projects rather than on social spending, such as education, health and social protection. 
Moreover, over the last three decades, the Gini index of income inequality increased 
significantly from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.48 in 2010 (according to China’s NBS, 2012), a fact 
which had already constrained China’s substantial economic development. Hence, the 
debate outlined above has been rekindled by concerns over the effect of public spending 
and decentralization on income inequality. 
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This dissertation focuses on the growth and redistributive effect of public spending during 
China’s unique period of economic growth. This chapter provides a brief overview of 
China’ public spending system and economic development since its economic opening-up 
in 1978, which will shed light on China’s unique economic developmental characteristics 
and its fiscal policy-making process. The discussion in this chapter will address various 
data analyses and interpretations, which will serve as a necessary prelude and help to 
improve the understanding of econometric analysis at the national and sub-national levels.  
 
In this chapter, section 4.2 will focus on the policy changes within past fiscal reforms. It 
outlines the two periods of the Chinese fiscal system, and the evolution of Chinese fiscal 
positions of both central and provincial governments. Section 4.3 will explore China’s 
economic growth and structure over the past three decades. Section 4.4 will investigate 
income inequality at different levels, an aspect which may compromise further social 
economic development in China. Section 4.5 will analyze China’s redistributive public 
spending. Section 4.6 will investigate the relationship between inequality and income 
levels in China. Finally, a conclusion of Chinese public spending will be provided.  
4.2 The two periods of China’s fiscal reforms 
The pre-reform fiscal system in China copied the system in the Soviet Union, one which 
had an overwhelming dependence on industry, and a reliance on the profits of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) for government revenue. In this centralized system, 
administrative prices were set to discriminate against agricultural and raw material 
producers. Surpluses from the agricultural and extractive sectors were transferred to the 
heavy industrial sector, where artificially high surpluses were created (Wong, 1991). 
Although China remained a unitary fiscal system, a variety of fiscal reforms were 
implemented to put local governments on an increasingly self-financing basis.  
 
There were two phases of fiscal reform in China: (1) the fiscal contracting system 
between 1979 and 1993, (2) the tax assignment system after 1994 (Jin and Zhou, 2005). 
The first period provided better incentives for local governments to promote regional 
economies by ‘devolution’, and the second period of fiscal reform provided a rule-based 
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framework in the public finance system through splitting the existing tax bureau into 
national and local tax offices. Hence, the fundamental achievement of China’s fiscal 
reforms over the past three decades has been the establishment of an institutionalized and 
standardized public fiscal system to meet the requirements of economic liberalization.  
4.2.1 Fiscal contracting system (1979-1993) 
China promoted fiscal decentralization reform between 1979 and 1993, which made sub-
national governments more fiscally self-reliant. China’s fiscal decentralization resembled 
those of other transition economies, in which the central government delegates its fiscal 
power to sub-national governments. In theory, fiscal decentralization is an effective tool 
for increasing the efficiency of the provision of public goods and services, and it results in 
faster economic development. This is because a local government has better knowledge 
than the central government of providing public goods and services, ones which match 
local preferences and needs (Limi, 2005). China has promoted fiscal decentralization, 
which can be seen as a reaction to the failures of large, centralized bureaucracies; in the 
case of China, this bureaucracy was its planned economy. Policy makers believe that 
decentralization will improve the allocation of public resources and, therefore, promote 
economic growth and reduce poverty and inequality.  
 
During the period of the fiscal contracting system, fiscal revenue and expenditure were 
clearly divided into the sub-national and central levels. Provincial governments had a 
contract to share revenue and expenditure with the central government, and central 
government agreed to subsidize the anticipated shortfall between contracted expenditure 
and revenue. The sub-national governments are responsible for local investment, wages 
and the provision of public goods and services (Park et al., 1996). Within the framework 
of the contracting system, tax revenue has occupied an increasing proportion of the total 
budget revenue, which rose from 49.3 per cent in 1980 to 97.8 per cent in 1993 (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2006).  
 
In the early 1980s, the government carried out a further fiscal reform by subjecting SOEs 
to income taxes, instead of turning in all its profits, which allowed SOEs to keep a 
proportion of their profits in order to expand production and increase workers’ wages. 
Chapter 4: Background to the Analysis of China’s Fiscal Reforms, Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
80 
 
Thereby, SOEs were still required to submit a proportion of their profits to the 
government after paying corporate income taxes (Lin, 2009). Qian (1999) proposes that 
fiscal decentralization made SOEs more efficient by introducing the budgetary constraints 
system. The sub-national government had less control over banks, and therefore they 
could not bail SOEs out by unlimited extension of credit to SOEs as the central 
government did. However, an overreliance on subsides and loans in SOEs has increased 
the risk of fiscal reforms. SOEs’ low economic efficiency and profits had threatened the 
stability of the Chinese fiscal system, because a large share of fiscal revenue was 
dependent on them throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, from 1979 to 1993, 
fiscal reforms expanded the role of local government in the market economy. 
Simultaneously, local governments faced greatly expanded expenditure responsibilities, 
which led them to focus on economic growth (Wong, 1991).  
 
Figure 4.1: The ratio of total fiscal revenue and expenditure to GDP from 1979 to 1993 
 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2011 
 
However, the introduction of fiscal contracts between central and local governments 
failed to increase the total government budgetary revenue; consequently, public spending 
dropped significantly during the period of the fiscal contracting system. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, the Chinese government’s revenue share of GDP 
decreased from 33 per cent to 11 per cent between 1978 and 1993, the same as on the 
expenditure side (Figure 4.1). Table 4.1 shows the share of government revenue and 
spending between central and local governments. In the beginning of 1979, the central 
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government collected 20 per cent of total revenue, but spent 51.1 per cent of total public 
spending. The local governments collected 80 per cent of total revenue, but only spent 
48.9 per cent of total spending. Therefore, there was a huge revenue surplus for local 
governments. Under the decentralization of public spending, local public spending was 
increased to 71.4 per cent of total spending in 1993, which was more consistent with its 
revenues. 
 
Table 4.1: The share of central and local governments’ revenue and spending between 
1979 and 1994 
Year  Central 
Government 
Revenue in total 
Revenue (%) 
Local 
Governments’ 
Revenue in total 
Revenue (%) 
Central 
Government 
Spending in total 
Spending (%) 
Local 
Governments’ 
Spending in total 
Spending (%) 
1979 20.2 79.8 51.1 48.9 
1980 24.5 75.5 54.3 45.7 
1981 26.5 73.5 55.0 45.0 
1982 28.6 71.4 53.0 47.0 
1983 35.8 64.2 53.9 46.1 
1984 40.5 59.5 52.5 47.5 
1985 38.4 61.6 39.7 60.3 
1986 36.7 63.3 37.9 62.1 
1987 33.5 66.5 37.4 62.6 
1988 32.9 67.1 33.9 66.1 
1989 30.9 69.1 31.5 68.5 
1990 33.8 66.2 32.6 67.4 
1991 29.8 70.2 32.2 67.8 
1992 28.1 71.9 31.3 68.7 
1993 22.0 78.0 28.3 71.7 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 
 
In the ‘fiscal contracting system’ period (1979-1993), a major shift in the distribution of 
public revenue and spending was that total public revenue and spending dropped 
significantly. At the same time, local governments had a bigger share of public revenue 
than the central government, and the central government accounted for more public 
spending than its collected revenue. Hence, some economists were deeply concerned 
about the prospect that insufficient central government revenue would have difficulty in 
financing basic public spending and promoting economic development. This attempt to 
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revamp the financial interaction between the central and provincial governments was 
made immensely more complicated by rapid changes in the fiscal system and the shifting 
composition of revenues and expenditures in the fiscal contracting system (Lin, 2009). 
Hence, the central government was determined to reverse this trend by introducing new 
fiscal reforms in 1994. 
4.2.2 Tax-sharing system (after 1994) 
In the first half of the 1990s, there was a concern that the fiscal decentralization in China 
had been implemented too rapidly; this decentralization had increased fiscal disparity 
among provinces and reduced the volume of government revenues. Furthermore, Zhang 
and Zou (1998) state that national priorities in public spending had often been crowded-
out by local government’s spending in the fiscal contracting system. Hence, in 1994, the 
government introduced its Tax-Sharing Reform (TSR) in order to boost central revenues 
and enhance intergovernmental transfers (Zhang, 2006).  
 
Reforms in the intergovernmental fiscal system were implemented in the early 1990s to 
overcome declining fiscal revenue and expenditure. In 1994, the revenue-sharing system 
between central and local governments was replaced by a TSR, whereby local 
governments were granted the legal right to collect local taxes, while value added tax 
(VAT)
31
 was to be shared by both government tiers. This fiscal arrangement encouraged 
local governments to promote economic growth. Therefore, local fiscal autonomy was 
successfully preserved, in addition to substantially improving the fiscal status of the 
central government (Wong, 2000). Moreover, local governments were no longer 
permitted to grant tax breaks. The discretion to grant privileges of reduced taxes and tax 
exemptions had been a major loophole in the old system, one through which local 
governments frequently used to channel budgetary funds into extra-budgetary funds, thus 
reducing the revenues to be shared with the central government (Wang, 1997). Hence, the 
TSR was a comprehensive package designed to address three concerns: firstly, to increase 
government revenue, especially for the central government; secondly, to eliminate the 
distortionary elements of the tax structure and increasing transparency of government; 
thirdly, to revamp central-local revenue sharing arrangements. The transparency, 
                                                 
31
 VAT: a tax on local production and distribution 
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accountability, controllability and overall effectiveness of public spending were greatly 
improved after the tax reforms. These efforts would help to ensure greater consistency in 
spending over time, and allow the rapid increase of fiscal revenues (OECD Report, 2006). 
 
In the post-TSR period, China’s tax categories became diversified, rather than consisting 
only of the contributions of SOEs. For example, by the year 2003, the source of fiscal 
revenue presented a diversified situation, known as 3:7: this meant that the contributions 
of SOEs constituted 29.5 per cent of total fiscal revenue, and multi-ownership enterprises 
including collective enterprises, corporate enterprises, private enterprises and foreign-
invested enterprises and the contributions by urban residents constituted 70.5 per cent of 
total fiscal revenue. Within the framework of public finance, the tax revenue system plays 
a dominant role in fiscal revenue; it appeared to be more imperative to focus on the tax 
revenue system to reinforce the construction of the fiscal revenue system. 
 
Since the TSR in 1994, the goal to improve China’s public spending system has been 
addressed by the Chinese central government. A rising proportion of tax revenue 
increased the level of total fiscal revenue and public spending continuously. Jin and Zou 
(2005) suggest that at given level of expenditure decentralization, more revenue 
centralization contributes to growth. Their finding supports the view that the central 
government is better placed to allocate budgetary resources for horizontal balance, 
macroeconomic stability and investment in national projects. Therefore, the total revenue 
to GDP ratio and the share of central government revenue to total revenue has increased 
dramatically in the post-TSR period Notwithstanding this, China’s tax revenue system 
still has some weaknesses, for example the complexity of the tax system, the lack of 
unification of the tax system between urban and rural areas, the coexistence of tax 
categories and the lack of tax categories.  
 
Firstly, two different kinds of tax system are set up between urban and rural areas, which 
cannot match up with the role of public finance that guarantees to treat people equally and 
reduce urban-rural inequality. Particularly before the cancellation of agricultural tax, 
poorer rural workers were overburdened because of the low profits on agricultural 
products, and because of the absence of social protection in rural areas. Moreover, in 
China’s governmental revenue system, there are too many fees, charges and incomes 
outside tax revenue, which accounts for the extra-budgetary revenue of local government. 
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China has an excess of extra-budgetary funds; a large sum of charges floats outside of the 
government budget, and this phenomenon has experienced an unceasing trend year after 
year, which has significantly weakened the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government. 
Therefore, it is necessary to bring extra-budgetary revenue (especially governmental 
charges) into budget revenue management to achieve the goal of standardized fiscal 
management in China.  
 
Nevertheless, the TSR has a crucial role in the Chinese public spending system, which 
increased both national fiscal revenue and public spending. Simultaneously, the public 
spending system has continuously decentralized to provincial level government. 
Compared with Figure 4.1, the following Figure 4.2 shows that total fiscal revenue and 
public spending have increased dramatically each year following the TSR in 1994. For 
example, the ratio of total fiscal revenue and public spending in GDP doubled from 1994 
to 2012.  
 
Figure 4.2: The share of total fiscal revenue and expenditure to GDP from 1993 to 2012 
 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 
 
As shown in Table 4.2 below, central government revenue experienced a significant 
increase in 1994, and then levelled off at about 50 per cent of total revenue. Conversely, 
central public spending dropped from 30 per cent in 1994 to 15 per cent in 2012. 
Therefore, provincial level public spending increased from 70 per cent to 85 per cent of 
total spending, with roughly 50 per cent of total revenues. In other words, local 
government spending was 5.6 times greater than central public spending in 2012. Hence, 
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local governments played a more important role during decentralization, but they faced a 
greater pressure of shortage of fiscal revenue. Local governments are increasingly 
dependent on extra-budgetary revenues to meet the responsibility of their public 
spending. Moreover, the gap between local public revenue and spending has led 
provincial governments to fix economic growth as their priority, and thus they may 
neglect people’s welfare and basic needs in the post-TSR period.  
 
Table 4.2: The share of central and local governments’ revenue and spending between 
1994 and 2012 
Year Central government 
revenue in total 
revenue (%) 
Local governments 
revenue in total 
revenue (%) 
Central government 
spending in total 
spending (%) 
Local governments 
spending in total 
spending (%) 
1994 55.7 44.3 30.3 69.7 
1995 52.2 47.8 29.2 70.8 
1996 49.4 50.6 27.1 72.9 
1997 48.9 51.1 27.4 72.6 
1998 49.5 50.5 28.9 71.1 
1999 51.1 48.9 31.5 68.5 
2000 52.2 47.8 34.7 65.3 
2001 52.4 47.6 30.5 69.5 
2002 55.0 45.0 30.7 69.3 
2003 54.6 45.4 30.1 69.9 
2004 54.9 45.1 27.7 72.3 
2005 52.3 47.7 25.9 74.1 
2006 52.8 47.2 24.7 75.3 
2007 54.1 45.9 23.0 77.0 
2008 53.3 46.7 21.3 78.7 
2009 52.4 47.6 20.0 80.0 
2010 51.1 48.9 17.8 82.2 
2011 49.4 50.6 15.1 84.9 
2012 47.9 52.1 14.9 85.1 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 
 
Through this investigation of the Chinese fiscal system, we can identify a significant 
decentralization of China’s public spending. Firstly, the fiscal contracting reform has 
meant that fiscal revenue is sourced from different types of ownership, rather than solely 
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SOEs. The development of the market-oriented economy in China has resulted in a 
change of resource distribution methods, the transformation of government functions, the 
reform of taxation and the financial markets. Secondly, the TSR reform has continued the 
decentralization of public spending to local governments, wherein local government 
spending has increased significantly between 1995 and 2010. However, there are still 
numerous irregular phenomena that exist in China’s current fiscal revenue system; for 
example, an unreasonable revenue structure, flaws in tax system design, too much extra-
budgetary revenue and a lack of standardization in public funds’ management. Hence, 
China still has a certain distance to go before achieving its goal of public spending 
attaining greater efficiency and equality in the process of economic liberalization.  
4.3 Economic development and growth in the post-economic 
reform era in China 
In the last thirty years, China has shifted from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy, and has experienced rapid economic and social development. The logic 
behind the economic reform was to improve economic efficiency through market 
liberalization and industrialization. However, China still has an organizational hierarchy 
in which its local governments are highly influenced by the central government, and this 
enables China to implement its national development plan relatively easily. Although 
there has been a growing non-state sector since the 1980s, most financial resources, land, 
other factors of production and economic policies are still controlled and allocated by 
local government. Therefore, political institutions have a profound influence on China’s 
economic growth (Zhang, 2002). In this section, we will explore China’s economic 
development and growth in the post-economic reform era in relation to its unique political 
institution.  
 
In the following Figure 4.3, we can see the growth and fluctuations in the economy since 
the economic opening-up of 1978. The economic growth rate boomed in 1984, 1993 and 
2006, and then quickly declined to below the average growth rate (10 per cent, annually). 
In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the 11
th
 Central Committee established the 
economic reform and opening-up policy. The economic reform firstly started in rural 
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areas, whereby freedom was granted to rural households to use their land in return for 
meeting tax and quota obligations. After the economic reform, China’s economic growth 
increased to 15 per cent in 1984 and then dropped to about 4 per cent in 1989.  
 
Figure 4.3: China’s real economic growth rate since 1978 
 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicator, 2013 
 
During the economic reforms in rural and urban areas, slow price adjustment caused the 
significant price inflation in 1988 and 1989; for example, the inflation rate was 18.8 per 
cent in 1988. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s speech32 in south China announced a new era for 
China’s economic reforms by adopting a faster economic growth strategy, such as 
establishing special economic zones in the coastal provinces. However, the rapid 
economic development during the early 1990s reached an overheated peak of a 14 per 
cent growth rate in 1993, culminating once more in rapid inflation. In 1994, the inflation 
jumped to 24 per cent, and economic growth started to decline. In 1997, the Asian 
Financial Crisis reduced China’s economic rate by 2 per cent, compared with 1996. The 
Crisis continued impacting on China’s economy until 2000. From 2000 to 2007, China’s 
economy experienced a third upward cycle, in which the growth rate reached 14 per cent 
in 2007. After the world economic slowdown in 2008, China’s economic growth declined 
to 7.7 per cent in the years 2011 and 2012.  
 
Economic liberalization has helped China to maintain an average 10 per cent annual 
                                                 
32
 In 1992, the China’s leader Deng Xiaoping announced the first growth strategy for the special economic 
zones in coastal areas. 
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economic growth and has improved income levels over the past three decades. In 2013, 
China’s gross national income per capita reached $6,560 US dollars, with a 7.7 per cent 
growth rate. However, 6.3 per cent of the Chinese population were living below the 
poverty line ($1.25 a day), which is the second highest such population after India (World 
Bank, 2014). Simultaneously, the overall Gini coefficient in China reached a historically 
high level of 0.49 in 2008, compared with a very low level of income inequality at the 
beginning of the 1980s (China’s NBS, 2014). The Chinese government also recognized 
this as a social problem which needs to be addressed. In fact, income inequality was the 
most frequently discussed topic during the recent National Congress
33
 of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC). The ‘Western Development Plan’ was introduced at the start of the 
10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), with a view to narrowing income differentials between 
the sparsely populated and under-developed western regions and the more prosperous and 
faster-growing eastern regions. This change in emphasis was evident in policy statements 
of the 17
th
 National Congress (held in 2007), which called for a rebalancing between 
fairness and efficiency in distribution.  
 
China started the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan
34
 in 2011, which highlighted the development of 
services and measures to address environmental and social imbalances, setting targets to 
reduce pollution, to increase energy efficiency, to improve access to education and 
healthcare and to expand social protection. The growth rate target was reduced by 1 per 
cent compared with the previous target of 8 per cent, which indicates the intention to 
focus on the quality and equality of economic development.China continuously improves 
its macroeconomic regulations and adjusts its economic structure, factors which have 
contributed to the rapid economic growth since opening up. There were four major 
changes involved in China’s economic reforms and opening-up. 
 
a) Change towards a free market economy 
 
Since the late 1970s, China’s economy has been transformed from a planned system to a 
socialist-market system. China’s economic transition began in the rural areas, when the 
                                                 
33
 The National Congress of the CPC is held about once every five years, and it is the highest level decision-
making process in the CPC and China’s central government.  
34
 The Five Year Plans are a series of social and economic development initiatives made by the National 
Congress (the highest level of decision making). The first Five Year Plan is from 1953 to 1957, and the 
twelfth Five Year Plan is from 2011 to 2015.  
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Household Responsibility System (HRS) dismantled the collectives and granted 
household rights to use land in return for meeting tax and quota obligations in late 1978. 
Under the original planned system, enterprises had no autonomy in their business 
activities including production, supply, sales and investment. All these activities were 
centrally planned. Under a socialist-market economy, economic entities acquired 
autonomy and market mechanisms, such as price leverage; in addition, competition 
mechanisms and factor markets were introduced. The market played an increasingly 
important role in resource allocation, which brought unprecedented vigor and vitality into 
China’s economic development. Taking corporate ownership structures as an example, the 
proportion of enterprises with various ownerships to aggregate industrial output value 
experienced a major transformation. Before the economic reform, there were only two 
possible types of ownership structures for industrial enterprises: state-owned and 
collectively-owned. They accounted for 77.6 and 22.4 per cent, respectively, of aggregate 
industrial output value. During the reform and opening-up period, the reconstruction of 
the macroeconomic foundation enabled the joint development and synergy of economic 
entities of different ownership types. This also diversified market players and investment 
sources, and provided an important economic institutional premise for steady, rapid 
growth. 
 
b) Sufficient resource supply and industrial restructuring 
 
The fundamental role of the introduction of the market mechanism was to overcome the 
severe shortages of supply and resource allocation through changes in ownership 
structures. During the economic transition period in the 1980s, the supply bottleneck 
eased for resources such as coal, electricity, oil, transportation and materials (major raw 
materials such as steel and cement). Some goods even experienced a certain periodical 
surplus, which also supported rapid and steady economic growth. In terms of GDP, the 
output values of industries changed dramatically. For example, the proportion of primary 
industries declined from 50.5 per cent in 1952 to 28.2 per cent in 1978, before reaching 
10.3 per cent in 2010. The proportion of secondary industries climbed from 20.9 per cent 
in 1952 to 47.9 per cent in 1978. Since the late 1970s, the proportion of secondary 
industries has been relatively stable, reaching 46.3 per cent in 2010. The proportion of 
tertiary industries reached 43.4 per cent in 2010 (NBS, 2011). Overall, primary industries 
have continued to decline in proportion, secondary industries have remained relatively 
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stable, while tertiary industries have increased significantly in proportion over the last 
three decades.  
 
c) Urbanization and maintaining a high growth rate  
 
Economic liberation has facilitated the flow of labour, advanced the process of 
industrialization and increased the urbanization ratio, which has created massive demand 
for urban construction and housing, resulting in a boom of the urban economy. In 1949, 
China’s urbanization rate stood at only 11 per cent, and then increased to 18 per cent in 
1978 and to 50 per cent in 2010. Correspondingly, the proportion of the rural population 
declined from 82.1 per cent in 1978 to 50.4 per cent in 2010 (China’s NBS, 2012). 
 
Simultaneously, there is a minimum growth target in the national development plan 
reports. For example, China’s central government believes that the economic growth rate 
needs above at least 7 per cent during the economic transition period, because a low 
growth rate will also take a toll on fiscal revenue and social programmes, which are 
instrumental in maintaining socioeconomic stability. Liu (2011) suggests that market 
liberalization and urbanization have played an important role in driving China’s rapid 
growth during the economic reforms. A higher urbanization ratio and further development 
in the real estate sector, particularly the housing sector, will continue to be a major source 
of growth in the coming decade.  
 
d) Uneven regional development  
 
When Deng Xiao Ping emphasized openness to international trade and the development 
of regional comparative advantages, the central government chose to experiment with an 
‘open door’ in its coastal provinces, such as Fujian and Guangdon. The central 
government provided a number of advantages for these provinces through the creation of 
special economic zones. The objective was to promote growth in coastal regions, with the 
idea that there would be spillover effects to the inland provinces. Brun et al., (2002) 
studied the regional development spillover effects of the coastal provinces on inland 
provinces. They argued that the spillover effects of coastal growth to the western 
provinces are not significant. The relative failure to boost the development of western 
provinces with spillovers from the coastal regions’ growth suggests that these effects have 
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been insufficient to ameliorate regional inequality in China. The failure of regional 
development threatens Chinese social stability, and increases the risk of political and 
social fragmentation as well as massive interregional migration. These perceived dangers 
in China have led the central government to prioritize public spending in the western 
regions and support low income households since the introduction of the ‘western 
development plan’ in 2000. 
 
Table 4.3: China’s provincial economic development in 2012 
Provinces Real GDP 
growth rate 
Rate of 
Unemployment  
Rate of 
Urbanization 
Income gap 
of urban and 
rural 
Ratio of public 
spending to 
GDP 
Tianjin 13.8% 3.6% 81.6% 2.1 16.6% 
Chongqing 13.6% 3.3% 57.0% 3.1 26.7% 
Guizhou 13.6% 3.3% 36.4% 3.9 40.2% 
Yunnan 13.0% 4.0% 39.3% 3.9 34.7% 
Shaanxi 12.9% 3.2% 50.0% 3.6 23.0% 
Gansu 12.6% 2.7% 38.8% 3.8 36.5% 
Sichuan 12.6% 4.0% 43.5% 2.9 22.8% 
Qinghai 12.3% 3.4% 47.4% 3.3 61.2% 
Anhui 12.1% 3.7% 46.5% 2.9 23.0% 
Jilin 12.0% 3.7% 53.7% 2.4 20.7% 
Xinjiang 12.0% 3.4% 44.0% 2.8 36.2% 
Tibet 11.8% 2.6% 22.8% 3.2 129.1% 
Ningxia 11.5% 4.2% 50.7% 3.2 36.9% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
11.5% 3.7% 57.7% 3.0 21.6% 
Fujian 11.4% 3.6% 59.6% 2.8 13.2% 
Guangxi 11.3% 3.4% 43.5% 3.5 22.9% 
Hunan 11.3% 4.2% 46.7% 2.9 18.6% 
Hubei 11.3% 3.8% 53.5% 2.7 16.9% 
Jiangxi 11.0% 3.0% 47.5% 2.5 23.3% 
Henan 10.1% 3.1% 42.4% 2.7 16.9% 
Shanxi 10.1% 3.3% 51.3% 3.2 22.8% 
Jiangsu 10.1% 3.1% 63.0% 2.4 13.0% 
Heilongjiang 10.0% 4.2% 56.9% 2.1 23.2% 
Shandong 9.8% 3.3% 52.4% 2.7 11.8% 
Hebei 9.6% 3.7% 46.8% 2.5 15.4% 
Liaoning 9.5% 3.6% 65.7% 2.5 18.3% 
Hainan 9.1% 2.0% 51.6% 2.8 31.9% 
Guangdong 8.2% 2.5% 67.4% 2.9 12.9% 
Zhejiang 8.0% 3.0% 63.2% 2.4 12.0% 
Beijing 7.7% 1.3% 86.2% 2.2 20.6% 
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Shanghai 7.5% 3.1% 89.3% 2.3 20.7% 
Median 11.3% 3.4% 51.3% 2.8 22.8% 
Note: the rate of urbanization is derived from the urban population divided by total population. 
The income gap is derived from urban income divided by rural income.   
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 and 2013 by China’s NBS. 
 
The Table 4.3 shows the level of regional economic development in 2012, which includes 
the real growth rate of GDP, the rates of unemployment and urbanization, the income gap 
between urban and rural areas and the ratio of public spending to GDP. Table 4.3 (as well 
as Figure 4.4 and 4.5) include all (mainland) Chinese provinces and four municipalities. 
The four municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin, which are treated 
the same as a provincial level government. In Table 4.3, these four municipalities are 
ranked in the two extremes in terms of real GDP growth in 2012, where Tianjin and 
Chongqing had the highest growth rate, and Beijing and Shanghai had the lowest growth 
rate. We can see that the urbanization rates in three of the four municipalities are above 80 
per cent, with only Chongqing at 57 per cent. Simultaneously, Chongqing also had the 
highest ratio of public spending, accounting for 26.7 per cent of GDP. Excluding the four 
municipalities, we can see that the poorest province of Guizhou (in Figure 4.3) had the 
fastest economic growth in 2012. Similarly, most poor, western provinces had higher 
economic growth in 2012. For example, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai 
experienced an economic growth rate of more than 10 per cent. Hence, we can find that 
those provinces with a lower level of GDP per-capita are likely to experience more rapid 
economic growth than the wealthier provinces in China. In these poor provinces, the 
urbanization rate is lower than 50 per cent, which means the rural population is larger 
than the urban population. At the same time, the income gap between rural and urban 
areas is higher than the median level of 2.8 times, while public spending is higher than the 
median level of 22.8 per cent of GDP.  
 
Conversely, the eastern coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian 
and Shandong, have a relatively lower level of public spending to GDP, a higher 
urbanization rate and a lower income gap between rural and urban areas. Urbanization 
and rural migration have played an important role in China’s economic development, with 
rural households in poor provinces moving to urban areas in the rich provinces, a process 
which has produced cheaper labour and a housing demand to promote urban economic 
growth. Over the past thirty years of economic development, a huge gap has emerged 
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between urban and rural areas, and the eastern and western provinces.  
 
Figure 4.4 shows the per-capita GDP and public spending in thirty-one Chinese 
provinces. We can see that the Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai have the highest level of 
GDP per capita, but a relatively low level of public spending per capita. Tianjin is the 
most industrialized city with the highest level of GDP per capita (93,173 Yuan35), and 
Guizhou is the least advanced province with the lowest GDP per capita (19,701 Yuan). 
However, the poorer provinces have a relatively high level of public spending per capita. 
The richest, Tian, had 15,487 Yuan per capita public spending, and the poorest, Guizhou, 
7,927 Yuan per capita public spending in 2012. The one extreme is Tibet, with 29,620 
Yuan on public spending, more than its per capita GDP in 2012. This suggests a low level 
of private business and investment in Tibet. The eastern provinces have superior private 
investment and business environments, with a higher level of GDP per-capita. 
Conversely, public investment plays more important role in the western regions because 
of the low level of private capital. The Figure 4.5 suggests that the poorest province 
GuiZhou has the highest economic growth in 2012, as well as Yun Nan and Tibet. Hence, 
the Figure 4.5 indicates that the poor provinces have faster growth rate of GDP and public 
spending than rich provinces.   
 
Figure 4.4: China’s provincial per-capita GDP and public spending in 2012 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 and 2013 by China’s NBS. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 The Yuan is the Chinese unit of currency: 1 British pound equals 10 Chinese Yuan. 
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Figure 4.5: China’s provincial growth rate of GDP and public spending in 2012 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2012 and 2013 by China’s NBS.  
 
The multiple transformations that China has undergone since the late 1970s brought rapid 
economic growth, but many challenges as well, such as extreme inequality, rapid 
urbanization and environmental pollution. Moreover, the country also faces the 
demographic pressures of an aging population and internal migration of labour. Despite 
increasing public investment in rural areas and the western provinces since 2000, the 
disparity in regional development has remained unchanged. Hence, the higher growth 
rates in recent years in the western provinces only indicate a limited improvement in 
balancing regional growth. Similar past experiences (such as the economic growth 
experienced in Latin America) show that the transition from a middle income to a high 
income status will generate numerous economic uncertainties. Therefore, this is a huge 
challenge for further public spending reforms and adjustments, if the aim is to maintain 
sustainable growth in China.  
4.4 Income Inequality in China 
During the process of economic reforms, China’s overall Gini coefficient rose from about 
0.3 in the early 1980s to 0.49 in 2008. Although this figure declined slightly after 2008, it 
has still remained at a high level (around 0.45) in recent years (NBS, 2014). According to 
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studies on China’s income inequality36, there are two major types of inequality in China: 
urban-rural inequality and cross-regional inequality. In section 4.4.1, we explore the 
inequality between urban-rural areas, and then discuss cross-provincial inequality in 
section 4.4.2.  
4.4.1 Urban-rural inequality 
The urban-rural income gap is a major factor in Chinese inequality, and it has increased 
significantly during the period of economic reforms. Sicular (2013) states that urban-rural 
disparity in China arises in part from the ‘Hu Kou’ system, which is an internal passport 
system to control the movement of the domestic population. Rural households have lower 
wages than urban households. Simultaneously, rural households also have poorer living 
standards than urban households, due to their more limited access to education, transport, 
health care, culture and leisure. The ‘Hu Kou’ (household registration) system has served 
to restrict the movement between rural and urban of residents, and has maintained a fixed 
agricultural labour force in rural areas. In the early 2000s, the movement of residents was 
significantly relaxed in China, while currently it continues to register and identify 1.3 
billion Chinese by their location and administrative categories (rural versus urban), which 
protects welfare and the employment rates in urban areas (Young, 2010).  
 
China’s urban-rural gap has widened since the economic liberalization. Per capita income 
for urban households was three times higher than those of rural households in 2010, 
which is markedly high in terms of international standards (World Bank, 2012). In recent 
years, China’s urban-rural income gap has been a major factor underlying national income 
inequality, which contributed to overall inequality by 45 per cent in 2002, and 51 per cent 
in 2007 (Li et al., 2013). Figure 4.6 shows the income37 gap between rural and urban 
households in China from 1978 to 2010. We can see that urban income was 2.5 times 
more than the rural income in 1978, then dropped to less than two times in the mid-1980s, 
increased dramatically in the early 1990s and then dropped to 2.5 times during the late 
                                                 
36
 We have discussed the decompensation method to measure China’s overall Gini, in Chen et al., (2010) 
and Tian (2012).  
37
 According to the NBS of China, income in urban households is post-tax income, called the disposable 
income of urban households. The income in rural households is net income, which excludes the rent of land 
and other costs of farm production.  
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1990s. Since 1999, it has increased significantly to more than three times. We can see 
turban incomes increased faster than rural incomes during the last few decades. 
Consequently, the ratio of income gap between urban and rural has increased from 2.5 in 
1998 to 3.2 in 2010, though the income gap declined in the early 1980s and mid-1990s. 
 
Figure 4.6: Income gap between rural and urban households from1978 to 2010 
 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the composition of consumption between urban and rural households in 
percentages of total consumption. It includes consumption of food, clothing, household 
facilities, medical care and services, transport and communications, education and 
culture, housing maintenance, and other items between rural and urban households in 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively.  
 
Table 4.4: The composition of consumption between urban and rural households (in 
percentage of total consumption) 
Item 
 
 
Composition of Consumption 
Expenditure of Urban Households 
Composition of Consumption 
Expenditure of Rural Households 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Food 54.25 49.92 39.18 36.69 35.67 58.80 58.62 49.13 45.48 41.09 
Clothing 13.36 13.55 10.01 10.08 10.72 7.77 6.85 5.75 5.81 6.03 
Household 
Facilities 
10.14 8.39 8.79 5.62 6.74 5.29 5.23 4.52 4.36 5.34 
Health Care and 
Medical 
Services 
2.01 3.11 6.36 7.56 6.47 3.25 3.24 5.24 6.58 7.44 
Transport and 
Communications 
1.20 4.83 7.90 12.55 14.73 1.44 2.58 5.58 9.59 10.52 
Education and 
Culture  
1.12 8.84 12.56 13.82 12.08 5.37 7.81 11.18 11.56 8.37 
Housing 
maintenance  
6.98 7.07 10.01 10.18 9.89 17.34 13.91 15.47 14.49 19.06 
Others 0.94 4.28 5.17 3.50 3.71 0.74 1.76 3.14 2.13 2.15 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2011 
0
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From Table 4.4 we can see the decline of food spending as a share of the total spending in 
both urban and rural households, although rural food spending share is higher than in 
urban areas. At the same time, the share of clothing spending is lower in rural areas, 
because of the poor living standards in rural area. On the other hand, there is increasing 
amount of spending on education, culture, transport and communications in both urban 
and rural areas; the figure in urban areas is higher than in rural areas, which indicates that 
urban areas have better education and standard of living There is an increasing share of 
house maintenance spending in rural areas due to rural house improvements, while urban 
households do not spend much on housing maintenance because of the nature38 of houses 
in urban areas. Hence, urban households spend a greater percentage on clothing, 
household facilities, transport and education, yet less on health and housing maintenance, 
than rural households.  
 
Moreover, the leading urban areas have also promoted better education, healthcare and 
other social services than other areas. Luo and Zhu (2008) argue that the level of 
education and sector of employment are the key factors to explaining overall inequality. A 
decomposition analysis, based on households’ income determination, shows that the 
increase in returns to education account for two-thirds of the income change in urban 
areas and one-sixth in rural areas. China’s central government introduced two national 
strategies, ‘Constructing a New Socialist Countryside’ and ‘Building a Harmonious 
Society’, in 2006 to reduce urban-rural inequality through increasing public spending in 
less developed rural areas (Zhu and Wang, 2012). These national strategies include the 
improvement of education, health care and investment in rural areas, and abolishing 
agricultural taxation for rural households. However, it is a long term task for China’s 
government to reduce the income gap between urban and rural areas in the unique model 
that is the Chinese economic growth model.  
4.4.2 Cross-regional inequality 
Cross-regional inequality is another major factor in China’s overall inequality; it is linked 
                                                 
38
 Houses in urban areas are leasehold properties with 70-year leases; houses in rural areas are built by the 
land owners. The cost of purchasing a house is not included in this survey.  
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to high poverty rates in the western regions of China. In 2000, only 10 per cent of China’s 
poor lived in the eastern (coastal) regions, compared with 28 per cent in central regions 
and 62 in the western regions (Wang et al., 2010). Park et al., (1996) find that China's 
fiscal reforms lead local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in meeting 
expenditure responsibilities. Furthermore, the reforms also led to greater inequality in the 
provision of public goods and services, because local governments have pursued 
economic growth at the expense of distributional objectives. Hence, provincial 
governments have accumulated large debts, and they rely increasingly on investment 
strategies to promote faster economic growth in order to pay the interest on these debts. 
 
Due to the differences in initial economic structures and revenue bases, the fiscal burdens 
to support local government expenditures vary significantly across regions. Before the 
economic reforms, the coastal regions were endowed with a large share of non-farming 
economic activity, while inland regions still relied heavily on agriculture as the major 
source of economic output. Since China’s fiscal decentralization, both types of regions 
have been responsible for collecting their own revenues and fulfilling the same 
responsibilities. Hence, the poorer regions initially relied on agricultural production as 
their major economic activity, which limited their resources for local public spending. 
The welfare of poor, rural households still largely relied on income from farm production. 
The lack of attention paid to regional economic growth has led to the emergence of great 
social disparities among provinces, while income equality is crucial for national cohesion 
and socio-economic development.  
 
A major policy in China during the era of economic reforms has involved the trade-off 
between equity and efficiency in regional growth policies. The decentralization of control 
by the central government devolved greater responsibilities to the provinces and 
governments at lower level. During the fiscal reforms, the fiscal relationships between the 
centre and the provinces changed drastically, giving more power to provincial level 
governments. When Deng Xiao Ping emphasized openness to international trade and the 
development of regional comparative advantages, the central government chose to 
experiment with an ‘open door’ policy in coastal provinces such as Fujian and Guangdon. 
The central government provided a number of advantages for these provinces by the 
creation of special economic zones. The objective was to promote growth in coastal 
regions, with the idea being that there would be spillover effects to the inland provinces 
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(Brun et al., 2002).  
 
In 1992, the Chinese government accelerated the process of economic liberalization in the 
coastal areas by establishing special economic zones, which shifted the focus of regional 
development to the coastal provinces, where there were favourable economic policies 
such as taxation reduction and special economic zones to attract more foreign investment. 
The combination of better location, infrastructure and economic foundations in these 
coastal areas promoted a higher rate of return on investment than in inland regions. 
Hence, the coastal provinces attracted far more foreign investment and generated more 
volume of trade than inland provinces during the liberalization process.  
 
However, this resulted in uneven regional economic development between coastal and 
western provinces during the economic opening-up. Huang, Kuo and Kao (2003) find that 
the overall inequality has shifted from intra-province to inter-province, wherein the 
income disparity between the coastal and interior areas is the most significant determinant 
of the rising income inequality in China. Moreover, their larger economic gains have 
promoted better education, healthcare and other social services in these coastal areas. In 
turn, the coastal provinces have a more skilled population, which will in return receive 
higher salaries than those in the inland provinces. 
 
Inequality in urban areas 
Firstly, we have compared the inequality in urban areas across China’s provinces. 
According to the NBS of China, the income inequality in urban areas was very low at the 
beginning of the economic reforms in 1978 because most urban employees received 
similar salaries in the system of SOEs. However, China accelerated privatization to finish 
off loss-making SOEs in 1997, a move which caused a rapid reduction in the number of 
employees in SOEs. For example, Solinger (2002) estimated that about 30 million 
workers were dismissed from SOEs between 1996 and 2001. Hence, the reform of these 
SOEs has made a significant contribution to the rise in urban inequality over the last two 
decades. Moreover, a huge number of rural households move to urban areas to find jobs 
each year. These unskilled rural workers tend to work in the lower-paid jobs than urban 
employees. Table 4.5 shows the regional income and consumption disparities in urban 
areas.  
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Table 4.5: Urban households’ annual income and the consumption disparities between regions 
Year Indicator Total 
Income 
Income from 
Wages and 
Business 
Income from 
Properties 
Total 
Consumptio
n  
Food 
Expenditure 
Clothing 
Expenditure 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
Education 
and Cultural 
Expenditure 
2000 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai Guangdong Shanghai Shanghai Tibet Beijing Beijing 
Lowest 
region 
Shanxi Heilongjiang Tibet Jiangxi Inner 
Mongolia 
Hainan Jiangxi Henan 
Gap  2.49 2.53 91.67 2.45 2.89 4.68 3.96 3.15 
2005 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai Zhejiang Shanghai Shanghai Zhejiang Beijing Shanghai 
Lowest 
region 
Guizhou Qinghai Tibet Hainan Shanxi Hainan Jiangxi Hainan 
Gap 2.46 2.46 53.12 2.32 2.40 4.08 3.97 3.49 
2010 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai  Zhejiang  Shanghai  Shanghai Inner 
Mongolia 
Beijing Shanghai 
Lowest 
region 
 Gansu Heilongjiang Gansu Qinghai Shanxi Hainan Tibet Tibet 
Gap 2.50 2.61 20.35 2.41 2.55 3.46 3.44 7.04 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2001and 2011 
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Table 4.5 presents the regional income and consumption disparities in urban areas from 
2000 to 2010. Overall, the regions on the eastern coast of China have higher levels of 
income and consumption than western regions. The first column indicates the highest 
income or consumption region, and the lowest region and the gap between them, in 2000, 
2005 and 2010 respectively. In terms of total income, Shanghai is the highest region in 
every featured year, with the lowest regions being Shanxi in 2000, Guizhou in 2005 and 
Gansu in 2010. The total income gap between the highest region and lowest region almost 
kept at the same level from 2000 to 2010, at 2.49, 2.46 and 2.5 in 2000, 2005 and 2010 
respectively. Simultaneously, the gap between income from wages and business rose 
slightly from 2.53 to 2.61. Shanghai still had the highest income from wages in 2000, 
2005 and 2010. Contrastingly, the province with lowest income from wages varied from 
Heilongjiang in 2000 to Qinghai in 2005, and later to Heilongjiang in 2010 
 
In the terms of income from properties39, the gap decreased significantly from 91.67 times 
in 2000 to 53.12 times in 2005, and later to 20.35 times in 2010. This indicates that the 
provincial gap in properties’ income reduced significantly over the last ten years under 
study. This trend appears to be caused by the rapid rise housing prices in urban areas; the 
second-tier cities had lower housing prices in 2000, but a faster growth rate between 2000 
and 2010. However, the reduction of the income differential from properties had no effect 
on the total income difference between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Table 4.5 also illustrates the gaps of expenditure regarding urban households. It features 
the gaps between total consumption expenditure, food expenditure, clothing expenditure, 
health care and medical services expenditure, and education and culture expenditure. In 
general, the regions that have higher incomes will have higher spending, such as 
Shanghai, Beijing and Zhejiang. We can see that Shanghai has the highest total 
expenditure and food expenditure in 2000, 2005 and 2010, and the highest educational 
and cultural spending in 2005 and 2010. Beijing has the highest healthcare spending in 
2000, 2005 and 2010 and the highest educational and cultural spending in 2000. The gaps 
among consumption spending, food, clothing and healthcare spending have narrowed. 
Conversely, the gap between education and cultural spending increased from 3.15 in 2000 
to 7.04 in 2010. This indicates that the educational inequality between Chinese provinces 
                                                 
39
 Income from properties includes the both income on capital stock, such as savings, bonds and stocks, and 
real estate.  
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increased over the last ten featured years. 
 
Inequality in rural areas 
 
China’s economic transition began in the agricultural sector, with each rural household 
being given a long term lease of land in return for meeting tax and quota obligations (Das, 
2007). The rural reforms promoted agricultural production and poverty reduction in the 
rural areas, while increasing rural inequality at the beginning of the economic reforms. 
The rapid growth of regional income inequality in rural areas was primarily caused by the 
rural areas’ non-agricultural activities. Rural collective enterprises boosted rural economic 
growth differently, while those regions with more rural enterprises experienced faster 
income growth. Moreover, the profits of rural enterprises are distributed unevenly in rural 
areas. The owner retains most of the profits because of the low labour costs in these rural 
areas. The workers receive only the minimum wage, compared with urban workers. On 
the other hand, the extremely poor rural residents receive income only from agricultural 
output, which is even less than the worker in rural enterprises because of the low price of 
agricultural products in China.  
 
The Table 4.6 shows the ranking of the per capita annual income and expenditure of rural 
households by region from 2000 to 2010. As with the ranking in urban areas, Shanghai 
has the highest total income and consumption per household in rural areas. In general, the 
provinces with the highest net income and consumption expenditure are all located on the 
east coast of China. This indicates that those regions endowed with better infrastructure, 
resources and a good geographic location will enjoy a higher level of economic 
development. Compared with the ranking in urban areas, the income and consumption 
gap is larger in rural areas. For example, the total urban households’ income gap between 
the highest, Shanghai, and the lowest, Gansu, is 2.5; contrastingly, the total rural 
households’ income gap was 4.08 in 2010. In the first column, the gaps in net income rose 
from 4.21 to 4.39 between 2000 and 2005, and later fell to 4.08 from 2005 to 2010. The 
gap between wage and operations declined dramatically from 4.51 in 2000 to 3.39 in 
2010. However, the gap of income from assets increased from 25.96 in 2000 to 39.66 in 
2010. This indicates that households in Beijing, Shanghai or Zhejiang had more savings 
or real estate than households in Guizhou, Hubei or Guangxi.   
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Table 4.6: Rural households’ annual income and the consumption disparities between regions 
Year Indicator Net Income Income 
from Wages 
& 
Operations 
Income 
from 
properties 
Total 
Consumptio
n 
Expenditure 
Food 
Expenditure 
Clothing 
Expenditure 
Health care 
Expenditure 
Education 
and 
Cultural 
Expenditure 
2000 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai Zhejiang Shanghai Shanghai Beijing Tianjin Shanghai 
Lowest 
region 
Tibet Tibet Guizhou Tibet Gansu Guangxi Tibet Tibet 
Gap 4.21 4.51 25.96 7.90 6.79 4.77 16.86 50.33 
2005 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai Beijing Shanghai Shanghai Beijing Shanghai Shanghai 
Lowest 
region 
Guizhou Xinjiang Hubei Guizhou Xinjiang Hainan Tibet Tibet 
Gap 4.39 4.89 34.98 4.69 3.34 5.71 12.64 33.21 
2010 Highest 
region 
Shanghai Shanghai Beijing Shanghai Shanghai Beijing Beijing Shanghai 
Lowest 
region 
Gansu Guizhou Guangxi Tibet Shaanxi Guangxi Tibet Tibet 
Gap 4.08 3.39 39.66 3.83 2.93 6.33 11.81 19.54 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2011  
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On the expenditure side, there was a significant narrowing in the gap of total consumption 
expenditure, from 7.9 in 2000 to 3.8 in 2010, as well as a reduction in the gaps on food, health 
care and education. Only the gap regarding clothing expenditure increased in the final studied 
decade. Conclusively, households in the eastern coast of China have greater income 
expenditure than those in other parts of China. The income and consumption gaps are lager in 
rural areas, although the gap in total consumption expenditure declined in rural areas during 
the final decade studied. 
4.5 Redistributive public spending in China 
Compared with the public capital investment spending, redistributive
40
 public spending 
provides a more important role in economic development. Kelly (2005) states that any 
specific government spending that affects the income of individuals received and spent in the 
markets can influence distributional outcomes. Social expenditure is the spending on basic 
needs such as housing, health and education. Investment in human resources contributes to 
the enlargement of productive capacity by improving the quality of the labour force. For 
example, education spending can influence the characteristics of individuals. Public spending 
provides opportunities for human capital development that would not be affordable to some 
individuals in a privately-funded system. A debate exists as to whether public spending 
programmes do actually have their intended effects, but nevertheless they would be expected 
to equalize income distribution. If distributional outcomes are the central goal of government, 
then we should expect the government to use public spending as a tool to influence income 
inequality. 
 
This section will mainly focus on public expenditure on the social sectors, which includes 
education, health and social protection (also known as the social security net) spending. 
Understanding the trends of public spending in industrial economies is a useful method for 
analyzing public spending in China. Although there are different levels of economic 
development across different countries and their public spending varies, the overall size of 
public spending in developed countries is larger than that of developing countries. Social 
                                                 
40
 Redistributive public spending, also known as social spending, includes spending on education, health and 
social protection. Elsewhere, it is also referred to as social sector or social welfare public spending. 
Chapter 4: Background to the Analysis of China’s Fiscal Reforms, Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
105 
 
spending constitutes the largest proportion of public expenditure in the most-developed 
countries. Social spending programmes also have a redistributive component. At the inception 
of social security programmes in the western economies in the 1930s, their redistributional 
aspects were common political arguments in their favour (Glomm and Kaganovich, 2003).  
 
Table 4.7: The share of public spending of GDP in various countries, 1990-2000 
Year  France  Germany Japan  United 
Kingdom  
United 
States  
China 
1990 50%  45% 31% 40% 33% 21% 
1995 54% 50% 36% 43% 33% 13% 
2000 51% 43% 38% 38% 29% 17% 
2005 54% 47% 34% 41% 36% 19% 
2010 56% 47% 40% 47% 41% 23% 
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1988, IFM World Economic Outlook 2011 
 
 
Figure 4.7: The share of public spending on social sectors of total public spending in various 
countries in 2007 
 
Source: IMF, General Government Finance Statistics, 2008 
 
Table 4.7 shows the size of government, which is measured by public spending as a share of 
national income. We can see that European economies had a higher share of government 
expenditure of GDP than the United States and Japan from 1990 to 2010. On the other hand, 
China had the lowest level of public spending - only 23 per cent of its GDP. Hence, compared 
with the developed economies, China’s level of public spending was very low, which 
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significantly affected public welfare. The middle and low income countries are at the 
beginning stages of economic development, so public spending projects play an important 
role in increasing demand and supply, which may have less of a crowding-out effect (Li, 
2013). 
 
Figure 4.7 compares the share of social welfare spending in various developed countries with 
China. It includes the shares of health spending, education spending, social protection 
spending and the sum of them, which we call total social welfare spending. The table shows 
that countries at higher levels of economic development have a higher level of governmental 
spending on social sectors such as education, health and social protection. For example, 
Germany has the highest level of total social welfare spending, which accounts for 69 per cent 
of total public spending. Contrastingly, China only directed 30 per cent of public spending 
towards social welfare in 2007. Compared with the spending on health and social protection, 
education spending in China is similar to that of other developed countries, which was 15 per 
cent of total public spending in 2007. Hence, we can see that the Chinese government has 
paid more attention to education than to health and social protection.  
 
Providing better education as a fundamental role of government spending is universally 
accepted by economists. The literature on economic growth has highlighted the role of 
education in reducing inequalities that prevail in many developing societies. In recent 
economic literature, such as Lucas (1988), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Bils and Klenow 
(1999), human capital is regarded as a major determinant of differences in productivity, 
although the appropriate method of including the human capital variable is still not agreed 
upon. However, there is a general consensus on the importance of education to promote 
economic development.  
 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) found that there is a pattern of increasing expenditure on basic 
education to cater to the increase of income in developed countries. Furthermore, Sen (1999) 
states that education spending is not only for the individual, but also for the society as a whole. 
It provides benefits directly to those who receive it, which in turn affect the individual’s 
future income stream. At the aggregate level, a better-educated workforce is thought to 
increase the stock of ‘human capital’ in the economy and to increase its productivity. 
Considering the externalities in education, it is widely accepted that the government has an 
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important role in ensuring the equitable distribution of education to the public. From a 
microeconomic perspective, a higher level of education raises the individual’s wage rate in 
the labour market. Concurrently, empirical analyses regarding the contribution of human 
capital has explained the divergence in the rates of growth across countries of the world 
(Barro and Lee, 1993). 
 
Figure 4.8: The trend of total public spending and social sector spending in terms of share of 
GDP, and the share of social sector spending on total public spending 
 
Source: NBS of China: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000 and 2007-2013 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the share of people’s well-being spending41 in total public spending (top 
blue line), the ratio of total public spending to GDP (middle red line) and the ratio of people’s 
well-being spending to GDP (bottom line). We can see that the share of people’s well-being 
spending has increased dramatically from 7 per cent of total public spending in 1978 to about 
33 per cent in 2012. However, its share of total public spending in China is still less than in 
most developed countries’ level. This also suggests that past Chinese public spending has had 
a growth-oriented nature. The ratio of total public spending has shown two different trends in 
the past thirty-years: it fell from 31 per cent of GDP in 1978 to 11 per cent of GDP in 1994, 
and then later rose to about 25 per cent of GDP in 2012. In 1994, the tax reforms significantly 
increased the taxation capacity of China’s central government, which led to greater public 
spending after 1994. The share of people’s well-being spending to GDP maintained a constant 
level of less than 5 per cent GDP until 2002, but it was not affected by the reduction of the 
                                                 
41
 People’s well-being spending, as well as social welfare spending, is the sum of education, health and social 
protection spending in China. This name is taken from the government report of the State Council in 2012.  
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share of total public from 1979 to 1994. When the ‘Building a Harmonious Society’ national 
campaign in 2006 was first implemented, public spending on social welfare rose significantly 
in terms of both share of GDP and total public spending.  
 
Figure 4.9 shows public spending as a percentage of GDP on education, healthcare and social 
protection from 2007 to 2012. The share of public spending on education, health and social 
protection in GDP increased during this period, and was less than 8 per cent of GDP in 2012. 
For example, health spending only constituted about 1 per cent of GDP during this period, 
with social protection and education spending taking about 2 and 3 per cent of GDP, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 4.9: The ratio of national educational spending, health spending and social protection 
spending to GDP in China from 2007 to 2012 
 
Source: NBS of China: China Statistical Yearbook from 2008 to 2013 
 
Although China’s public spending on social sectors has significantly risen over the last three 
decades, its share of GDP and total public spending are relatively smaller than most 
developed countries, accounting for less than 8 per cent of GDP and 30 per cent of total 
public spending in 2012. Spending on social sectors is important because it tends to benefit 
the poorer population more than the rich. Moreover, it increases the human capital of the 
economy, which can produce direct growth effects and indirect spillover benefits for the rest 
of the economy (Baqir, 2002). Some Chinese economists argue that China’s low level of 
social welfare spending has failed to provide a basic safety net for Chinese citizens during the 
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economic reforms, and that this has inevitably compromised domestic consumption (Lou, 
2008). Hence, China needs to promote greater public spending on the social sectors, which 
would smooth the social problems experienced thus far in the process of economic 
development and promote sustained economic growth and greater equality. 
4.6 Conclusion  
During the first period of fiscal decentralization (the fiscal contract system), both the revenue 
share and expenditure share of sub-national governments dramatically increased, which can 
be viewed as a period of fast decentralization. In the second fiscal reform period (the tax 
reforms of 1994), the central government re-centralized fiscal revenue through taking a larger 
share of the total fiscal revenues via tax assignment. Simultaneously, almost 80 per cent of 
total public expenditure was still the responsibility of sub-national governments. Hence, 
China’s fiscal reforms increased the self-reliance of sub-national governments in dealing with 
expenditure, which may have led to greater inequality in the provision of public goods and 
services across regions. The uneven decentralization of expenditure responsibilities has led to 
marked divergences in spending per capita across regions, and has generated adverse 
incentives in carrying out spending by local governments. Provincial governments with a 
limited amount of fiscal revenue are unable to meet social needs such as education and health 
(OECD, 2006). 
 
Economic development and social stability require the government to have adequate revenue 
for the provision of essential public goods and services. China’s rapid economic growth has 
contributed to a huge increase in fiscal revenue, which theoretically would provide the 
opportunity to solve the social problems during the period of fast economic growth. Economic 
decentralization in the reform period has undoubtedly helped to prompt China’s growth. 
Nevertheless, regional disparities have widened significantly. Therefore, the matter of how to 
balance economic growth and income becomes a delicate task for policymakers (Zhang, 
2006). Improving the effectiveness of the public finance system is the key to promote 
economic development. In order to have better fiscal policies, China needs to improve its 
public finance system and to increase public spending on social welfare continually in order 
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to achieve more effectiveness in its economy development. Moreover, section 4.4 has focused 
on the income inequality between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland 
provinces. The fight against poverty and income disparities is the main task of the Chinese 
government; it is crucial to use appropriate fiscal policies as a tool to achieve the ‘harmonious 
society’ goal of the Chinese government. Section 4.5 has analyzed China’s public spending on 
social sectors, such as education, health and social protection. There is an increasing trend 
towards social public spending; however, less than 30 per cent of public spending goes on 
social sectors, and it only constituted less than 8 per cent of GDP in 2012. The low level of 
social spending has failed to provide a basic safety net for Chinese citizens during the past 
economic reforms, and this has inevitably compromised domestic consumption. Given the 
increasing self-reliance on local public financing, a close relationship between local revenue 
and expenditure suggested that richer regions can spend more, and the poorer regions spend 
less. Therefore, continuing to improve public spending on social welfare in lagging areas is 
crucial for sustainable economic growth and equitable distribution in the long term.  
 
China has now entered the ‘second transition’ toward a welfare state after the rapid economic 
development of the last three decades. With the huge increase in its fiscal revenues, the 
Chinese government now has the ability to provide a social welfare framework for the public. 
Wang et al., (2010) state that the Chinese government should increase the funds it allocates to 
the poorer regions and people, which needs to introduce more comprehensive package of 
transfer, which includes reforms in the pension system, the social insurance system and the 
employment system in order to protect the low income population in the less developing 
areas. In recent years, the Chinese government appears to have paid more attention to the 
issues of income equality, reducing corruption and providing greater market liberalization to 
foster a more balanced economic development. Crucially, this view was reinforced by a 
former President of China (Hu Jintao) who pursued a ‘harmonious society’ policy agenda that 
emphasized equitable growth. China has implemented a wide range of policies designed to 
reduce wealth disparity, such as agricultural support policies, social welfare transfers, local 
minimum wage increases, targeted tax reductions and poverty alleviation. In order to achieve 
its goal, the Chinese government needs to promote greater public spending on the social 
sectors, which could alleviate the problems experienced during its previous economic 
development, and promote sustained economic growth and greater equality.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology and Data Analysis  
5.1 Introduction 
This dissertation mainly adopts quantitative approach because of the nature of the 
research. The selection of research methods is based on a careful consideration of the 
hypotheses and others possible research methods. The hypotheses are focused on a 
statistical analysis of numerical data, although some observations and interpretation of 
data are required in the analysis of the whole process of China’s economic development42.  
 
Before the econometric test, we provide a descriptive background of China’s overall 
economic and fiscal trends in the context of market transformation. This chapter provides 
a description of the data and the empirical methodology used in the analysis. This chapter 
also indicates the advantages and limitations of the selected research methods.  
 
The research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. In terms of methodology, it 
improves previous empirical studies by applying panel data analysis. One important 
advantage of VAR analysis is that it incorporates the endogenous variable in the same 
model, which has been a major flaw in previous studies. The PVAR applies Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel techniques to address the potential 
endogeneity of government expenditure in the endogenous growth model.  
 
Based on China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, we employ an updated data 
set from a broad cross-section of provinces over a long time span. The econometric 
analysis contains national level data from 1978-2012, and a subnational level data from 
24 provinces over the period 1995-2010. Most importantly, these data sources offer a 
more comprehensive measure of government spending by using total government 
expenditure and specific public spending items, such as agricultural spending, educational 
spending and social welfare and security spending. The decomposition of government 
spending allows us to isolate both the productive and unproductive elements of 
                                                 
42
 The observation and interpretation data, whilst qualitative in nature, are nevertheless also based on 
numerical data. 
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government spending from the total. This enables us to additionally explore, in broad 
terms, the different effects attributable to the composition of public spending. This 
chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the hypotheses and tests in econometric 
analysis. Section 5.3 discusses the VAR and PVAR models in the econometric analysis. 
Section 5.4 presents a description of the data in the regression analysis. Section 5.5 
investigates the relationship between inequality and economic growth at the provincial 
level. Finally, section 5.6 provides a conclusion to this chapter.  
5.2 Hypotheses and Tests 
The fundamental aim of the study is to investigate the effects of public spending43 on the 
economic growth and inequality in, China. The study uses annual data at the national 
level between 1978 and 2012, and provincial panel data from 24 provinces from 1995 to 
2010. Focusing on the issues surrounding public spending in the literature review, this 
research posits four hypotheses. We examine these hypotheses at both the national and 
provincial levels of data according to different econometric models. This dissertation 
investigates the anticipated effect of public spending44 on the basis of three hypotheses 
focusing on the relationships between public spending, economic growth and inequality 
in China. 
 
Hypothesis 1: there are positive relationship between economic growth and national and 
provincial public spending and their share of social spending in China.  
 
Hypothesis 2: there are negative relationship between income inequality and national and 
provincial public spending and their share of social spending in China. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between economic development and 
inequality in China.  
 
                                                 
43
 For the purposes of this thesis, the 4 types of public spending [total national public spending, total 
provincial public spending, share of social spending in total national spending, and share of social spending 
in total provincial spending] shall be referred to collectively as ‘public spending’. 
44
 The role of public spending includes faster economic growth, reducing of income inequality and 
balancing efficiency and equity during economic development (OECD, 2006).  
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Notes for Hypotheses 1 to 3: Since late 1978, China has adopted market-oriented 
economic reforms and fiscal decentralization, with the intention of improving efficiency 
through economic liberalization and the provision of local public services (Tsui and 
Wang, 2004). Since the economic opening up, China’s government has set economic 
growth as the priority of economic development. Chinese economic growth was strongly 
influenced by public investment or investment by SOEs. The rapid growth of GDP has 
created a large capacity for public spending.  
 
Conversely, inequality has increased dramatically during China’s period of economic 
growth. This suggests requirement growing need for higher public spending to meet the 
citizens’ social welfare and security needs. After the tax reforms of 2004, China’s public 
spending increased from 12 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 23 per cent in 2010, with an 
average of annual growth rate of around 20 per cent. Simultaneously, provincial public 
spending accounted for 85 per cent of national public spending in 2010. Thus, provincial 
public spending has played a significant role of China’s total public spending.  
 
The role of the government in economic development encompasses both economic 
growth and income redistribution through public spending. Hence, assuming China’s 
public spending includes a welfare policy designed to achieve a more egalitarian income 
distribution, government spending should therefore have a positive effect on income 
equality.  
 
Social spending is the sum of public spending on education, health and social protection, 
and it has the greatest direct effect on income redistribution. Hence, it has a more 
significant distributional effect than total public spending. Furthermore, income inequality 
has risen significantly during China’s economic development. Hence, the last hypothesis 
investigates whether economic growth has a positive relationship with income inequality.  
 
In response to the major deficiency in the current literature on the empirical analysis of 
public spending, we examine the effects of public spending at both the national and 
provincial levels. Hence, apart from the VAR model adopted in the national level analysis 
from 1978 to 2012, this dissertation also applies the PVAR method to explore the effects 
of provincial public spending on growth and inequality in China. This thesis presents an 
empirical analysis of the provincial macroeconomic effects of public spending in China, 
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based on panel datasets of 24 Chinese regions over a 16-year period from 1995-2010. 
Before the hypotheses are formally tested, we provide a descriptive analysis of the data, 
which neither directly confirms nor rejects the hypotheses; it serves only to capture the 
country’s overall economic development and trends in public spending in the context of 
China’s market transformation. 
5.3 The VAR and PVAR models 
The VAR model is a multivariate, time-series specification developed as a generalization 
of the univariate autoregressive (AR) model. It was initially proposed by Sims (1980) to 
avoid the ‘incredible identification restrictions’ of (large-scale) structural econometric 
models, and it has subsequently become a vital tool in empirical econometrics. The VAR 
model is a reliable framework that has been widely used in the Economics literature. It is 
an n-equation, n-variable linear model in which each variable is in turn explained by its 
own lagged values, plus the current and past values of the remaining n - 1 variables. This 
simple framework provides a systematic way to capture rich dynamics in multiple time 
series. In addition, the statistical toolkit that came with VARs was easy to use and to 
interpret (Stock and Watson, 2001).  
 
In the usual unrestricted VAR specification, there is one equation for each and every 
variable. Therefore, all variables are assumed to be endogenous, which avoids 
unnecessary a priori distinctions between endogenous and exogenous variables. Any 
assumptions regarding endogenous and causal effects can be tested. Moreover, for each 
endogenous variable there is a set of explanatory variables that comprise its own lags and 
the lags of all the other variables in the model, allowing for rich dynamic effects to be 
captured. If there are only two variables, the VAR model will be: 
 
 
 
 
Consider the following reduced form of the vector autoregressive model with p variables  
 
y
tntnktkktktt exaxayayay   11111 ......
y
tntnktkktktt exbxbybybx   11111 ......
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + … + 𝐴𝑃𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + Ɛ𝑡 
 
Where, 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables, p is the lag length. We employ Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the appropriate lag length. The VAR model is 
linear in the parameters and assumes that these are constant over time. Moreover, we 
assume that the error terms are identically and independently distributed, i.e. they are 
serially uncorrelated (E (Ɛ𝑡, Ɛ’t-k) =0 for k ≠ 0), have a zero mean (E (Ɛ𝑡) = 0), and have a 
time-invariant positive definite covariance matrix (E (Ɛ𝑡, Ɛ′𝑡) = Ω). Hence, the error terms 
follow a Gaussian (normal) distribution (or white-noise process): Ɛ𝑡 ~ iid Np (0, Ω). The 
residual covariance matrix (Ω) has dimensions p × p, and contains information about 
possible contemporaneous effects (Martins, 2010).  
 
If the process is found to contain non-stationary behaviour (i.e. at least one variable is 
non-stationary), then any inference based on the VAR may be invalid, and the 
relationships among the variables spurious. In this case, it will be more appropriate to 
analyze the data within a co-integration framework. Following Engle and Granger’s 
(1987) work on the non-stationary behavior of variables, a study which has dramatically 
shaped modern time-series econometrics, Johansen and Juselius (1992) extended the VAR 
model by applying the concepts of co-integration and error-correction to analyze long 
term relations amongst non-stationary variables. Johansen (1995) states that if all 
variables in the system are not level stationary I(0), it is possible to examine the existence 
of possible long run relationships between the variables in the VAR system. For this 
purpose, the VAR can be re-written in the general Vector Error Correction Model (VECM 
(k-1)) form:  
 
∆𝑌𝑡= ∏𝑌𝑡−1+ 𝐷1∆𝑌𝑡−1+ ∙∙∙∙∙∙ + 𝐷𝑝−1∆𝑌𝑡−𝑝+1 + Ɛ𝑡  
 
The error-correction terms (∏ 𝑌𝑡−1 ) measures the disequilibrium, which represents 
stochastic shock in the dependent variables. Specifically, they represent the proportion by 
which the long term disequilibrium in the dependent variables is corrected in each short 
term period. The coefficients of the error-correction term are expected to be negative and 
statistically significant and they reflect the speed of adjustment in the elimination of 
disequilibrium (Loizides and Vamvoukas, 2005).   
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In the unrestricted VAR specification, all variables are assumed to be endogenous (there is 
one equation for each and every variable), avoiding unnecessary distinctions between 
endogenous and exogenous variables. The fact that it does not assume an a priori 
direction of causality among the variables is particularly useful for fiscal variables, which 
are often jointly determined. Instead, the framework allows a number of hypotheses to be 
tested within the specified model. This framework is often used to help the formulation of 
realistic models, uncovering facts and describing the characteristics of the data (Martins, 
2010). Hence, using the VAR model can be better fitted the theoretical framework of the 
endogenous growth model.  
 
The VECM model enables easy dealing with non-stationary time series variables in the 
regression analysis, as compared with the OLS model. Moreover, Vector autoregressive 
models are particularly appropriate for estimating the medium and long term impacts of 
public policy for at least three reasons. Firstly, they take due account of the dynamic 
feedback between variables, as well as their effect on other variables in both the short and 
long term. This is of primary importance when the delay between a policy change and its 
implementation and posterior impact is not negligible, as is usually the case with fiscal 
policy. Moreover, the short term and long term effects may differ in magnitude and sign. 
Secondly, VAR models are especially suitable when the variables of interest are 
endogenous, as is the case here, where output, public expenditure and inequality are 
interrelated. Finally, VAR models are not too demanding on data, which has surely 
contributed to the recent proliferation of empirical research on the macroeconomic effects 
of fiscal policy (Ramos and Roca-Sagales, 2008). 
 
VAR techniques have been used mostly to analyze macroeconomic time series data. 
Furthermore, over the past two decades, important advances have been made in the study 
of dynamic PVAR models (Binder et al., 2005). Hence, the PVAR is quite a common 
technique in contemporary econometric analysis. Our approach is to use a PVAR 
methodology which was employed by Holtz-Eakin et al., (1988). This technique 
combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the variables in the system as 
endogenous, with estimation techniques for panel data, which allows for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. Numerous macro studies have estimated PVARs using existing 
techniques for single-equation dynamic panel data models. In such models, it is well 
known that the simple, Least-Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator is not 
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consistent for a finite time dimension T, even when the cross-sectional dimension N 
becomes large (Juessen and Linnemann, 2010). 
 
In this thesis we do not use the LSDV estimator of PVAR model of Holtz-Eakin et al., 
(1988), which has bias in panels that include lagged endogenous variables. This bias is 
particularly severe if the time dimension (T) is small (Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 
2008). Therefore, we use the GMM to overcome the bias, because our sample period is 
relatively short. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a first-differenced generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator in the first difference, which includes the lagged dependent 
variable and its built-in correlation with the combined error term. This method employs 
valid instruments for the lagged endogenous variables. It is called the ‘standard moment 
condition’, and is widely used in empirical estimations. 
 
The PVAR model in the GMM is provided by (Love and Zicchino, 2006), who developed 
a technique in Stata to work on the PVAR model. This thesis will follow their model and 
technique to test variables among Chinese provinces, which are economic growth rate, 
ratio of total public spending in GDP, income inequality, social public spending in GDP, 
non-social public spending in GDP, SOEs investment in GDP and employment rate. 
 
𝐸 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝜌∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡) = 0  For all ρ=2. . ., t – 1. 
 
The resulting instrument matrix for the past values of the endogenous variable can then be 
written as: 
 
𝑍𝑖
∆,(𝑦)
= 
 
 
And analogously for the set of strictly exogenous explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡−1): 
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𝑍𝑖
∆,(𝑥)
=  
 
And the full set of the first difference transformed model 𝑍𝑖
∆ is given by: 
 
𝑍𝑖
∆ = ( 𝑍𝑖
∆,(𝑦) , 𝑍𝑖
∆,(𝑋) ) 
It can be written in matrix form as: 
 
 𝑧𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛤0 +  𝛤1 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡  is an m × 1 vector in the PVAR model, 𝛤1 is an m × m matrix of slope 
coefficient and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an m × 1 vector of the composed error term. The PVAR model is 
thus a straightforward generalization of the univariate dynamic panel data model.  
5.4 Data collection and analysis  
This section focuses on the data of economic growth, total public spending and social 
spending, private and SOE investment, the total employed population and income 
inequality. The data of the variables employed in the national level analysis are time 
series data from 1978 to 2012. The provincial level data are panel data from 24 provinces 
from 1995 to 2010.  
 
We use the real GDP per capita to measure economic growth at the national level due to 
the selected VECM methods. The Gini coefficient is used as a measure of income 
inequality. The national Gini coefficient is collected from Chen et al., (2010), and the 
provincial Gini coefficients from 1995 to 2010 are obtained from Tian (2012), where the 
Gini coefficients are calculated with the same data source and method. All the other data 
have been collected from the ‘China’s Statistical Yearbook’ by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) and the ‘Finance Yearbook of China’ by the Ministry of Finance of China 
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over various years. 
5.4.1 Measurement of the Gini coefficient 
There are two main data sources regarding income inequality in China: the annual 
household income and expenditure surveys of the NBS, and the periodic national 
household surveys of the China Household Income Project (CHIP). The NBS surveys 
contain numerous observations from 1978 onwards, but feature only a limited number of 
questions. The CHIP surveys relate to the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007, and they 
feature more comprehensive questions and definitions as regards income comparisons 
between rural and urban areas (Knight et al., 2013). Since 2007, the China Family Panel 
Studies (CFPS) dataset has launched independent research into public policy and family 
income, provided by Beijing University. Kanbur and Zhang (1999) used the CHIP survey 
to examine the Gini coefficient in the sub-period 1988-1995. Longer term studies adopted 
the NBS micro data to obtain the Gini coefficient, such as those studies by Ravallion and 
Chen (2007), Fan and Sun (2008) and Chen et al., (2010). The annual household income 
survey of NBS is the most important data source to calculate the Chinese Gini coefficient, 
yet it does possess some limitations. For example, the statistical data in the yearbook has 
ignored the income disparity within each group, and it is generally not sufficiently 
accurate.  
 
Based on their knowledge and understanding of the limitations of Chinese data, some 
scholars have implemented their own adjustments to the Chinese data to obtain a more 
accurate Gini coefficient. Ravallion and Chen (2007) adopted the cost of living (COL)45 
adjustments to measure the inequality between rural and urban areas. Chen et al., (2010) 
used a decomposition method 46  to obtain the national Gini coefficient. In the 
decomposition model, the Gini coefficient (G) of the whole country can be divided into 
three parts: the intra-rural Gini ratio (Gr), the intra-urban Gini ratio (Gu) and the Gini 
ratio between urban and rural areas (Gur).  
 
                                                 
45
 They state that COL adjustments are not ideal, in that a common deflator is applied to all levels of income. 
46
 The decomposition method is the most common method to calculate the aggregated Chinese Gini 
coefficient. It can be written as G = Gur +δGu +βGr, whereδ and β stand for the results of the population 
proportion of urban and rural areas (Chen et al., 2010).  
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Figure 5.1: China’s overall Gini coefficient from 1978 to 2012 
 
Source: data from 1978 to 2006, collected from Chen et al., 2010, and the 2007-2012 
from the NBS of China.  
 
Figure 5.1 shows China’s overall Gini coefficient from 1978 to 2012. There is no 
continued data for China’s overall Gini coefficient for the period 1978 to 2012 by NBS. 
Numerous studies have sought to measure China’s Gini coefficient during the economic 
reform period, such as those of Chen and Fleisher (1996), Kanbur and Zhang (2005), 
Ravallion and Chen (2007), Fan and Sun (2008) and Chen et al., (2010). However, we 
cannot find a single study which encompasses the period from 1978 to 2012. In addition, 
the NBS has the Gini coefficient only after the year 2003. Therefore, we chose the data 
from Chen et al., (2010) and the NBS of China, because these two measurements of the 
Gini coefficient are consistent with both the data sample and calculation methods. For 
example, they have the same level of Gini coefficient for 2003 to 2006, which NBS and 
Chen (2010) both included. The overall Gini coefficient is calculated based on both the 
urban and rural Gini coefficients, which suggests that the urban-rural income gap plays an 
important role in China’s inequality. 
 
From Figure 5.1 we can see that the overall Gini coefficient increased significantly from 
about 0.3 to 0.5. At the beginning of the period of economic reforms, the overall Gini 
dropped slightly, then increased to about 0.4 in 1994, then it levelled off at around 0.4 
until 2000, and increased to about 0.5 in 2008. The most common explanation for this 
growth in inequality was the reform of SOEs in the mid-1990s. As a result of this reform, 
thousands of workers lost their jobs from the former SOEs. Hence, the SOEs’ reform 
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played an important role in the rise of inequality in the 1990s. The abolition of agriculture 
tax in 2004 benefitted all rural households, especially the poorer households who relied 
solely on agricultural output. In 2006, the social protection in urban areas improved 
significantly. Hence, the Gini coefficient fell after 2008, possibly as a consequence of the 
world economic crisis, as well as the rise in public spending on social welfare, which rose 
significantly. Furthermore, the decline may even suggest that the inflection point of 
Kuznets’ inverted U-curve had been reached. 
 
Similarly, in the decomposition model, Tian (2012) calculated the provincial Gini 
coefficient in Urban and Rural respectively. The equation is: 
 
𝐺 = 1 −
1
𝑃𝑊
∑(𝑊𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑊𝑖−1) × 𝑃𝑖 
Where P is total population, W is total income and 𝑊𝑖 is the income accumulated to group 
i. Then, he used the urban and rural Gini coefficient from the above equation and, 
following the ‘Grouping weighting method’ by Sundrum (1990), calculated the overall 
Gini coefficient at the provincial level. The Grouping weighting method is as follows: 
 
𝐺 = 𝑃𝐶
2
𝑢𝑐
𝑢
𝐺𝑐 + 𝑃𝑅
2
𝑢𝑟
𝑢
𝐺𝑟 + 𝑃𝑐𝑃𝑟
𝑢𝑐 − 𝑢𝑟
𝑢
 
 
Where G is the overall Gini in each province, 𝐺𝑐 is the urban Gini and 𝐺𝑟is the rural Gini. 
As same as the population ratio𝑃𝑐  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟 𝑢𝑐is the per-capita income in urban areas, 𝑢𝑟 is 
the per-capita income in rural areas and 𝑢 is the per-capita income in each province.  
 
The following Figure 5.2 presents the inequality map of China, with different colours in 
the provinces and municipalities, which are divided in terms of the Gini coefficient value 
of resident income in 2010. Figure 5.2 indicates strong regional characteristics in the 
provincial Gini coefficient, which shows a trend of Gini coefficient increasing 
progressively with regions from the coast to inland, east to west. The three direct-
controlled municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, have a relatively high level of 
urbanization (around 80 per cent in 2010). Therefore, the gap in resident income between 
rural and urban areas does not make an obvious contribution to the overall resident 
income gap. The overall Gini coefficient of resident income in the three cities is below 
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0.3 per cent in each case, and the income distribution is reasonable. Compared with 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, the urbanization of Chongqing is much lower (53.02 per 
cent in 2010), therefore the gap between rural and urban resident income makes a huge 
contribution to the overall resident income gap. The numeral value of the Chongqing Gini 
coefficient is above the international warning line, and presents a fluctuating, rising trend 
since 2002. In 2002 it reached maximum peak of 0.4474, and in 2010 it was 0.4003.  
 
Figure 5.2: The China’s provincial inequality map in year 2010 
 
Source: Data collected from (Tian, 2012), diagram by the author 
 
 
As regards the provinces of Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan and Hubei, we can see from Figure 5.2 that the Gini coefficient 
ranges from 0.3 to 0.4, which indicates that the income distribution is comparatively 
reasonable. In contrast, in the other ten provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang the Gini coefficient of resident income all exceed the warning line (0.4, 
according to the NBS). This illustrates a wider gap of resident income in these inland 
regions. Although the Gini coefficient of Sichuan resident income presents below 0.4, this 
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numeral value is nevertheless quite close to the international warning line, as the Gini 
coefficient of resident income reached 0.3931 in 2010.  
 
The Gini coefficient of resident income of the provinces of Guizhou, Gansu and Qinghai 
exceed 0.45, which indicates a markedly imbalanced income distribution in the three 
provinces. In 2010, the Gini coefficient in these provinces was 0.4756, 0.4901 and 
0.4735, respectively. In addition, their historically highest points were 0.4907, 0.4901 and 
0.4735, respectively. It is not difficult to account for this. As a consequence of the 
complicated geographic environment, agriculture production depends more on natural 
factors, which causes the Gini coefficient of rural resident income to be markedly higher 
than those of other provincial areas. In the meantime, the gap in resident income between 
rural and urban areas is clearly wider than other provincial areas. The ratio of national 
urban to rural resident income is 3.23, the specific values being 4.07, 3.85 and 3.59, 
respectively, for the three provinces. Thus, the gap in resident income between rural and 
urban areas makes a greater contribution to the overall Gini coefficient than elsewhere in 
the country. 
5.4.2 Summary of statistics at the national level  
The national level analysis covers 35 years from 1978 to 2012, the period of China’s 
whole economic liberalization, in which the Chinese economy experienced rapid growth, 
accompanied by a huge increase in public spending and investment. Moreover, inequality 
rose significantly at this time. In this thesis, two kinds of econometrics models are 
established to investigate the relationship between public spending, economic growth and 
inequality. This thesis mainly focuses on the public expenditure on social sectors, which 
include education, health and social protection (also called social security) spending. 
Kelly (2005) states that distributional outcomes can be influenced by any specific 
government spending that affects the income that individuals receive and spend in the 
markets. Social expenditure consists of spending on people’s basic needs and well-being, 
such as social protection, health and education. Investment in human resources 
contributes to the enlargement of productive capacity by improving the quality of the 
labour force. For example, public spending provides opportunities for human capital 
development that would not be affordable to some individuals in a privately-funded 
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system. A debate exists as to whether public spending programmes do have their intended 
effects, but these programmes would be expected to equalize income distribution. If 
distributional outcome is the central objective of governments, then we should expect the 
government to use public spending as a tool to influence income inequality. 
 
In its econometric analysis, this thesis uses the constant price values based on 1978. 
Firstly, we use the real GDP index from the NBS of China to obtain the real GDP for each 
year. Secondly, we calculate the GDP deflator for each year. Then, all other nominal 
economic variables are divided by the GDP deflator in order to remove the impact of 
price inflation. Moreover, this dissertation uses real GDP per capita to measure economic 
growth. The share of social welfare indicates the sum of education, health and social 
protection spending in total national public spending. Private investment is calculated by 
total investment minus investment of SOEs. The ratio of employed labour to total 
population measures the size of the working population. All the above data is from the 
Statistical Yearbook of the NBS of China. The overall Gini coefficient is obtained from 
Chen et al., (2010) for 1978-2003 and NBS of China for 2004-2012. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of statistics of national level data from 1978 -2012 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln (real GDP per capita)  35 7.309 0.869 5.943 8.785 
Ratio of national public spending to GDP                                                                           35 0.190 0.052 0.112 0.316 
Ratio of Social spending to GDP 
Ratio of non-social spending to GDP 
35 
35  
0.037 
0.154 
0.016 
0.051 
0.021 
0.090 
0.079 
0.293 
Overall Gini coefficient 35 0.392 0.070 0.269 0.491 
Ratio of employed population 
Ratio of total investment to GDP 
35 
33 
0.529 
0.375 
0.06 
0.141 
0.417 
0.196 
0.571 
0.722 
Ratio of private investment to GDP  32 0.178 0.140 0.005 0.500 
Ratio of SOE investment to  GDP 33 0.174 0.021 0.136 0.224 
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook, and Chen et al., (2010) for Gini coefficient from 1978 to 
2003 
 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 5.1, and Appendix B shows the trend of each 
variable from 1978 to 2012. There are some missing values for private and SOE 
investment in the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 respectively. Hence, they have fewer 
observations than other variables. Real GDP per capita growth increased four-fold, from 
381.2 Chinese Yuan in 1978 to 6538.3 Chinese Yuan in 2012, with an average growth rate 
of real GDP per capita of 8.8 per cent annually. Therefore, the ln (GDP per capita) 
increased from 5.943 to 8.785 during the last 35 years. For the entire Chinese economic 
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reform period (1978-2012), the average ratio of total public spending was 19 per cent of 
GDP, with a minimum value of 11.2 per cent of GDP and a maximum value 31.6 per cent 
of GDP. However, there was a significant decline between 1978 and 1994 during the first 
part of the process of fiscal reforms. After the TSR in 1994, the size of total public 
spending in GDP doubled from 11 per cent in 1995 to 24 per cent in 2012. Moreover, 
there has been an upward trend for the Gini coefficient over the last 35 years, which 
increased from 0.3 in 1978 to 0.47 in 2012. The Gini coefficient had a minimum value of 
0.26 in 1983, and a maximum value of 0.49 in 2008. 
 
Social spending and private spending experienced a similar upward trend over the 
recorded 35 years. The ratio of social welfare spending in GDP increased from 3.7 per 
cent in 1978 to 7.9 per cent in 2012, and the ratio of other spending also increased from 
15.4 per cent of GDP to 29.3 percent of GDP. At the same time, the ratio of private 
investment to GDP increased from 0.5 per cent in 1981 to 50 per cent in 2012. However, 
the ratio of SOE investment fluctuated during those 35 years, with a relatively high level 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, then falling in the late 1990s with advent of privatization, 
before increasing significantly along with the huge economic simulation plan of 2009. 
The ratio of employed labour to total population experienced a significant growth 
between 1978 and 1989. However, there was a positive shock on the number of employed 
people in 1990 compared with 1989. Therefore, there was a dramatic jump in 1990, and 
then it maintained a similar level of around 57 per cent of the total population.  
5.4.3 Summary statistics at the provincial level 
Data at the province level were obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of China (1995-
2011), the NBS of China. This thesis includes the real growth rate of provincial GDP per 
capita, the real growth rate of provincial public spending and its share of GDP, the share 
of social spending
47
 in total public spending, the Gini coefficient, labour growth rate, 
SOE investment and private investment. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the statistics of 
all the provincial level panel data from 1995 to 2010. Table 4.3 shows a summary of 
statistics of means of variables used in provincial level analysis. The first column shows 
                                                 
47
 It is called ‘Min Sheng’ spending or spending on people’s well-being in China, which can directly affect 
people’s welfare and standard of living. 
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the means of real GDP growth rate from 1995 to 2010 for each province. The real GDP 
per capita is based on the price levels in the year 2000. The overall summary of statistics 
is reported in Table 4.2 for the post-tax reform period. The mean of variables is reported 
in Table 4.3, and the standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported in 
Appendix B. From the analysis of the provincial level data, we can see that the average 
provincial growth rate of real GDP per capita is 10.1 per cent annually, with a maximum 
growth rate of 32.3 per cent in Guizhou and a minimum growth rate of a negative 6 per 
cent in Shanghai.  
 
Table 5.2: Summary of statistics of provincial level data from 1995 to 2010 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP growth (pc) 384 0.101 0.041 -0.064 0.323 
Public spending as share of GDP 384 0.150 0.070 0.049 0.550 
Ratio of social spending to GDP 382 0.335 0.070 0.009 0.796 
Ratio of non-social spending to GDP 382 0.099  0.043 0.030 0.320 
The growth rate of employees 384 0.014 0.030 -0.266 0.269 
Ratio of private investment to GDP 32 0.223 0.123 0.032 0.656 
Ratio of SOEs’ investment to GDP 382 0.225 0.074 0.078 0.471 
Overall Gini coefficient 384 0.379 0.058 0.228 0.491 
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook (1995-2010) 
 
Table 5.3: Means of variables in provincial level data from 1995 to 2010 
 Growth 
rate of 
GDP 
Public 
spending 
in GDP 
Social 
spending  
share  
Gini private 
investment 
in GDP 
SOEs’ 
investment 
in GDP 
Growth 
rate of 
labour 
GDP 
pc 
rank 
location 
Shanghai 0.072 0.155 0.236 0.278 0.231 0.233 0.013 1 East 
Beijing 0.088 0.147 0.301 0.267 0.215 0.215 0.046 2 East 
ZheJiang 0.100 0.083 0.313 0.353 0.294 0.202 0.024 3 East 
GuangDong 0.088 0.102 0.283 0.393 0.202 0.141 0.03 4 East 
JiangSu 0.108 0.081 0.327 0.337 0.28 0.184 0.015 5 East 
LiaoNing 0.092 0.132 0.341 0.345 0.277 0.189 0.007 6 East 
FuJian 0.096 0.092 0.356 0.371 0.219 0.159 0.022 7 East 
NeiMengGu 0.144 0.169 0.284 0.391 0.218 0.239 0.009 8 Central 
Heilongjiang 0.079 0.142 0.33 0.346 0.146 0.186 0.009 9 East 
Hebei 0.099 0.094 0.366 0.335 0.284 0.22 0.008 10 East 
Xinjiang 0.083 0.193 0.351 0.435 0.168 0.29 0.018 11 West 
HuBei 0.11 0.117 0.353 0.362 0.199 0.227 0.01 12 Central 
ShanXi 0.109 0.147 0.378 0.39 0.177 0.225 0.009 13 Central 
ChongQing 0.112 0.138 0.363 0.42 0.301 0.207 0.006 14 West 
HeNan 0.11 0.102 0.367 0.37 0.252 0.174 0.017 15 Central 
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ShaanXi 0.122 0.16 0.355 0.439 0.174 0.28 0.007 16 West 
Qinghai 0.100 0.306 0.385 0.451 0.169 0.359 0.018 17 West 
NingXia 0.109 0.236 0.303 0.415 0.26 0.32 0.021 18 West 
Sichuan 0.108 0.146 0.343 0.378 0.249 0.232 -0.012 19 West 
JiangXi 0.104 0.136 0.348 0.348 0.247 0.197 0.01 20 West 
AnHui 0.103 0.134 0.356 0.378 0.272 0.193 0.013 21 Central 
Guangxi 0.094 0.145 0.332 0.419 0.212 0.176 0.015 22 West 
Gansu 0.102 0.217 0.356 0.443 0.126 0.289 0.015 23 West 
Guizhou 0.103 0.234 0.327 0.429 0.175 0.265 0.016 24 West 
Total 0.101 0.150 0.336 0.379 0.223 0.225 0.014   
Notes: Expect in the case of location, values are the means over the period (1995-2010). The GDP per 
capita rank is based on the mean of real GDP per capita. 
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook (1995-2010) 
 
In Table 4.3, we can see the regional disparity in economic development. All of the nine 
eastern (coastal) provinces are in the top ten ranking of GDP per capita. In addition, most 
western provinces are at the bottom of the ranking of GDP per capita. Contrastingly, the 
western provinces show a higher growth rate than the eastern provinces from 1995 to 
2010. For example, Shanghai had the highest GDP per capita, yet the lowest growth rate 
of only 7.2 per cent between 1995 and 2010. The average share of provincial public 
spending took 15 per cent of GDP, with a 0.07 standard deviation. Its minimum value was 
4.9 per cent of GDP in Jiangsu and the maximum value was 55 per cent of GDP in 
Qinghai. In Table 4.3, provincial public spending also experienced a strong regional 
disparity. We can see that the richer provinces have more public spending per capita, but 
this constitutes a smaller share of GDP than the poorer provinces. For example, the 
average total provincial public spending was only 8.1 per cent of GDP in Jiangsu, but 
30.6 per cent of GDP in Qinghai province between 1995 and 2010. This also indicates 
that the richer eastern provinces had a lower level of public spending in GDP than the 
poorer provinces in the west. Moreover, the average social spending occupied 33.5 per 
cent of overall provincial level public spending.  
 
Social welfare spending is the sum of the spending on education, health and social 
protection. The richest province, Shanghai, had a 23.6 per cent share of the total social 
spending share between 1995 and 2010, but the western province Qinghai had 38.5 per 
cent of total social spending. This suggests that the richer provinces have little interest in 
the welfare spending, despite their higher level of income. The eastern provinces also 
have a higher growth rate of numbers of employees than the western provinces, which 
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suggests that rural migrants migrated to the eastern provinces to find work between 1995 
and 2010. The average share of private investment and SOE investment was 22.3 per cent 
and 22.5 per cent of GDP in the provinces overall. From Table 4.3, we can see that SOE 
investment had a higher share of GDP in the western provinces, and private investment 
had a higher share of GDP in the eastern provinces. This was also the case with the Gini 
coefficient, with the rich eastern provinces having relatively lower levels of inequality 
than the poorer western provinces.  
5.5 The relationship between inequality and income levels in 
Chinese provinces 
Income level is a crucial factor influencing the distribution of residents’ income in both 
‘Kuznets inverted U curve’ (1955) hypothesis and Barro’s (2000) ‘nonlinear relationship’ 
between income levels and inequality. Although their points of view differ, the level of 
economic development plays an important role in the variation of the Gini coefficient. 
Therefore, in order to further investigate the shifting characteristic of the provincial Gini 
coefficient as regards income levels, we carried out an analysis of the relationship 
between the level of economic development and the provincial Gini coefficient in 24 
Chinese provinces in 1995 and 2010.  
 
The Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3 reflect the degree of the overall provincial Gini coefficient 
and regional income levels. Table 5.4 includes China’s 24 provinces and their GDP per 
capita level and Gini coefficient in 1995 and 2010. To standardize the income levels, we 
use the ratio of provincial regional GDP per capita to the national GDP per capita. Figure 
5.3 features the distribution chart of income levels and the overall Gini coefficient at the 
provincial level in 1995 and 2010. The vertical axis is the Gini coefficient, and the 
horizontal axis is the relative provincial level GDP per capita. In addition, Figure 5.3 has 
been divided into four quadrants (districts A to D) according to the provincial income and 
inequality level. The horizontal-straight line presents the Gini coefficient that is 
equivalent to the warning line of the Gini coefficient (0.4), and the vertical-straight line 
indicates relative income level that is equal to one, which connotes that regional GDP per 
capita is equivalent to the national average level of GDP per capita.  
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Table 5.4: Analysis of the provincial Gini Coefficient and income levels in 1995 and 2010 
Provinces Year 1995 Year 2010 
GDP 
level 
Gini 
coefficient 
Position
s 
GDP 
level 
Gini 
coefficient 
Position
s Beijing  2.51 0.24 D 2.53 0.27 D 
Liaoning  1.36 0.32 D 1.41 0.36 D 
Shanghai  3.37 0.24 D 2.54 0.28 D 
Jiangsu  1.45 0.31 D 1.76 0.37 D 
Zhejiang  1.61 0.31 D 1.72 0.37 D 
Fujian  1.29 0.33 D 1.33 0.29 D 
Hebei  0.88 0.26 C 0.96 0.37 C 
Jiangxi  0.57 0.30 C 0.71 0.37 C 
Hubei  0.73 0.36 C 0.93 0.38 C 
Sichuan  0.6 0.39 C 0.71 0.39 C 
Heilongjiang  1.07 0.31 D 0.9 0.35 C 
Anhui  0.61 0.34 C 0.7 0.39 C 
Henan  0.65 0.33 C 0.82 0.39 C 
Guangdong  1.61 0.36 C 1.49 0.41 B 
Inner 
Mongolia  
0.75 0.34 C 1.58 0.42 B 
Guangxi  0.65 0.42 A 0.67 0.44 A 
Chongqing  0.67 0.41 A 0.92 0.40 A 
Shaanxi 0.59 0.41 A 0.9 0.41 A 
Gansu  0.46 0.41 A 0.54 0.46 A 
Qinghai  0.7 0.42 A 0.8 0.47 A 
Ningxia  0.68 0.43 A 0.9 0.44 A 
Xinjiang  0.93 0.44 A 0.83 0.42 A 
Shanxi  0.7 0.38 C 0.88 0.43 A 
Guizhou  0.36 0.35 C 0.44 0.48 A 
Source: Gini index from Tian (2012), GDP from China Statistical Yearbook from 1996 and 2011 
 
Figure 5.3: The distribution of provincial income level and Gini coefficient in 1995 and 
2010 
 
Source: Gini coefficient from Tian (2012), and GDP from China Statistical Yearbook, 1996 and 
2011 
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The economic meaning of each of the four quadrants is different. District A contains low 
income and high inequality provinces, which means the GDP per-capita is lower than the 
national average, and that the residents’ income distribution is highly unequal. District B 
is for those provinces with both a high level of income and inequality. District C is for 
those provinces with low levels of income and inequality. District D includes those 
provinces with a high income level and low inequality, which is the objective of economic 
development.  
 
Because the social preference is for low inequality and high income, therefore those 
provinces in District D perform better than the provinces in Districts A, B and C. 
Conversely, those provinces in District A have the lowest social objective function. If we 
treat inequality as being equally important as economic growth, then this suggests that 
those provinces in Districts B and C have the same social welfare objectives. However, 
most Chinese economists considered economic growth to be more important than income 
distribution in the period of economic reforms. According to division of the four 
quadrants, we can draw a regional judgment of income levels and income distribution in 
the years of 1995 and 2010 for each province; these results are shown in Table 5.8. In 
2005, seven provinces or municipalities (Beijing, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian and Heilongjiang) appear in District D. This indicates that these seven provinces 
occupy the best position in terms of economic development with higher levels of income 
and lower levels of inequality. Heilongjiang province slipped into the District C in 2010, 
which indicates the slow economic growth of Heilongjiang from 1995 to 2010.  
 
Ten provinces were located in District C in 1995, signifying a lower income level than the 
national average and low inequality as well. However, three of these provinces were 
moved to other positions. For example, Guangdong and Inner Mongolia shifted to District 
B by virtue of their fast growth of income and inequality. Shanxi and Guizhou dropped to 
District A, signifying low levels of income and a high level of inequality. Moreover, seven 
provinces occupied the worst position, district A, in 1995, and they remained there with 
both low levels of income and equality in 2010. Hence, provincial development did not 
mean a higher level of economic welfare from 1995 to 2010. Two provinces dropped to 
the lowest position A from a better position C, one province dropped to position C from 
the highest position D, and two provinces shifted from position C to B with higher level 
of income at the cost of higher inequality.  
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Furthermore, from Figure 5.10, we can see the negative relationship between the level of 
income and inequality in both 1995 and 2010. Compared with the figure for 1995, the 
negative relationship is more significant in 2010, indicated by the higher coefficient. 
From Table 5.9, we can see that the regional development characteristics conform to this 
division of eastern-western regions. All the provinces with the best economic 
development, in position D, are located in eastern coastal China. Conversely, all the 
provinces in position A, with lower levels of income and higher level inequality, are 
located in the western part of China. This shows a strong regional aspect in the levels of 
income and inequality, which basically identifies the eastern-western regional division as 
regards economic development.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an econometric method and data analysis to investigate the 
effects of public spending on economic growth and inequality in China. Three research 
hypotheses have been found, and these hypotheses will be tested by different methods and 
data in Chapter 6. This chapter has explored two econometric methods, which are VECM 
estimation and the PVAR model. The Chinese data includes both a national sample from 
1978 to 2012, and a provincial sample of 24 Chinese provinces from 1995 to 2010. The 
national analysis includes three main variables: real GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient 
and the ratio of total public spending to GDP in the basic model, then the share of social 
spending in total spending, the ratio of private investment and SOE investment and the 
ratio of employed people to the total population in the further developed models.  
 
The provincial level analysis includes the real GDP per capita growth rate, the Gini 
coefficient, the size of total public spending or social public spending, private and SOE 
investment and the growth rate of the employed population at the provincial level through 
PVAR and panel data models. There are some major conclusions regarding the data 
analysis. Firstly, there was a significant growth of GDP per capita, private investment and 
social spending during the 35 years under analysis. However, the Gini coefficient rose 
dramatically. Secondly, the regional economic disparities are significant in the 24 
provinces. For example, the eastern provinces had a higher GDP per capita, higher private 
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investment and growth rate of employees, but a lower growth rate and share of public 
spending. Moreover, the eastern provinces had a lower level of inequality than the 
western provinces. Conversely, the western provinces had a higher level of public 
spending and social spending, and a higher growth rate.  
 
Nevertheless, the research in this paper still has shortcomings. Due to the lack of 
statistical resources, the calculation of the Gini coefficient still cannot cover all 31 
provincial administrative regions. What is more, this research has not taken the influence 
of illegal and invisible income into account, nor out-budget public spending. These 
omissions could both lead to the depreciation of the Gini coefficient and total public 
spending. Future research may have to focus more on these issues. 
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Chapter 6: Estimations, Findings and Discussion  
6.1 Introduction 
The theoretical literature offers support to both the positive and negative effects of 
government size on economic growth. Governmental provision of public goods is thought 
to be conducive to growth (Aschauer, 1989; Ram, 1986). This idea has been formalized in 
the literature on endogenous growth models. In Barro’s (1990) model, in which the 
government’s size is relatively small, the economic growth rate rises with the increase in 
productive government spending as the positive effects of public spending dominate; 
however, beyond certain specific critical points, the disincentive effects of higher taxes on 
savings and investment reduce the growth rate. If Barro’s nonlinear hypothesis is valid 
and the effect of government spending on long term economic growth does vary with its 
size, this will provide a clearer guideline as to the appropriate level of public spending for 
a particular country. Furthermore, in Barro’s model, there exists an optimal size of 
government to maximize economic growth. Having an indication of this hypothetical 
optimum, as well as where a country stands relative to it, should be of potential interest to 
policymakers. 
 
Currently, there is no clear consensus in the empirical growth literature on how 
government spending affects growth, because the optimal point is likely to differ in each 
country, and various factors may affect the break point. This chapter re-examines the role 
of public spending during China’s economic development, which has featured rapid 
economic growth along with rising in income inequality. Firstly, this chapter tests the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth at the Chinese 
provincial level. Secondly, it examines the relationship between government spending and 
inequality during the period of fast economic growth. Thirdly, it investigates the 
relationship between economic growth and inequality. This chapter will investigate the 
dynamic relationship between public spending and China’s economic development, which 
features both growth and inequality. In Chapter 5, three hypotheses were offered: 
Hypothesis 1: there are positive relationship between economic growth and national, 
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provincial public spending and their share of social spending in China. Hypothesis 2: 
there are negative relationship between income inequality and national, provincial public 
spending and their share of social spending in China. Hypothesis 3: There is a negative 
relationship between economic growth and inequality in China. 
 
There are two reasons behind our assumption that public spending has a positive 
relationship on per capita GDP (Hypothesis 1) and a negative relationship with inequality 
(Hypothesis 2). Firstly, public spending is likely to have a positive effect in the long run 
on per capita income in the endogenous growth model, and it can crowd-in private capital 
in the Keynesian model. Secondly, public spending can counteract market failures and 
redistribute income between rich and poor people to promote equality in economic 
development. We also investigate the relationship between economic growth and 
inequality (Hypothesis 3) to examine whether China’s economic growth has caused an 
increase in the level of inequality, and whether a high level of inequality hampered 
economic growth. In the national level analysis, we can test all three hypotheses in the 
VEC models with the annual data from 1978 to 2012. Then, PVAR method is applied to 
study the impact of public spending on economic growth and income inequality across 24 
provinces from 1995 to 2010. This will not only provide a more detailed analysis of 
China’s public spending, but will also provide a robustness check on the national level 
analysis. Therefore, Section 6.2 explores the trivariate dynamic relationship between 
public spending, GDP per capita and income inequality via the national level data in the 
VEC models. Sections 6.3 investigates the dynamic relationship between public spending, 
GDP per capita and inequality via provincial level data in the PVAR models. Section 6.4 
provides a conclusion for this chapter.  
6.2 Econometric results of national level analysis on the VECM 
approach 
The aim of this section is to test the effects of total public spending, as well as social 
welfare spending, on growth and inequality at the national level in the VEC models.  
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Recall that in the neoclassical theory the aggregate production function serves as the 
platform on which the empirical model for public spending is built. Most well-known 
approach in this respect is the Barro (1990) model: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴𝐿𝑖
1−𝛼. 𝐾𝑖
𝛼 . 𝐺1−𝛼           
Where Y denotes the level of output, K denotes the stock of domestic physical capital, G 
is public spending and L is the labor force. However, in the neoclassical endogenous 
growth model, there are a number of problematic assumptions. For example, it is assumed 
that saving determines investment and the capital accumulation process is driven by the 
saving behavior of households. Demand is assumed to automatically grow with output 
(Palley, 1996). These assumptions have been criticized by Keynesian scholars. For 
example, Bhaduri (2006) developed a post-Keynesian endogenous model based on the 
demand-led growth and income distribution. It helps to overcome the error of ‘omission’ 
on the effective demand and the error of ‘commission’ on the supply side to the faulty 
assumption on the capital and labour substitution. Moreover, there is no role in neo-
classical approach for income distribution to affect the output growth on the supply side 
(Onaran, 2011). Therefore, the Keynesian economics, especially the post-Keynesian view, 
is more relevant for our purposes in this thesis. 
 
The Keynesian aggregate demand can be written as: 
 
 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐷 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋 
Bhaduri (2006) presents a demand side endogenous growth model where labour 
productivity is driven by inter-class conflict over income distribution between workers 
and capitalists and it is adjusted through the gap between the growth rates of real wage 
and labour productivity. In Bhaduri (2006) model:  
 
 𝑑𝑔𝑦 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑎(𝑔𝐼 − 𝑔𝑆), 𝑎 > 0, 𝑔𝐼 = 𝜂𝑦𝑔𝑦 + 𝜂𝑥𝑔𝑥 , 𝑔𝑠 = 𝜀𝑦𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑦 = 𝑔𝑥 + 𝑔𝐿   
 
Where Y is the output level, X is the labour productivity level, L is the employment level, 
I is investment, S is saving, and 𝜂𝑦 and 𝜂𝑥 are positive partial elasticities of investment 
with respect to output and investment, respectively. Saving is treated as an increasing 
function of income. In the Bhaduri (2006) growth model, the long run steady-state growth 
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rate is determined by the growth of labour, investment and saving decisions. This result 
shows that the endogenous growth of labour productivity provides long run output growth 
on the supply side. In addition, the income distribution which is measured by the wage 
share is related in the output growth. For example, an increase in the wage share has 
positive effect on the private consumption, but a negative effect on investment and export. 
Therefore, the total effect of changing wage share on aggregate demand depends on the 
sum of these effects. If an increase in the wage share (reducing inequality) increases 
aggregate demand and output, it is a wage-led growth; conversely, if it results in a 
decrease in the aggregate demand and output, it is profit-led growth (Onaran and Galanis, 
2013).             
 
In Chapter 5, we have the standard form of VEC model: 
∆𝑌𝑡= 𝐸𝐶𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−1+ 𝐷1∆𝑌𝑡−1+ ∙∙∙∙∙∙ + 𝐷𝑝−1∆𝑌𝑡−𝑝+1 + Ɛ𝑡  
 
The coefficient of ECt−1 is expected to be negative and it shows the eliminating speed of 
disequilibrium. Drawing on these insights, our empirical models are: 
 
Model one:   
𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝑓[𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝐺, 𝐼, 𝐿], 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑓[𝐿𝑛𝑌, 𝐺, 𝐼, 𝐿] 
Where Y indicates the real GDP per-capita, G denotes total public spending, I represents 
total investment and L is the employment level. Gini coefficient has also been included as 
an aggregate measure of income distribution which can affect domestic consumption and 
output.  
 
Model two:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝑓[𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖, Gs, Gns, Ip, Is, 𝐿], 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑓[𝐿𝑛𝑌, Gs, Gns, Ip, Is, 𝐿] 
Where investment is split into private investment (Ip) and SOEs’ investment (Is), and 
total public spending is split into social spending (Gs) and other spending (Gns). 
Specifically, seven variables have been included in VEC model two, which are: the real 
GDP per-capita (𝑌𝑡), the ratio of social spending to GDP (Gst) and non-social spending to 
GDP (Gnst), the ratio of total investment to GDP (It), the ratio of private investment to 
Chapter 6: Estimations, Findings and Discussion 
137 
 
GDP ( Ipt) , the ratio of SOEs’ investment to GDP (Ist) , employed labour in total 
population (Lt) and the Gini coefficient(Ginit).  
 
The stationary time series plays a key role in econometric analysis. A spurious regression 
with high R-squared and t-statistics can be misleading when one statistically independent 
random walk is regressed on another one i.e. with a unit root. Therefore, we first check 
whether the variables under consideration are stationary (without a unit root). The popular 
method to check unit roots is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF 
procedure aims to retain the validity of tests by choosing an appropriate lag length by 
minimizing the use of the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). As described by Dickey 
and Fuller (1981), one can use the statistics analogous to the regression t-statistics for 
testing the null hypothesis of units’ roots. For example, the ADF test is conducted using 
the regression of the form: 
 
 
Where △𝑌𝑡 are the first differences of the Series Y, p-1 is the lag order and t stands for 
time. In the ADF test, the null hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root. The lag order 
of each variable is determined by the AIC. If the t-statistics are greater than the significant 
level, we can reject the null hypothesis, which indicates the variable is stationary.  
 
Table 6.1 ADF Test for the unit roots of all national variables in the VAR models 
Variables ADF (t) statistics in levels I(0) ADF (t) statistics in first difference I(1) 
(ln𝑌𝑡) 0.115 Non-stationary -2.705** Stationary  
(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡) -0.658 Non-stationary -3.659** Stationary 
(𝐺𝑡) -1.072 Non-stationary -2.864** Stationary 
(𝐺𝑠𝑡) 
(𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡) 
-0.433 
-1.432 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
-4.679*** 
-4.264*** 
Stationary 
Stationary 
(𝐼𝑡) 1.014 Non-stationary -2.553* Stationary 
(𝐼𝑝𝑡) 2.199 Non-stationary -2.635* Stationary 
(𝐼𝑠𝑡) -1.616 Non-stationary -3.980*** Stationary 
(𝐿𝑡) 3.451 Non-stationary -2.303** Stationary 
Notes: ***indicates a 1 per cent significant level, **indicates a 5 per cent level and * indicates a 
10 per cent level 
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In Table 6.1, we can see all the variables in the levels have a non-significant t-statistic. 
Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, using the differenced data, the 
computed ADF test suggests that the null hypothesis is rejected for the individual 
variables with at least 10 per cent significant level. Therefore, they are stationary in the 
first order I (1). The model is fitted to the first differences of the non-stationary variables, 
but a lagged error-correction term is added to the relationship, where there is evidence of 
cointegration between two or more series in the VECM. Having confirmed that the 
variables are stationary in first differences, we adopt the Johansen Cointegration Test 
(1988, 1991) to examine whether the variables have common trends. The numbers of 
cointegrating vectors are shown in the maximum eigenvalues’ statistics. In order to check 
the robustness of the results, we test the cointegrating vectors in the Johansen 
Cointegration test. The consequences of over-estimation of the order of the VAR is much 
less serious than under-estimating it (Garratt et al., 2003). The national level VEC models 
only include 2 year lag lengths because of the small time sample.  It is also customary to 
identify the optimal lags in the VECM models. Cointegration by itself does not indicate 
the direction of the causal relationship. Granger (1988) proposes a Granger Causality test 
to study the long term causality relation between variables, which can be captured from 
the VAR model. However, this requires at least one cointegration relationship between the 
variables. The general procedure proposed by Johansen (1988) has the advantage of 
testing all the possible cointegrating relationships.  
 
Table 6.2: Johansen Cointegration Test for VEC model one and two 
Ho H1          Trace statistic(Lag=2)              5% Critical Value 
Model one: 
r = 0 
 
r ≥ 1 
 
           95.495 
 
68.52 
47.21 
29.68 
 
124.24 
94.15   
68.52 
47.21 
29.68 
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2                     46.955** 
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3            25.034 
Model two: 
r = 0 
 
r ≥ 1 
 
             210.925 
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2            10.39 
r ≤ 2 
r ≤ 3 
r ≤ 4 
r ≥ 3 
r ≥ 4 
r ≥ 5 
           94.398 
           56.902 
           32.961** 
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r ≤ 5 r ≥ 6           11.811 15.41 
Note: VEC model one includes ( 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝐺, 𝐼, 𝐿 ) and VEC model two includes 
(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖, Gs, Gns, Ip, Is, 𝐿). ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. The 
number of observations=33, lags=2  
 
The Johansen Cointegration test is reported in Table 6.2. The results of Table 6.2 reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r=0 and r≤1 ) and fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of at most two cointegrating equation (r≤2) in VEC model one, and fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of at most five cointegrating equation (r≤5) in VEC model two. 
The trace statistics are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level to reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration in the Lag (2). Therefore, we have confirmed the variables 
in VEC models one and two are cointegrated, so that we can carry out ECM models based 
on these variables. The results of the Johansen Cointegration Test show there is at least 
one cointegrated combination between variables, in which we can investigate the 
direction of long run causality between the variables in the VEC models.  
6.2.1 The growth effects of public spending and inequality 
In the standard VAR model, there is one equation for each and every variable. Therefore, 
all variables are assumed to be endogenous, which avoids unnecessary a priori 
distinctions between endogenous and exogenous variables. Any assumptions regarding 
endogenous and causal effects can be tested. Hence, we adopted the VEC techniques to 
investigate the relationship between public spending, economic growth and inequality. 
Because we only have a short time period consisting of only 35 annual observations and 
we use the first difference of variables, we decided to use the 2 lag length in the VEC 
models.  
 
In this section, we use the general-to-specific strategy48 to estimate the dynamic trivariate 
relationship between public spending, economic growth and inequality. VEC model (1) 
include three variables [(𝑌𝑡),(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡), (𝐺𝑡)] and two more control variables (𝐼𝑡) and (𝐿𝑡), 
and VEC model (2) separates (𝐺𝑡 ) into (Gs) and (Gns), and (𝐼𝑡) into (𝐼𝑝𝑡) and (𝐼𝑠𝑡) 
                                                 
48
 The general-to-specific strategy is a ‘progressive research strategy’ (Hendry, 2000). It ensures that the 
space of alternative specifications is fully explored, minimizing the danger that relevant competing 
specifications are ignored, and ensures that no information is lost relative to the general specification. 
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respectively. The VEC models (1) and (2) only have two-year lags to conserve degrees of 
freedom because of the short time period involved. The error-correction terms (𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) 
measures the disequilibrium, which represents stochastic shock in the dependent 
variables. Specifically, they represent the proportion by which the long term 
disequilibrium in the dependent variables is corrected in each short term period. The 
coefficients of the error-correction term are expected to be negative and statistically 
significant (Loizides and Vamvoukas, 2005).  
 
Table 6.3: Estimates of growth effects in VEC models 
 Model one: dependent variable 𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡 Model two: dependent variable 𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡 
variables coefficients variables coefficients 
(𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) -0.004 (-5.35)** (𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) -0.0457 (-2.07)** 
(𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1) -0.501 (-2.77)** (𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1) -1.33 (1.18) 
(𝐷𝐺𝑡−1) 0.325 (1.58)* (𝐷𝐺𝑠𝑡−1) -1.535 (-1.68)* 
(𝐷𝐼𝑡−1) 0.134(1.56)* (𝐷𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡−1) 1.013 (2.21)** 
(𝐷𝐿𝑡−1) 0.678 (2.48)** (𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑡−1) 0.060 (0.33) 
  (𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡−1) 0.324 (1.66)* 
  (𝐷𝐿𝑡−1) 0.026 (0.08) 
𝑅2 0.982 𝑅2 0.972 
LM test (p-value) 0.756 LM test (p-value) 0.716 
Long run coefficients 
(Gini) -11.118 (-4.38)** (Gini) -0.407 (0.36) 
(G) 15.601 (8.28)** (𝐺𝑠) -10.416(-1.86)** 
(I) 2.018 (2.43)** (𝐺𝑛𝑠) 7.476(3.59)** 
(L) 26.667 (8.18)** (Ip) 3.173(6 .81)** 
  (Is) -5.761(-6.66)** 
  (L) 5.964(3.92)** 
Notes: ***indicates statistical significance at a 1 per cent level, **indicates a 5 per cent level and 
* indicates a 10 per cent level. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses. The error-correction term 
𝐸𝑐𝑡−1 is the residual series from the long run regressions. LM (p-value) is the probability to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation lag order. The long run equilibrium 
relationships are reported at the bottom parts of the table.   
 
Table 6.3 presents the VECM results with both short and long term growth effects. The 
short run equilibrium relationships are reported at the top parts of the Table 6.3, and the long run 
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relationships are reported at the bottom part of the Table 6.3. It only reports the impacts of 
variables on real output fluctuation. The coefficients on the first differences of (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡), 
(𝐺𝑡), (𝐼𝑡), (𝐺𝑠𝑡), (𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡), (𝐼𝑝𝑡), (𝐼𝑠𝑡) and (𝐿𝑡) are short term impacts on the dependent 
variables 𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡. The long term parameters of independent variables on 𝑌𝑡 and the LM tests 
for the autocorrelation in each VEC models are also reported in Table 6.3.  
 
VEC Models (1) and (2) indicate the impacts of total public spending on economic 
growth and inequality with different control variables. The essential short run results in 
VEC Model (1) are: firstly, the error-correction term 𝐸𝑐𝑡−1 is negative and statistically 
significant, which indicates the negative feedback necessary in real GDP to bring the 
regression back to equilibrium; secondly, 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 has a statistically significant negative 
impact on 𝐷𝑌𝑡, and thirdly, 𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 has a statistically positive impact on 𝐷𝑌𝑡. Therefore, we 
find that total public spending has a positive effect on economic growth, and inequality 
has a negative impact on economic growth in the short term. This confirms the Keynesian 
view regarding the growth effect of public spending in the short term. For example, in 
VEC Model (1), if the size of public spending in GDP increases by 1 per cent, real output 
will increase by 0.32 per cent in next year. Conversely, increasing the Gini coefficient 
(inequality) by 1 per cent means real output will decline by 0.5 per cent in the following 
year. VEC Model (1) also includes total investment and the employed population as the 
control variables, they have statistically significant positive effect on the real output.    
 
VEC Model (2) divides the total public spending into social spending and non-social 
spending and the total investment into private investment and SOEs investment, 
respectively. 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1  has a negative effect on the real output fluctuation, but not 
statistically significant. 𝐷𝐺𝑠𝑡−1 has a statistically significant negative effect on the real output 
fluctuation, which suggests that the social spending  can reduce real output growth in the short 
run. On the other hand, 𝐷𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡−1 has a statistically significant positive effect on the real output 
fluctuation, which suggests that the non-social spending plays an important role on the real output 
growth in the short run. Compared with social spending, the non-social spending has a greater 
effect on the real output during the economic transition period. Similar results have been found by 
Jin and Gang (2012), Yang (2009) and Zhou (2010). They suggest that the effects of public 
spending were unevenly distributed between people’s welfare and economic construction during 
China’s economic reform. The social spending is too little (less than 10 percent of GDP and 30 
percent of total public spending) compared with most of the western economies. During the 
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economic transition, the private investment has increased significantly. Compared with SOE’s 
investment, private investment is more market based. However, it has no significant short run 
effect on the real output fluctuation. On the other hand, the SOE’s investment has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the change of real output during China’s economic reform. This 
indicates that the SOE’s investment has dominated the China’s economic development. The ratio 
of employed population has no significant short run impact on real output in the VEC 
Model (2).   
  
The statistically significant negative error-correction terms indicate that total public 
spending and the Gini coefficient have a long term causal relationship with real GDP per 
capita in both VEC models (1) and (2). The long term cointegrating coefficient is from the 
Johansen normalization restriction-imposed equations. Hence, we can explore the long 
term growth effects of variables on real GDP per capita in VEC models. In the VEC 
Model (1), the ratio of total public spending to GDP has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with real GDP per capita in the long term, and the Gini coefficient 
(inequality) has a statistically significant negative long term relationship with GDP per 
capita. The coefficients of 𝐸𝑐𝑡−1 strongly support that the real GDP per capita is related 
with total public spending growth, as well as with any increase in income inequality. 
Hence, public spending has a positive effect in both the short and long term, which 
supports both the Keynesian view and neoclassical endogenous growth theories. 
Inequality has a negative impact on real GDP per capita in the long term. It suggests that 
higher level of inequality will reduce the growth of real output in the long run. Moreover, 
the total investment and employed labour have a statistically significant positive 
relationship with real output, which indicates that higher investment or employment will 
increase the real output in the long run.  
 
Moreover, VEC Model (2) employs the ratio of social welfare spending in GDP and the 
ratio of non-social spending instead of the total size of public spending. We find that 
social public spending has a statistically significant negative effect on real GDP per capita 
in the long term in VEC model two. On the other hand, the non-social spending has a 
statistically significant positive effect on real GDP per capita. The SOE’s investment has a 
statistically significant negative relationship real GDP per capita in the long term, where it 
has a positive relationship with real GDP per capita in the short term. Conversely, the 
private investment has a statistically significant positive relationship with real GDP per 
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capita in the long term, where it is not statistically significant in the short term. Hence, the 
SOE’s investment plays an important role on real output growth in the short term, but 
private investment helps the growth of real output in the long term. Moreover, the Gini 
coefficient is not statistically significant in the short and long term in VEC Model (2).  
 
Therefore, at the national level, total public spending has a positive Granger causal 
relationship with real GDP per capita in the long and the short term. The same result have 
been suggested by Dong and Teng (2007), Li and Wu (2009) and Zhou (2010), who have 
reported a strong Keynesian effect of total public spending on economic growth in China 
from 1978 to 2006. The results also indicate that social spending has a negative impact on 
economic growth in the short and long term. The non-social spending has a positive 
impact on real GDP per capita in the short and long term. The positive impact of total 
public spending on economic growth has been suggested by macroeconomics theories, 
especially the Keynesian school of thought. Government spending can accelerate 
economic growth by increasing non-social spending (e.g. public investment) in the short 
term or increasing social spending in the long term. The same results have been reported 
by Guo and Jia (2006) and Xia (2009), who argue that social spending is less efficient 
compared with capital spending, so social spending may have a negative effect on 
economic growth in the short term. Hence, we accept the Hypothesis 1 with respect to 
total public spending, that is total national public spending has a positive effect on real 
GDP per capita in both short term and long term. However, social spending has a negative 
effect on real GDP per capita in both short and long term. The non-social spending has a 
positive effect on real GDP per capita in the short term and long term.   
 
The total investment has a positive Granger causal relationship with real GDP per capita 
in the long and the short term. As the non-social public spending, SOE’s investment has a 
positive impact on real GDP per capita in the short term, but a negative impact on real 
GDP per capita in the long term. The private has a positive impact on real GDP per capita 
in the long term, but no significant impact on real GDP per capita in the short term. The 
Gini coefficient has a negative Granger causal relationship with real GDP per capita in the 
long and the short term in VEC Model (1), but not statistically in VEC Model (2). The 
employed labour has a positive Granger causal relationship with real GDP per capita in 
the long and the short term in the VEC Model (1), but only has a significant positive 
relationship with real output in the VEC Model (2).  
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6.2.3 The redistributive effects of public spending and economic growth 
The previous section investigated the growth effects of public spending in China during 
the last 35 years. We found the total national public spending has a statistically significant 
positive effect on economic growth. This section explores the redistributive effects of 
public spending and the relationship between inequality and economic growth in China. 
Table 6.4 shows the relationship between independent variables and inequality based on 
VEC model one and two. It presents the VECM results with both the short and the long 
term growth effects. The short run equilibrium relationships are reported at the top parts of the 
Table 6.4, and the long run relationships are reports at the bottom part of the Table 6.4. It only 
reports the impacts of variables on Gini coefficient, where the first differences of 
(𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡), (𝐺𝑡), (𝐼𝑡), (𝐺𝑠𝑡), (𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡), (𝐼𝑝𝑡), (𝐼𝑠𝑡) and (𝐿𝑡) are short term impacts on the 
dependent variables 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡. The long term parameters of independent variables on 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
and the LM tests for the autocorrelation in each VEC models are also reported in Table 
6.4.  
 
In the VEC Model (1), variable (𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡−1) has a statistically significant positive effect on 
dependent variable 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 in the short term. This indicates that a rise in GDP per capita by 
1 per cent would increase the Gini coefficient by 0.25 per cent in the following year. 
Variables 𝐷𝐺𝑡−1, 𝐷𝐼𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝐿𝑡−1 are not statistically significant in the short term. However, the 
error-correction terms (𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) are statistically significant with a negative sign. Thus, there 
is a long term causal relationship in VEC Model (1). There is also a positive long term 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and real GDP per capita in VEC Model (1), 
implying that a higher level of GDP will also increase income inequality in China. The 
total investment has a positive relationship with Gini coefficient in the long term. On the 
other hand, total public spending and employed labour have a negative relationship with 
income inequality in the long term, respectively. Therefore, increasing total public 
spending and employed labour can reduce the income inequality in the long term, but this 
effect is not statistically significant in the short term. Total investment can increase the 
income inequality in the long term, but again this is not statistically significant in the 
short term. Only the real GDP per capita has a statistically significant positive impact on 
inequality in both of the short term and the long term.   
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Table 6.4: The estimates of redistributed effects in VEC models 
Model one: dependent variable 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 Model two: dependent variable 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
variables coefficients variables coefficients 
(𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) -0.174 (-2.51)** (𝐸𝑐𝑡−1) -0.005 (-2.36)** 
(𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡−1) 0.251 (2.62)** (𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡−1) 0.278 (2.25)** 
(𝐷𝐺𝑡−1) 0.096 (0.56) (𝐷𝐺𝑠𝑡−1) -0.456 (-0.46) 
(𝐷𝐼𝑡−1) -0.083(-1.10) (𝐷𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡−1) 0.182 (0.58) 
(𝐷𝐿𝑡−1) 0.111 (0.51) (𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑡−1) -0.130 (-1.68)* 
  (𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡−1) 0.079 (0.58) 
  (𝐷𝐿𝑡−1) 0.346 (1.66)* 
𝑅2 0.593 𝑅2 0.485 
LM test (p-value) 0.756 LM test (p-value) 0.716 
Long run coefficients 
(LnY) 0.009 (2.35)** (LnY) 2.460 (6.77)** 
(G) -1.403 (-7.68)** (𝐺𝑠) -6.380(-3.43)** 
(I) 0.181 (1.87)** (𝐺𝑛𝑠) 1.318(0.24) 
(L) -2.398 (-8.15)** (Ip) -7.805(-5.55)** 
  (Is) 14.171(6.58)** 
  (L) -14.646(-4.01)** 
Notes: ***indicates statistical significance at a 1 per cent level, **indicates a 5 per cent level and 
* indicates a 10 per cent level. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses. The error-correction term 
𝐸𝑐𝑡−1 is the residual series from the long run regressions. LM (p-value) is the probability to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation lag order. The long run equilibrium 
relationships are reported at the bottom parts of the table.   
 
In the Table 6.4, VEC Model (2) divides the total public spending into social spending 
and non-social spending and the total investment into private investment and SOEs’ 
investment, respectively. In line with VEC Model (1), variable ( 𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡−1 ) has a 
statistically significant positive effect on dependent variable 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 in the short term. It 
indicates that an increase in GDP per capita by 1 per cent would raise the Gini coefficient 
by 0.278 per cent in the following year. Variable 𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑡−1 has a statistically negative impact on 
𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 at the 10 per cent significance level. In the short term, the dynamic relationship between 
private investment and inequality indicates that a higher level of private investment can reduce the 
income inequality in the short term. On the other hand,  𝐷𝐿𝑡−1 has a positive effect on 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 at 
the 10 per cent significant level which implies that a higher level of employment will increase the 
income inequality in the short term. Moreover, the variables 𝐷𝐺𝑠𝑡−1, 𝐷𝐺𝑛𝑠𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡−1 do 
Chapter 6: Estimations, Findings and Discussion 
146 
 
not have a statistically significant impact on 𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡, which indicates that the social spending, 
non-social spending and SOE’s investment have no short term relationship with Gini coefficient 
in VEC model (2).  
 
The error-correction terms ( 𝐸𝑐𝑡−1 ) measures the disequilibrium, which represents 
stochastic shock in the dependent variables. Specifically, they represent the proportion by 
which the long term disequilibrium in the dependent variables is corrected in each short 
term period (Loizides and Vamvoukas, 2005).  The statistically significant negative error-
correction terms indicate that total public spending and the real GDP per capita have a 
long term causal relationship on Gini coefficient in both VEC Models (1) and (2). The 
long term co-integration coefficient is from the Johansen normalization restriction-
imposed equations. Hence, we can explore the long term growth effects of variables on 
Gini coefficient in VEC models (1) and (2). In table 6.4, there is a positive long term 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and real GDP per capita in VEC models one and 
two. We find that real GDP per capita has a long term, causal relationship with income 
inequality. Thus, economic growth has a positive trade-off with income inequality, which 
has suggested by Barro (2000). It indicates that higher level of income has increased the 
level of income inequality or the economic output and income inequality has risen 
simultaneously during China’s economic growth. Hence, we reject the Hypothesis 3 at the 
national level which there is a negative relationship between economic development and 
income inequality. The positive relationship between inequality and economic growth has 
been widely accepted by Chinese researchers. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) and Zhu and 
Wang (2012) have argued that China’s economic opening up and fast economic growth 
contributed to the rapid rise in income inequality between inland-coastal and urban-rural 
areas. 
 
Moreover, there is a negative long term relationship between the total public spending and 
Gini coefficient in the VEC Model (1), although it is not statistically significant in the 
short term.  In the VEC Model (2), the social spending also has a negative long term 
relationship with Gini coefficient, but this is not significant in the short term. This 
suggests that higher level of total public spending and social spending can help to reduce 
the income inequality in the long run.  On the other hand, the non-social spending such as 
public investment and administrative spending has no significant effect on Gini 
coefficient in both of the short term and the long term. Hence, we can accept the 
Chapter 6: Estimations, Findings and Discussion 
147 
 
Hypothesis 2 at the national level that total public spending and social spending have a 
redistributive effect on income inequality in the long term. Conversely, non-social 
spending, which account for almost 70 per cent of total public spending, has no impact on 
inequality in the long term. The low level and efficiency of social spending has caused 
horizontal public spending inequality, resulting in the wealthier regions providing more 
public goods and services in education, health and social protection than the poorer 
regions. In turn, this has increased inequality in the Chinese economic transition period 
(Cai et al., 2002, Zhang 2006, Du et al., 2014).  
 
In summary, we find that total public spending has a positive effect on economic growth 
in the VEC Model (1), which confirms the Keynesian view of the growth effect of public 
spending in the short term. Moreover, total public spending shows a long term Granger 
causality with GDP per capita, which supports the positive growth effect of public 
spending in the endogenous growth model. Social public spending has a negative effect 
on real output per capita in both the short term and long term, but it also has a negative 
impact on income inequality in both of the short term and the long term. Moreover, we 
find that a higher level of real GDP per capita will increase the level of inequality in both 
short term and long term, and that a higher level of inequality has a negative effect on real 
GDP per capita in the long term. 
6.3 Results of provincial PVAR analysis 
The pervious section investigated the growth effect and redistributive effect of total 
spending and social public spending at the national level via VEC models. The VEC 
analysis has a limitation due to data availability which leaves very few degrees of 
freedom. This limitation in national data has motivated us to use province level data for 
intuitive reasons as well as methodological reasons as discussed previously. Therefore, 
this section explores the relationships between public spending, output growth and the 
Gini coefficient at the provincial level via PVAR models. In the endogenous growth 
models, the economic growth rate is determined by forces that are internal to the 
economic system, particularly those forces the opportunities and incentives to create 
technological progress taken place through innovations. According to Keynesian theory, 
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public spending can generate sustained per capita income growth in the short term by 
promoting aggregate demand and crowding in private investment. In Chapter 5, we 
examined the trends and reforms of public spending over the last three decades. We found 
that provincial public spending has constituted more than 70 per cent of total public 
spending after the tax reforms of 1994. Hence, this provincial level analysis is crucial for 
the study of the effects of public spending in China.  
 
We extend the public spending adjusted endogenous growth model by Bhaduri (2006) to 
include the cross-sectional dimension in the empirical model for the PVAR models: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝑖𝑡 , 𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡) 
 
Thus, the PAVR models can be written in a matrix form as: 
 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛤0 +  𝛤1 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a six-variable vector {RGDP, PS/GDP, GINI, PI/GDP, SOE/GDP and 
REMP} in PVAR model one, and a seven-variable vector {RGDP, SW/PS, GINI, PI/GDP, 
SOE/GDP and REMP} in PVAR model two. RGDP is the real GDP per capita growth rate 
at the provincial level. PS/GDP is the ratio of public spending on GDP at the provincial 
level. SW/GDP is the share of social spending in GDP, where it includes education, health 
and social protection spending. NS/GDP is the share of non-social spending in GDP. GINI 
is the Gini coefficient at the provincial level. PI/GDP is the ratio of private investment in 
GDP, and SOE/GDP is the ratio of SOEs’ investment in GDP. REMP measures the labour 
factor via the growth rate of employee numbers at the provincial level.  
6.3.1 Unit Root test 
The aim of this section is to test the relationship between provincial public spending, 
GDP per capita and inequality in 24 Chinese provinces or municipalities. Before 
interpreting the econometric results, we need to conduct a stationary test (or unit root 
test). A spurious regression, which is fitted with high R-squared and t-statistics, can be 
misleading when one statistically-independent random walk is regressed to another one, 
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i.e. with a unit root. Therefore, we firstly check whether the variables under consideration 
are stationary (with no unit root).  
 
The popular methods to check panel unit roots are the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) and Harris-
Tzavalis tests. Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) proposed a test involving fitting an ADF 
regression for each panel, which is usually applied if N is very large (or T very small). In 
the Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test, the null hypothesis refers to the series containing unit 
root, and the alternative indicates a stationary series. The LLC test involves fitting an 
augmented Dickey–Fuller regression for each panel; we requested that the number of lags 
to include be selected based on Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). A similar test is 
described by Harris and Tzavalis (1999), which also has a null of unit root versus an 
alternative with a single stationary value, which is designed to be applied to data sets 
which cover a relatively short time period.  
 
 
Table 6.5: Variable definitions and unit-root test by LLC at the provincial level 
Abbreviation Description t-statistics p-value 
RGDP Real GDP per capita growth rate -2.245   0.012 
PS/GDP Ratio of total public spending in GDP -5.848 0.000 
SW/GDP Ratio of social welfare spending in GDP -10.26 0.000 
NS/GDP Ratio of non-social spending in GDP -4.274 0.000 
GINI Gini coefficient at the provincial level -6.778 0.000 
REMP Growth rate of total number of employees -2.633 0.004 
PI/GDP Share of private investment in GDP -4.421 0.000 
SOE/GDP Share of investment by SOEs in GDP -1.92 0.027 
Note: Data is collected from China Statistical Year Book, (1995 to 2011), and the real price level 
is based on the year 2000. P-value is the probability of obtaining a significant statistic result if 
the null hypothesis is true. We reject the null hypothesis if the p-value < 0.05. 
In the panel unit root test, the null hypothesis is the panels containing a unit root, and the 
alternative is that the all the panels are stationary. If the p-value is less than 0.05, we can 
reject the null hypothesis at a 0.05 significant level, which indicates the variable is 
stationary. In Table 6.5, we can see that each variable has a significant t-statistic and a p-
value to reject the null hypothesis for each variable. Hence, we can run the PVAR models 
with the stationary provincial level data. 
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6.3.2 Results of PVAR models one and two in GMM estimator 
Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator has been designed for the cases 
involving a large cross-sectional dimension relative to the time dimension. On the other 
hand, simple Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator has advantages for the 
case of large time dimension than cross-sectional dimension. For example, we have 24 
provinces and a 15-year time period, which is the case when ‘N’ is greater than ‘T’. 
Hence, we firstly conduct the PVAR models49 in the GMM framework provided by Love 
and Zicchino (2006), which developed a technique in Stata to work on the PVAR model. 
This thesis will follow their model and technique to test variables among Chinese 
provinces. The following Table 6.6 reports the results of PVAR (1) model one with 
variables {RGDP, PS/GDP, GINI, PI/GDP, SOE/GDP and REMP}. In addition, Table 6.7 
shows the results of PVAR model two with variables {RGDP, SW/GDP, NS/GDP, GINI, 
PI/GDP, SOE/GDP and REMP}. The variables in the first row are the dependent 
variables, and the variables in the first column are the independent variables with 1 lag. 
 
The estimated results for PVAR (1) models one and two based on the GMM approach are 
reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The estimated results for the RGDP equation shows the 
effect of the public spending variable with lag (1) on the growth rate of GDP per capita. 
The result of the RGDP equation in Table 6.6 suggests that the share of provincial public 
spending in GDP has no significant impact on the growth rate of GDP per capita. In Table 
6.7, the ratios of social spending and non-social spending in GDP have no significant 
impact on the growth rate of GDP per capita. Hence, we cannot accept the Hypothesis 1 
that provincial public spending has a significant impact on economic growth in the PVAR 
(1) models. However, the investment of SOEs has a significant growth effect in both 
PVAR (1) models one and two. This suggests that increasing the share of SOEs’ 
investment50 by 1 per cent will increase growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.2 per cent. 
Conversely, private investment has no significant effect on per capita GDP growth rate in 
either PVAR (1) models one and two.  
 
                                                 
49
 We focus on the PVAR with a 1 lag model, since longer time lags are difficult to apply given the rather 
short overall sample period (Lecke et al., 2010).  
50
 Kneller et al., (1999) indicate that industrialized counties have more public consumption than public 
investment, but public investment has more growth effects. The SOEs’ investment in China partly consists 
of public investment.  
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This result is similar with VEC model two, wherein the ratio of private investment in 
GDP has no significant effect on economic growth at the national level, but the SOE’s 
investment has a positive growth effect. Therefore, the SOEs’ investment has more of a 
growth effect than public spending and private investment in China. Mittnik and Neuman 
(2001) also find the public investment has a positive effect on GDP, but the positive 
elasticity does not exceed 0.1 in the PVAR model from six industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, the Gini coefficient has a significant, positive effect on per capita GDP 
growth in both models one and two, which suggests that the provinces with higher level 
of income inequality will have faster economic growth in China during last 15 years. The 
PI/GDP equation in Table 6.6 and 6.7 shows the response of variables (in lag 1) to the 
ratio of private investment in GDP. We can see that both PS/GDP (t-1) and SW/GDP (t-1) 
have a negative effect on the PI/GDP(t). This indicates that total provincial public 
spending and its share of social spending have a crowding-out effect on private 
investment the following year. Moreover, economic growth has a positive effect on 
private investment in both PVAR models. This indicates that higher economic growth will 
promote a higher level of private investment. Conversely, investment by SOEs has a 
significant crowding-in effect on private investment in China.
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Table 6.6: Results of PVAR model one in GMM estimator 
Notes: No. of obs. = 384, No. of province = 24. This PVAR model is estimated by GMM, with variables including RGDP, PS/GDP, GINI, PI/GDP, 
SOE/GDP and REMP. Reported numbers show the coefficients and t-statistics of variables with one lags to the dependent variables in each column. 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. **indicates significance at the 5 per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Table 6.7: Results of PVAR model two in GMM estimator 
 RGDP(t) SW/GDP(t) NS/GDP(t) GINI(t) PI/GDP(t) SOE/GDP(t) REMP(t) 
RGDP (t-1) 0.27(4.54)** -0.05(-0.67) 0.01(0.31) -0.02(-0.93) 0.11(2.22)** 0.06(1.28) -0.06(-1.29) 
SW/GDP(t-1) -0.04(-0.56) 0.44(3.18)** 0.43(1.34) -0.88(-3.15)** -0.12(-1.72)* -0.02(-0.27) 0.03(0.62) 
NS/GDP(t-1) 0.73(1.08) 0.27(1.64)* 0.63(2.14)** -0.17(-1.49) 0.25(0.42) -0.30(-1.09) -0.02(-0.09) 
GINI(t-1) 0.73(1.87)** 0.30 (2.49)** 0.03(0.16) 0.82(8.88)** 1.18(4.46)** -0.13(-0.49) 0.11(0.64) 
PI/GDP(t-1) -0.04(-0.51) -0.02(-0.38) 0.01(0.26) 0.03(1.02) 0.70(16.22)** 0.03(0.56) 0.04(1.18) 
SOE/GDP(t-1) 0.20(3.00)** -0.009(-0.13) -0.01(-0.31) -0.03(-1.21) 0.19(3.41)** 0.85(17.05)** -0.10(-1.70)* 
REMP(t-1) 0.04(0.64) -0.10(-0.80) 0.02(0.56) -0.08(-2.01)** 0.04(0.85) -0.04(-0.97) 0.20(3.19)** 
Notes: No. of obs. = 384, No. of province = 24. This PVAR model is estimated by GMM, with variables including RGDP, SW/PS, GINI, PI/GDP, 
SOE/GDP and REMP. Reported numbers show the coefficients and t-statistics of variables with one lags to the dependent variables in each column. 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. **indicates significance at the 5 per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 RGDP(t) PS/GDP(t) GINI(t) PI/GDP(t) SOE/GDP(t) REMP(t) 
RGDP(t-1) 0.25(4.29)** 0.03(0.92) -0.02(-0.91) 0.14(2.71)* 0.08(1.70)* -0.06(-1.30) 
PS/GDP(t-1) 0.15(0.87) 0.85(7.87)** -0.11(-1.81)** -0.24(-1.64)* -0.20(-1.16) -0.08(-0.63) 
GINI (t-1) 0.58(2.02)** 0.29(3.68)** 1.03(13.33)** 1.10(5.79)** -0.05(-0.29) 0.20(1.44) 
PI/GDP(t-1) -0.07(-0.93) -0.04(-1.03) 0.02(0.95) 0.79(12.23)** 0.09(1.29) 0.06(1.21) 
SOE/GDP(t-1) 0.22(3.20)** 0.01(0.47) -0.03(-1.18) 0.14(2.53)** 0.81(16.34)** -0.11(-2.24)** 
REMP(t-1) 0.08(1.22) -0.06(-1.91)** -0.09(-2.23)** 0.03(0.60) -0.07(-1.50) 0.18(3.17)** 
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The traditional view of the government in economic development rests on both economic 
growth and income redistribution associated with public spending. Hence, if we assume that 
provincial public spending is designed to achieve a more egalitarian income distribution, 
provincial government spending should have a negative effect on inequality at the provincial 
level. Hypothesis 2 is designed to test whether provincial public spending had a redistributive 
effect from 1995 to 2010. In the GINI equation, we find provincial total public spending and 
social spending have a statistically significant negative effect on inequality. This indicates that 
a higher level of provincial public spending or a higher level of social spending will reduce 
income inequality. Because social spending includes education, health and social welfare 
spending, which is directly related to people’s wellbeing, a higher share of social public 
spending in total public spending will benefit the poor population and reduce the income 
inequality. Moreover, the higher growth rate of employed population can reduce the 
inequality. This indicates the higher level of employment can promote better social equality 
rather than economic growth in China. Hence, we accept Hypothesis 2 in which the provincial 
public spending and its share of social spending have a redistributive effect on income 
inequality during 1995 to 2010. Furthermore, the growth rate of GDP per capita has no 
significant effect on the level of inequality at the provincial level in both PVAR (1) models, 
while inequality has a significant positive effect on per capita GDP growth. In Hypothesis 3, 
we assume there is a positive relationship between per capita GDP growth and inequality. 
Hence, we can only accept that inequality has a statistically significant positive effect on 
economic growth, but economic growth has no significant effect on inequality in the short 
term. This suggests that there is a one way trade-off51  between inequality and economic 
growth in the economic development process. The positive effect of inequality on economic 
growth at the provincial level can be accounted for by recognizing that those provinces with a 
higher level of inequality have experienced faster economic growth over the last 15 years. The 
provincial Gini coefficient has significant regional characteristics, wherein eastern (rich) 
regions have a lower level of inequality than the western (poor) regions. Thus, a higher level 
of income will reduce income inequality in China according to the data analysis in Chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                 
51
 If there is a positive correlation between inequality and economic growth, there is a trade-off between 
inequality and growth, in which inequality can be seen as the natural cost of growth (Garcia-Penalosa and 
Turnovsky, 2007).  
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In summary, the results of PAVR (1) models one and two suggest that: (1) provincial level 
public spending and its share of social spending have no significant impact on GDP per capita 
growth rate; (2) provincial public spending and its share of social spending have a negative 
effect on inequality; (3) inequality has a positive effect on economic growth. Hence, we 
cannot accept Hypothesis 1 that public spending has a growth effect based on the results of 
the PVAR models. As regards the redistributive effects of public spending, we can accept 
Hypothesis 2 that provincial total public spending and its share of social spending have a 
negative effect on inequality. We also reject the Hypothesis 3 that there is a negative 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality.   
6.3.3 Robustness check of PVAR models in LSDV estimator 
Numerous macroeconomic studies have estimated PVAR models by using the simple Least 
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator, including Alesina et al., (2002), Beetsma et al., 
(2006). However, the LSDV estimator is not consistent for a finite time dimension (T) even 
when the cross-sectional dimension (N) gets larger (Juessen, and Linnemann, 2010). This 
indicates that there is a bias in the panel regressions if the time dimension (T) is small. The 
GMM estimator has been designed for situations with a small ‘T’ and a large ‘N’, which 
means few time periods but many cross sectional observations (Roodman, 2006). This means 
that the GMM estimator can be biased if the N is small. The provincial data used in this thesis 
covers 24 provinces and 15 years. Hence both of its cross-sectional dimension and time 
dimension are small. It is suggested that the LSDV estimator can be used as a robustness 
check for the results in GMM method in situations where both the ‘N’ and ‘T’ are small.  
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Table 6.8:  PVAR results of model one in LSDV estimator 
Notes: No. of obs. = 384, No. of province = 24. This PVAR model is estimated by LSDV, with variables including RGDP, PS/GDP, GINI, PI/GDP, 
SOE/GDP and REMP. Reported numbers show the coefficients and t-statistics of variables with one lags to the dependent variables in each column. 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. **indicates significance at the 5 per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Table 6.9:  PVAR results of model two in LSDV estimator 
 RGDP(t) SW/GDP(t) NS/GDP(t) GINI(t) PI/GDP(t) SOE/GDP(t) REMP(t) 
RGDP (t-1) 0.27(4.54)** -0.01(-0.29) -0.01(-0.26) -0.08(-1.32) -0.17(1.01) 0.06(0.67) -0.05(-1.09) 
SW/GDP(t-1) -0.14(-0.96) 0.16(1.91)** -0.17(-1.51) -0.39(-2.57)** -0.02(-0.72) 0.17(0.80) 0.06(0.57) 
NS/GDP(t-1) -0.01(-0.15) 0.22(4.19)** 0.66(9.73)** 0.22(2.36)** -0.32 (-1.22) 0.40 (3.07)** 0.01(0.16) 
GINI(t-1) 0.10(2.09)** 0.05(1.63)* 0.03(0.79) 0.71(14.08)** -0.18(-1.28) -0.01(-0.08) -0.05(-1.46) 
PI/GDP(t-1) -0.02(-1.17) -0.08(-6.65)** -0.11(-7.50)** -0.12(-6.07)** 0.11(1.81)* -0.12(-4.06)** -0.01(-0.55) 
SOE/GDP(t-1) 0.05(1.69)* 0.04(2.13)** 0.09 (3.49)** 0.05(1.63)* 0.01(0.17) 0.37(7.31)** 0.002(0.09) 
REMP(t-1) -0.08(-1.09) -0.02(-0.58) -0.02(-0.41) -0.20(-2.67)** -0.21(-0.98) 0.16(1.47) -0.001(-0.02) 
Notes: No. of obs. = 384, No. of province = 24. This PVAR model is estimated by LSDV, with variables including RGDP, SW/GDP, NS/GDP, GINI, 
PI/GDP, SOE/GDP and REMP. Reported numbers show the coefficients and t-statistics of variables with one lags to the dependent variables in each 
column. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. **indicates significance at the 5 per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per 
cent level. 
 RGDP(t) PS/GDP(t) GINI(t) PI/GDP(t) SOE/GDP(t) REMP(t) 
RGDP(t-1) 0.04(0.75) -0.01(-0.14) -0.07(-1.19) 0.17(1.04) 0.06(0.71) -0.05(-1.10) 
PS/GDP(t-1) -0.06(-1.34) 0.56(10.19)** 0.001(0.02) -0.21(-1.65)* 0.32(5.01)** 0.03(0.89) 
GINI (t-1) 0.09(2.02)** 0.04(0.06) 0.66(13.93)** -0.16(-1.19) -0.02(-0.36) -0.05(-1.44) 
PI/GDP(t-1) -0.02(-1.24) -0.20(-7.92)** -0.13(-6.33)** 0.11(1.87)** -0.12(-4.16)** -0.01(0.52) 
SOE/GDP(t-1) 0.05(1.80)** 0.13(3.09) 0.05(1.54) 0.02(0.17) 0.37(7.31)** 0.002(0.09) 
REMP(t-1) -0.07(-1.03) -0.02(-0.17) -0.18(-2.37)** -0.22(1.03) 0.15(1.54) -0.03(-0.05) 
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The Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 show the results of PVAR models one and two in LSDV 
estimator. We have chosen the same six-variable vector {RGDP, PS/GDP, GINI, PI/GDP, 
SOE/GDP and REMP} in PVAR model one and seven-variable vector {RGDP, SW/PS, 
GINI, PI/GDP, SOE/GDP and REMP} in PVAR Model 2. We only focus on the growth 
equation and Gini equation in PVAR models by LSDV estimator. 
 
In the Table 6.8 and 6.9, the PVAR models in LSDV estimator show a similar result as the 
GMM estimators. In the growth equations of PVAR models one and two, only the income 
inequality and SOE’s investment have a positive effect on per capita GDP growth rate. 
The total public spending, social spending and non-social spending have a negative effect 
on the per capita growth rate, but all of them are not statistically significant. In the Gini 
equation of PVAR model one, the total provincial public spending has no significant 
effect on income inequality, but the private investment shows a significant negative 
impact on income inequality. Compared with the PVAR results of GMM estimator, the 
LSDV method has improved the significance of variables in the Model 2. Most variables 
have a statistically significant effect on Gini coefficient in PVAR Model 2, which is 
different from the GMM method.  For example, the social spending seems to have a 
negative impact on income inequality unlike the non-social spending which exhibit a 
positive influence on that variable. This finding suggests that a higher share of social 
spending in total spending reduced the income inequality at the provincial level in last 15 
years. Moreover, the private investment has negative effect on income inequality, but the 
SOE’s investment has a positive effect on the income inequality, implying that private 
investment can play a more instrumental role in reducing income inequality at the 
provincial level. In the data analysis in Chapter 5, we find that poor provinces with less 
private investment are more likely to have a high level of income inequality. Hence, there 
is a negative relationship between private investment and income inequality.  
 
As regards to the three Hypotheses we have made, the LSDV method shows almost   
same result with GMM estimator. Firstly, total public spending and its share of social 
spending have no statistically significant effect on real growth rate. Secondly, the social 
spending has a significant negative effect on the income inequality, but total public 
spending has no significant redistributive effect. Thirdly, the income inequality has a 
positive growth effect, but the real growth rate has no impact on the income inequality.  
Therefore, we can confirm the robustness of the results at the provincial level, because the 
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LSDV estimator shows a similar result as the GMM method.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presents two empirical studies on the dynamic relationship between public 
spending, economic growth and inequality. Firstly, we explore the effects of public 
spending on economic growth and inequality in VEC models at the national level, then 
use PVAR models to examine the effects of public spending on economic growth and 
inequality at the provincial level based on the GMM and LSDV estimator, respectively.  
 
The national level analysis focuses on the whole Chinese economic reform period from 
1978 to 2012. The ADF unit root tests on the national level data strongly suggest that all 
the variables are integrated of the same order one (i.e., non-stationary in levels, but 
stationary in the first difference). Having confirmed that the variables are stationary in the 
first differences, the results of the Johansen cointegration test show there is at least one 
cointegrated combination between variables, through which we can investigate the 
direction of long term causality between the variables in the VEC models. VEC model 
one investigates the dynamic relationship between total public spending, economic 
growth and inequality with the two control variables total investment and employed 
labour. VEC model two divides the total public spending into social spending and non-
social spending and the total investment into private investment and SOEs’ investment, 
respectively. In summary, we have confirmed that total public spending has a positive 
relationship with real GDP per capita in both the long and the short term. Its share of 
social spending has a negative impact on real GDP per capita while the share of non-
social spending has a positive effect on real GDP per capita. Hence, we accept Hypothesis 
1 with respect to total public spending, i.e. total public spending has a positive effect on 
real output in the both long term and short term. However, social spending and non-social 
spending have a different effect on real per capita GDP in the both long and short term.  
Social public spending has a statistically significant negative effect on real output, but the 
non-social spending has a significant positive effect on real output. Moreover, total public 
spending and social spending can reduce the level of inequality in the both short term and 
long term, but the non-social spending is not statistically significant. Therefore, we accept 
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Hypothesis 2, in that total public spending and its share of social spending have a 
redistributive effect (a negative relationship with inequality). The relationship between 
inequality and real GDP per capita is more complicated, where the real per capita GDP 
has a positive effect on Gini coefficient, but the Gini coefficient has a negative effect on 
the real per capita GDP. Hence, we cannot accept Hypothesis 3, which posits a negative 
relationship between economic growth and inequality at the national level. 
 
At the provincial level, the PVAR models have re-examined the dynamic relationship 
between public spending, economic growth and inequality based on the 24 provinces’ 
data from 1995 to 2010. This thesis uses the PVAR (1) models in the GMM framework 
provided by Love and Zicchino (2006) and the LSDV method as the robustness check. In 
the PVAR models, the growth effect of provincial public spending and provincial social 
spending share are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot accept Hypothesis 1 that 
public spending has a growth effect based on the results of the PVAR models. Moreover, 
PVAR model one shows that total provincial public spending has a crowding-out effect on 
private investment in the short term. However, the results show that SOEs’ investment has 
a significant positive growth effect at both the national and provincial levels. The results 
of the PVAR models also suggest that total provincial public spending and social 
spending has a negative effect on inequality. As for the redistributive role of the public 
spending, social spending has played an important role on improving equity during the 
economic transition. Hence, we can accept Hypothesis 2 that provincial total public 
spending and its share of social spending have a negative effect on inequality. 
Furthermore, the Gini coefficient has a positive effect on the per capita growth rate at the 
provincial level, but the economic growth has no significant impact on the Gini 
coefficient. Therefore, we reject the Hypothesis 3 that there is a negative relationship 
between economic growth and income inequality. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The aims of this thesis are to assess the role of public spending on economic growth and 
inequality in China at both the national and provincial levels. The comprehensive 
literature review of the theoretical and empirical studies regarding the effects of public 
spending on growth and inequality has provided us with a suitably well-developed lens to 
analyse public spending throughout the period of fiscal reforms in China. Specifically, we 
focused on the impact of public spending on economic growth and inequality at both the 
national and provincial level. This concluding chapter recaps the research background as 
well as the hypotheses, and then discusses the major research findings, policy 
implications and limitations of this research. This chapter summarizes the findings of the 
previous chapters and provides a general conclusion to the thesis. Simultaneously, this 
chapter reflects on the results regarding the main themes of the effectiveness of public 
spending in light of the research findings in the previous chapters. The first part of this 
chapter discusses the research aims and hypotheses, and the second part of this chapter 
discusses the findings, implications and limitations of this study.  
7.1 Summary of research aims and hypotheses 
Numerous studies have explored the effectiveness of public spending on economic 
development by focusing on several countries or a single country. However, there are two 
gaps in the existing literature. Firstly, most studies focus only on the growth effect of 
public spending in the process of economic development. Secondly, there are few 
comprehensive studies of public spending in a single developing country with both 
national and provincial level-data and with different econometric methods. Compared 
with the developed countries, the economic growth rate in developing countries has less 
power to measure the overall economic development, because of poverty, inequality and 
social uncertainty in economic development process. Hence, this dissertation investigates 
the impact of public spending on per capita output and income redistribution in China, in 
order to obtain a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of public spending.  
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The introduction chapter provided the background and motivation for this research. Since 
it first initiated China’s economic opening up, China’s government has emphasised 
economic growth as the priority of economic development. Empirical studies have found 
a strong, positive relationship between total public spending and economic growth at both 
the national level and the provincial level in China (Chen, 2012). Currently, China is 
entering a new stage of economic development with a growing level of per capita GDP. 
However, new challenges such as high income inequality and limitations in the growth 
model have been found, which may result in a rise in social instability and the inability to 
maintain economic growth. This requires public spending to play a key role in the 
Chinese economy to overcome the limitations during this economic development. 
Improving the efficiency of public spending can promote better resource allocation and 
income distribution, which private capital fails to provide. Therefore, the study of the 
effectiveness of public spending has significant implications for Chinese economic 
development.  
 
In Chapter 2, four issues were discussed: the role of government spending, the different 
views on public spending for economic growth and the empirical evidence of government 
spending and the Chinese literature on public spending. Keynesian theory and 
endogenous growth theory provided a theoretical framework for the growth effect of 
government spending. In Keynesian theory, increasing government spending will increase 
aggregate demand; it will cause an increase in output, and subsequently an increase in 
income; simultaneously, an initial increase in output leads to an increased demand for 
money, which then pushes up the real interest rate. The rise in interest rates may reduce 
private investment, the extent of which depends on the interest elasticity of investment.  
 
With the emergence and popularity of the neoclassical growth theories, the endogenous 
growth model provides a foundation for productive government spending in fostering 
long term economic growth. The government’s provision of public capital to the 
production process contributes to growth directly by adding to the existing capital stock, 
as well as indirectly by raising the marginal productivity of privately supplied factors of 
production (Barro, 1990). However, while the theory identifies productive government 
expenditure as having a key role in obtaining a higher steady-state growth rate of the 
economy, the empirical findings are not consistent with the theoretical suggestions. The 
empirical review has focused on the impact of government spending, and it has 
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demonstrated that the relationship with economic growth varies across different 
compositions and taxation methods. The review on Chinese empirical studies show that 
China’s public spending has a strong Keynesian effect, one in which an increase of public 
spending (investment) will increase economic output. The majority of the studies indicate 
that public expenditure on science, economic reconstruction (public investment) and 
education have a significant growth effect on economic growth, while social welfare and 
administration expenditure have negative effects on economic growth. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed that public spending is a powerful instrument in income 
redistribution. However, the budget of public spending is limited. If the government 
increases public spending on social welfare, public investment on other economic 
activities will fall. Kneller et al., (1999) indicate that industrialized counties have more 
public consumption than public investment, where public investment has a greater effect 
on economic growth and public consumption has a greater effect on income 
redistribution. Empirical studies on China’s public spending show that Chinese public 
spending has played a limited role in the redistribution of income. Zhang and Fan (2000) 
argue that public spending has been unequally distributed among regions and citizens, 
which has caused not only low private consumption, but also unsatisfied public resource 
needs in poorer areas. They assert that Chinese provincial public spending has a positive 
relationship with economic growth, but has increased overall inequality.  
 
Furthermore, we have investigated the relationship between economic growth and 
inequality. Empirical evidence indicates that it can have either a positive or a negative 
relationship between economic growth and inequality. If there is a positive correlation 
between inequality and economic growth, then there is a trade-off between inequality and 
growth. This suggests that inequality can be regarded as the natural cost of growth, and 
that reducing inequality will hinder economic growth, as argued by Garcia-Penalosa and 
Turnovsky (2007). Conversely, Barro (2000) investigated the impact of inequality on 
economic growth in a cross-country analysis. He found that inequality restricts growth in 
poorer countries, but encourages growth in richer countries. Specifically, economic 
growth tends to fall with greater inequality when the per capita GDP is below 
approximately $2,000 dollars, and rises with inequality when the per capita GDP is above 
$2,000 dollars.  
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Chapter 4 has provided substantial background research on China’s public spending 
decentralization, fiscal reforms and income inequality during the period of economic 
reforms. Post the tax reforms of 1994, China has increasingly relied on provincial public 
spending in meeting its spending requirements, which has generated a greater inequality 
in the provision of public goods and services among regions. This uneven decentralization 
of expenditure responsibilities has led to marked divergences in spending per-capita 
among regions and between urban and rural areas, and has generated adverse incentives 
in carrying out spending by local governments. Local governments have also limited the 
amount the government has been able to spend on key social needs such as education and 
health (Wang et al., 2010). Thus, compared with the developed economies, China has a 
low level of total public spending share of GDP, as well as its social welfare spending. 
 
Therefore, in order to explore the impacts of public spending on economic growth and 
income inequality in China, we provided three hypotheses in Chapter 5, assuming that 
public spending has a positive growth effect and redistributional effect on income 
inequality, and that there is a negative relationship between inequality and economic 
growth. Chapter 5 also outlines the method and data analysis to investigate the effects of 
public spending on economic growth and inequality. The limit time-series dimension on 
national level data has generated a low power on the unit root and long run cointegration 
test. In order to have reliable results, two econometric methods (VECM and PVAR 
estimations) are examined, as well as two data samples: the national sample includes 35 
years’ of observation and the provincial sample includes 24 Chinese provinces from 1995 
to 2010.  
 
Three major conclusions regarding the data analysis are presented in Chapter 5. Firstly, 
the levels of GDP per capita and income inequality have increased significantly during 
the period of economic reforms. Secondly, the share of China’s total public spending and 
social spending is much smaller than those of most OECD countries (OECD, 2006). 
Social spending is the sum of public spending on education, health and social protection, 
and has a direct impact on people’s welfare. Thirdly, the regional economic disparities are 
significant among the Chinese provinces. For example, the eastern provinces have a 
higher GDP per capita, higher private investment and growth rate of numbers of 
employees, yet a lower growth rate and share of public spending. Moreover, the eastern 
provinces have lower levels of inequality than the western provinces. Conversely, the 
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western provinces have a higher level of public spending and social spending, as well as a 
higher level of growth rate than the eastern provinces. 
 
Although there is an increasing trend towards social public spending, less than 30 per cent 
of public spending goes on social sectors, and it constituted less than 8 per cent of GDP in 
2012 (NBS, 2013). This low level of social spending has failed to provide a basic safety 
net for Chinese citizens during the past economic reforms, and this has inevitably 
compromised domestic consumption (Tian, 2012). This chapter also explored the 
relationship between income levels and inequality in China’s provinces. It was shown that 
the income Gini coefficient at the provincial level has distinct regional characteristics 
from coast to inland, east to west. The analysis of income levels and the Gini coefficient 
also revealed strong regional characteristics in both of them, which essentially identifies a 
division of the eastern-western regions as regards economic development. In general, the 
eastern parts of China have a relatively high level of income and low levels of inequality, 
whereas the western parts have a higher level of inequality and lower levels of income. 
7.2 The findings of this research  
Although it has been generally accepted that public spending has a positive growth effect 
through a variety of mechanisms, nevertheless debates persist in the empirical literature. 
The extended production function approach, based on the AK model with the inclusion of 
public capital, is the most widely used method of measuring the effects of public 
spending. In the econometric analysis, we adopted Bhaduri (2006) endogenous growth 
model as the fundamental framework by including inequality in the regression. As the 
first step, we examined the dynamic relationship between public spending, economic 
growth and inequality in the context of time series data at the national level. The 
stationary and cointegration tests have a relatively low power in small-time observations; 
however, China has public spending data only for certain decades, and there was a 
significant policy break in 1978. Kamps (2004) suggests that one way to increase the 
power of econometric tests is to make use of the cross-sectional dimension of the data in 
addition to the time series dimension. Therefore, this dissertation also includes provincial 
analysis based on 24 provinces between 1995 and 2010.  
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Public spending and economic growth 
In Chapter 6, we examined the effects of public spending on economic growth using both 
national and provincial level data. In the national level analysis, we found that total public 
spending has a positive effect on real GDP per capita, which confirms the Keynesian view 
about the growth effect of public spending in the short term. Moreover, total public 
spending has shown a long term Granger causality with GDP per capita, which supports 
the notion of the positive growth effect of public spending in the long run endogenous 
growth model. In the composition of public spending, social spending and non-social 
spending have a different effect on real per capita GDP at the national level. Social public 
spending has a statistically significant negative growth effect, but the non-social spending 
has a significant positive growth effect. The provincial level analysis by PVAR models 
suggest that total public provincial spending and social spending have no significant 
effect on economic growth, but a statistically-significant crowding-out of private 
investment in the short term. Thus, the results indicate that only total national public 
spending has a growth effect in both the short and long term. Compared with public 
spending, the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) investment has a significant, positive 
growth effect at both the national and provincial level.  
 
The majority of empirical studies on China’s public spending have found that total 
national public spending has a positive effect on economic growth. However, controversy 
surrounds the growth effect of social spending and provincial public spending. For 
example, Zhang and Zou (1998) argue that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization is 
associated with lower economic growth in China. Their results suggested that increasing 
the share of local government expenditure may cause a decline in income growth, because 
public spending decentralization undermines the government's ability to redistribute 
public resources between rich and poor regions. Guo et al., (2003), Wang (2009) and Xia 
(2009) find that public investment has a negative effect on economic growth. 
Furthermore, the negative growth effect of social spending is attributable to its low 
efficiency and uneven distribution. Xue and Xu (2012) examine the relationship between 
government spending and private consumption. They find that government spending has a 
positive relationship with urban households’ consumption, but a negative relationship 
with the rural households’ consumption. Hence, they suggest that government spending 
should focus on rural areas in order to enlarge domestic demand and to reduce income 
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disparity between rural and urban areas. Hence, we can conclude that the total size of 
public spending has had a positive effect on economic growth during the period of 
economic reforms and opening up, but that the share of social spending and provincial 
public spending has a very limited role in terms of economic growth in China.  
 
Public spending and income inequality  
Experiencing a government revenue growth rate greater than GDP growth rates has been 
a common trend in China since the tax reforms of 1994. Although public spending in 
China has increased rapidly over the last two decades, the distribution of public spending 
across different regions has been quite unbalanced. Moreover, a large proportion of public 
spending has gone towards public investment in public infrastructure programmes and 
public administration. This has inevitably caused the relatively low proportion of public 
spending on essential social sectors such as the social security system, health, education 
and other basic public goods and services. Over the last three decades, the inequality 
index has increased significantly from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.48 in 2010 (China Academy of 
Sciences, 2012) which may constrain the economic development.  
 
In the VEC models of national data, we have found that public spending has played an 
important role in income redistribution during the economic transition. For example, 
increasing the overall volume of total public spending, especially social spending will 
reduce the level of inequality in both the short term and long term. When compared with 
social public spending, the non-social spending has less effect on inequality reduction. 
However, the social spending only accounts for around 30 percent of total public 
spending, which is too low for it to play any meaningful redistributive role.  
 
Regarding the provincial level data, the results of the PVAR models suggest that 
provincial public spending and its share of social spending have a negative effect on 
income inequality. Moreover, the coefficient of social spending is greater than the total 
provincial public spending. Thus, the social spending had a more important role in 
inequality reduction between 1995 and 2010.Moreover, the higher growth rate of 
employed population can reduce the inequality. This indicates the higher level of 
employment can promote better social equality rather than economic growth in China. 
Hence, the decentralization of public spending to provincial level governments did not 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
166 
 
help to improve economic growth and income distribution after the tax reforms of 1994. 
McNab (2003) argues that the objectives of income redistribution may be better pursued 
by the central government because of the mobility of people between regions. Zhang and 
Fan (2000) state that public spending has been unequally distributed between regions and 
citizens, and those poorer regions have low private consumption and unsatisfied public 
resource needs. They indicate that Chinese provincial public spending has increased 
overall inequality. In general, the government has pursued a coast-biased investment 
strategy, and this has contributed to the rapid rise in regional inequality. They suggest 
that, if the government continues to favour coastal regions in its public spending, then 
regional inequality will widen even further. 
 
Economic growth and income inequality  
Since the early 1990s, labour productivity growth has been the most important factor 
driving China’s GDP growth, and this impressive growth of labour productivity was 
chiefly the result of a massive investment effort. Consequently, the productivity gap 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy has continued to widen, leading to 
increased rural–urban income inequality. The current growth pattern would not be 
sustainable over the long term, because it requires unobtainable, ever-increasing 
investment. In addition, economic growth would be accompanied by a low growth in 
urban employment and a further widening of the rural–urban income gap (Kuijs and 
Wang, 2006). In the Bhaduri’s (2006) post-Keynesian endogenous growth model, the 
growth of labour productivity should increase the real wage, so that the wages share 
remains constant over the long run. It suggests that inequality should not increase too 
much to have the equilibrium steady state growth in the long run. 
 
We find that a higher real GDP per capita will increase the level of inequality, and a 
higher level of inequality has a negative effect on real GDP per capita in the national VEC 
models. This suggests that economic growth will increase the level of inequality and, in 
turn, a higher level of inequality will reduce economic growth. Likewise, He (2005) and 
Tian (2012) examined the relationship between inequality and economic growth in China 
from 1992 to 2003 and 1985 to 2007, respectively. Both sets of results show that income 
inequality has a negative impact on the economic growth rate. According to the 
Keynesian theory, a higher level of inequality will reduce the level of effective demand 
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and then domestic consumption. However, at the provincial level, inequality has a 
positive effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita, although economic growth has no 
statistically significant impact on the level of inequality from 1995 to 2010. This indicates 
that the provinces with a higher level of inequality have a faster economic growth rate 
than those provinces with a lower level of inequality. In addition, section 5.5 explored the 
relationship between income levels and inequality in China’s provinces. It showed that the 
income Gini coefficient at the provincial level has obvious regional characteristics from 
coast to inland, i.e. east to west. In general, the eastern parts of China have a relatively 
high level of income and low levels of inequality, whereas the western parts have a higher 
level of inequality and lower levels of income. We also find that low income provinces 
have a faster economic growth than high income provinces. Thus, income inequality has a 
positive relationship with economic growth among Chinese provinces due to the different 
levels of income.  
7.3 Policy implications and limitations of research 
The results of the econometric analysis suggest that public spending in China has not met 
the objectives of public spending in promoting economic growth and income distribution 
simultaneously during the period of economic reforms, because of the low level of social 
spending. Particularly after the tax reforms of 1994 and the decentralization of public 
spending, the overtaking strategy and ‘growth-first’ strategy were adopted by provincial 
level governments. This led to income distribution biased toward capital and against 
labour, an economic structure biased toward investment and against consumption, and 
government spending biased toward infrastructure and against social welfare (Du et al., 
2014). The results suggest that this overreliance on investment in infrastructure and 
technology-intensive projects has made government spending less focused on the people’s 
welfare, as also argued by Wong (2000), Tsui and Wang (2004) and Shen et al., (2006). In 
addition, economic growth has raised inequality significantly since the economic reforms. 
Social public spending has constituted less than 10 per cent of GDP over the last three 
decades. Hence, there is an urgent task for the Chinese government to improve the 
structure of public spending, especially at the provincial level, to promote economic 
development towards economic efficiency and equality.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
168 
 
China’s inadequate social welfare protection and the increasingly high cost of private 
expenditure on health and education have caused a lower level of private consumption in 
China. During the past thirty years of economic reforms, the ratio of private consumption 
to GDP dropped from 50 per cent to 37 per cent, and the saving rate increased from 11 per 
cent to 25 per cent (Baldacci et al., 2010). This low private consumption and high saving 
rate are the key elements in China’s economic development. Moreover, the huge income 
gaps between urban-rural, coastal and inland areas also play an important role on China’s 
domestic consumption. Xue and Xu (2012) found that China’s public spending has a 
positive relationship with urban households’ consumption, but a negative relationship 
with the rural households’ consumption. Hence, they suggest that government spending 
should focus on rural areas in order to promote domestic demand and to reduce the 
income disparity between rural and urban areas.  
 
In recent years, the Chinese government has placed an increasing emphasis on stemming 
the growth in inequality. National strategies such as the ‘western development plan’, 
‘providing a social safety net’ and ‘building a harmonious society’ have aimed to reduce 
the income disparity between urban and rural areas and the east and western regions52 
(Zhu and Wan, 2012). However, these reforms and strategies of public spending have not 
improved the income distribution in China. A large proportion of public spending went on 
public infrastructure programmes and public administration, which inevitably caused a 
relatively low proportion of public spending on essential social sectors, such as the social 
security system, health, education and other basic public goods and services. Moreover, 
social welfare, in terms of pensions, education, health and unemployment subsidies, is 
more advanced in the urban areas and wealthier provinces. Therefore, further public 
spending reforms should focus on social spending, as current public spending has failed 
to promote a balanced regional development.  
 
China’s income inequality creates the problem of insufficient consumption. Although its 
overall household saving rate is rather high, most of the saving is carried out by the rich. 
Poor households have the incentives to consume, but face liquidity constraints. Therefore, 
China’s public spending needs to pay more attention on the rising inequality during the 
economic transition which can help China to move from an export and investment-driven 
                                                 
52
 These strategies are designed to reduce income disparities by agriculture support policies, social welfare 
transfers, local minimum wage increases, targeted tax reductions and poverty alleviation plans.  
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economy to a domestic consumption-driven economy (Li, 2013). With exports slowing 
and fixed investment at an outsized 50 per cent of GDP, China needs to focus on the 
quality and breadth of its growth, not just the overall magnitude. Importantly, this view 
was reinforced by the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Hu 
Jintao, who pursued a ‘harmonious society’ policy agenda that emphasized equitable 
growth. However, redistributive policies can only do so much in reducing inequality if 
there are still forces that exacerbate or create new sources of inequality. China’s income 
disparities reflect the long term consequences of past and current institutions and policies 
that have created inequality between urban and rural, coastal and inland regions. For 
example, China recently announced a new policy of accelerated urbanization to reduce 
urban/rural inequality. However, this new urbanization does not appear to address the 
factors that underlie urban-rural income disparities. It is possible that the new 
urbanization program will replace the urban-rural gap with an urban-urban gap (Sicular, 
2013). 
 
This study offers a unique understanding of public spending in Chinese economy by 
combining various perspectives. Firstly, it incorporates VECM and PVAR methods with 
national and provincial level data to overcome a shortage of data observation at the 
national level, and the underestimated general effects of public spending at the provincial 
level. Secondly, it combined Keynesian and neoclassical economic frameworks to 
overcome the gaps between demand side and supply side theories. Finally, by 
investigating both income inequality and economic growth, a fuller understanding of 
economic development during Chinese economic reforms is presented. Therefore, this 
dissertation makes significant original contributions to the existing Chinese empirical 
studies through providing a more detailed and reliable analysis of Chinese public 
spending. The results not only confirm the positive growth effect of public spending on 
the national level, but also indicate the limited role of social spending on both economic 
growth and income distribution at national and provincial level. At the same time, the 
economic growth has increased the level of inequality, and in tune, the higher level of 
inequality will restrict further economic growth. Therefore, this dissertation has provided 
importance and direction for the further reform on China’s public spending system in 
order to achieve the sustained economic development in the long run.  
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However, the research in this dissertation still has various shortcomings. Due to the lack 
of statistical resources, the calculation of the Gini coefficient has been unable to cover all 
31 provincial administrative regions. The short time period may also have reduced the 
degree of freedom in the econometric analysis. The newly-developed techniques such as 
panel units test and the PVAR model have made it possible to investigate the dynamic 
relationship between public spending, economic growth and inequality at the regional 
level, but the process requires some restricting assumptions such as cross-sectional 
independence across units in the panel (Song, 2011). In addition, this research has not 
taken the influence of illegal and invisible income into account, as well out-budget public 
spending. Both of these factors may have affected the calculation of Gini coefficient and 
total public spending.  
 
Moreover, the official Chinese data has suggested that the level of output growth may 
have been inflated partly because of political pressure. Although the China’s statistical 
bureau has made attempts to adjust the possibly inflated data reported from provincial 
sources to meet output growth targets, these adjustments might not have eliminated all 
upward biases. Conversely, income data may be biased downward because some 
townships and village enterprises may have underestimated their output and because 
output from the underground economy is missing from the official data. However, these 
biases in opposite directions cancel each other out to some extent (Chow and Li 2002). 
Furthermore, the main limitation in the econometric analysis is data availability. China’s 
official data on the structure of public spending changed in 2006, which makes for 
incoherence in comparing the different types of public spending. The final limitation is 
the use of the chosen econometric method, as these are various constraints in using the 
PVAR model provided by Love and Zicchino (2006), and the PVAR method itself is 
subject to debate amongst econometrists. All of these limitations need to be addressed in 
future research. 
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Appendix A: Categories of government expenditures 
Table A1: Categories of government expenditures in China 
Category 
(Translation from 
Chinese) 
Explanation 
Economic 
Construction 
This is the largest category according to the Chinese classification by 
categories. It includes all Capital Expenditure (Capital Construction, 
Innovation Funds and Science and Technology Promotion Funds) and 
from Current Expenditure: Economic Services (Geological Protecting, 
Agriculture, Operating Expenses of Industry, Commerce, and Transport, 
and Working Capital for State enterprises). Urban Maintenance and 
Construction Support for Developing Areas, and Policy Subsidies.  
Social, Cultural, 
and Educational 
Development 
These are Current Expenditure items such as Culture, Education, Science, 
Health, Social Relief, Social Security Subsidies, and Pension for Retired 
Employees, and Spending of Additional Education Fees.  
National Defence National Defence Spending 
Government 
Administration 
Government Administration, Police and Courts, Armed Police, Tax 
Administration, and Foreign Affairs.  
Others This Category includes External Assistance, Interest on National Debt 
and other items. 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004); OECD (2006)  
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Appendix B: Summary statistics at provincial data 
Figure B1: The trend of variables in national level analysis 
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Table B1: The tables of summary statistics at provincial level 
a). The standard deviation of provincial level data  
 GDP(pc) 
growth  
PS/GDP social 
spending/PS 
gini private 
investment 
/GDP  
SOE 
investment/GDP 
labour 
growth 
AnHui 0.035 0.042 0.057 0.035 0.188 0.029 0.012 
Beijing 0.041 0.028 0.043 0.020 0.067 0.097 0.073 
ChongQing 0.055 0.048 0.045 0.022 0.142 0.088 0.016 
FuJian 0.028 0.012 0.096 0.035 0.057 0.017 0.013 
Gansu 0.036 0.074 0.068 0.045 0.056 0.055 0.016 
GuangDong 0.026 0.009 0.044 0.036 0.025 0.047 0.026 
Guangxi 0.043 0.038 0.050 0.030 0.121 0.025 0.007 
Guizhou 0.063 0.071 0.048 0.062 0.082 0.054 0.010 
Hebei 0.026 0.023 0.053 0.038 0.127 0.048 0.021 
Heilongjiang 0.028 0.042 0.073 0.046 0.093 0.039 0.022 
HeNan 0.036 0.026 0.062 0.037 0.166 0.019 0.020 
HuBei 0.029 0.027 0.058 0.027 0.085 0.032 0.025 
JiangSu 0.028 0.022 0.036 0.037 0.106 0.056 0.026 
JiangXi 0.032 0.036 0.056 0.046 0.186 0.045 0.023 
LiaoNing 0.033 0.028 0.084 0.035 0.200 0.022 0.037 
NeiMengGu 0.058 0.029 0.079 0.037 0.155 0.055 0.019 
NingXia 0.045 0.063 0.053 0.032 0.159 0.062 0.024 
Qinghai 0.035 0.104 0.129 0.028 0.091 0.056 0.017 
ShaanXi 0.043 0.040 0.054 0.037 0.093 0.058 0.017 
Shanghai 0.044 0.030 0.038 0.032 0.036 0.117 0.045 
ShanXi 0.049 0.039 0.061 0.031 0.101 0.044 0.019 
Sichuan 0.032 0.056 0.048 0.014 0.099 0.038 0.069 
Xinjiang 0.044 0.063 0.050 0.015 0.080 0.067 0.015 
ZheJiang 
 
0.036 0.022 0.028 0.020 0.054 0.065 0.024 
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b). The minimum value of provincial level data  
 real 
GDPpc 
growth 
PS/GDP social 
spending 
/PS 
gini private 
investment 
/GDP 
SOEs’ 
investment 
/GDP 
labour 
growth 
AnHui 0.042 0.075 0.228 0.320 0.108 0.154 -0.003 
Beijing 0.028 0.102 0.206 0.231 0.109 0.096 -0.055 
ChongQing 0.051 0.065 0.224 0.380 0.139 0.000 -0.027 
FuJian 0.041 0.078 0.218 0.315 0.167 0.130 0.005 
Gansu 0.041 0.126 0.208 0.370 0.059 0.213 -0.009 
GuangDong 0.054 0.088 0.184 0.342 0.157 0.078 -0.012 
Guangxi 0.026 0.092 0.217 0.365 0.111 0.147 0.004 
Guizhou 0.054 0.134 0.214 0.329 0.078 0.185 -0.009 
Hebei 0.064 0.067 0.240 0.259 0.169 0.143 -0.483 
Heilongjiang 0.039 0.088 0.180 0.262 0.048 0.145 -0.027 
HeNan 0.054 0.069 0.229 0.314 0.103 0.137 -0.010 
HuBei 0.045 0.077 0.217 0.318 0.115 0.179 -0.034 
JiangSu 0.073 0.049 0.268 0.288 0.160 0.091 -0.030 
JiangXi 0.055 0.094 0.218 0.268 0.066 0.133 -0.051 
LiaoNing 0.038 0.095 0.170 0.277 0.093 0.151 -0.119 
NeiMengGu 0.087 0.119 0.009 0.317 0.054 0.174 -0.041 
NingXia 0.070 0.131 0.188 0.356 0.065 0.211 -0.018 
Qinghai 0.016 0.172 0.190 0.402 0.032 0.261 -0.021 
ShaanXi 0.071 0.099 0.233 0.385 0.083 0.194 -0.016 
Shanghai -0.064 0.107 0.166 0.228 0.172 0.112 -0.130 
ShanXi 0.007 0.097 0.244 0.336 0.055 0.189 -0.037 
Sichuan 0.063 0.085 0.205 0.350 0.120 0.177 -0.266 
Xinjiang 0.009 0.118 0.224 0.410 0.041 0.197 -0.018 
ZheJiang 0.027 0.051 0.242 0.323 0.211 0.103 -0.018 
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c). The maximum value of provincial level data  
 
 real 
GDPpc 
growth 
PS/GDP social 
spending/PS 
gini private 
investment 
/GDP 
SOEs’ 
investment 
/GDP 
labour 
growth 
AnHui 0.194 0.213 0.425 0.417 0.649 0.257 0.043 
Beijing 0.161 0.193 0.342 0.296 0.301 0.390 0.269 
ChongQing 0.297 0.216 0.401 0.447 0.498 0.313 0.027 
FuJian 0.131 0.115 0.660 0.412 0.343 0.189 0.043 
Gansu 0.195 0.368 0.437 0.490 0.223 0.423 0.057 
GuangDong 0.129 0.118 0.336 0.431 0.236 0.250 0.089 
Guangxi 0.182 0.210 0.380 0.456 0.477 0.241 0.029 
Guizhou 0.323 0.355 0.383 0.491 0.318 0.350 0.035 
Hebei 0.139 0.138 0.435 0.380 0.549 0.295 0.992 
Heilongjiang 0.131 0.219 0.405 0.395 0.356 0.268 0.058 
HeNan 0.187 0.149 0.438 0.414 0.586 0.211 0.070 
HuBei 0.154 0.161 0.416 0.392 0.393 0.273 0.052 
JiangSu 0.169 0.119 0.385 0.383 0.455 0.261 0.046 
JiangXi 0.168 0.204 0.413 0.403 0.656 0.261 0.046 
LiaoNing 0.154 0.176 0.427 0.383 0.649 0.238 0.049 
NeiMengGu 0.274 0.213 0.333 0.437 0.446 0.335 0.037 
NingXia 0.242 0.330 0.389 0.453 0.527 0.413 0.081 
Qinghai 0.162 0.550 0.796 0.486 0.303 0.427 0.047 
ShaanXi 0.252 0.225 0.412 0.479 0.346 0.399 0.050 
Shanghai 0.130 0.199 0.299 0.318 0.315 0.471 0.073 
ShanXi 0.189 0.212 0.450 0.425 0.315 0.341 0.041 
Sichuan 0.181 0.254 0.408 0.393 0.425 0.314 0.022 
Xinjiang 0.177 0.315 0.400 0.459 0.265 0.412 0.032 
ZheJiang 0.174 0.116 0.338 0.376 0.359 0.287 0.064 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
